Narrative:

Approaching and aligned with the self parking system at my assigned gate I observed three items of ground equipment within the clearance lines (electric power cart entirely within; tow bar mostly within the clearance lines; and the fuel service cart half outside its 'box'). As I decelerated; a ground vehicle (baggage tug) entered the clearance area in front of the left wing and traveled under the left wing tip area and disappeared necessitating an immediate stop. No other ground personnel were in the gate area so operations was advised of the equipment problem. To mitigate further risk to my passengers; crew; and aircraft I elected to shut down the engines. After about 17 minutes a ramp manager appeared and moved the tow bar outside of the clearance lines. He moved the electric cart toward the terminal and into the red fire lane but it remained entirely within the clearance lines as these two areas overlap. The fuel cart was not moved at this time.operations was again notified of the need for a tow crew and we were notified they were on lunch break even though there were two ground men now in the gate area looking at the aircraft but doing nothing in spite of my flashing the nose gear light and the fact the engines were not running. About this time a manager finally connected a headset. I informed him to the specific equipment movement requirements and told him I was willing to restart the engines if ground men could be positioned to keep vehicles from entering the clearance area during taxi. He then told me the ground crew would be arriving in a few minutes and they would tow me to the gate.the ground crew arrived; hooked up the tractor; and gave the visual signal to release brakes. I did not as ground equipment was still positioned incorrectly as previously outlined. Eventually the crew chief connected his headset and ordered me to release the brakes. I informed him of the equipment positioning problem and asked him to position wing walkers as may be required. He then told me 'I am in command of this aircraft!' (I believe those words were very close to exactly what he said. Unbelievable!) [he] ordered me to release the brakes again. I did not release the brakes and informed him that I; not he; was the captain in command of the aircraft and would not release the brakes until the equipment was moved. When he claimed he was entirely responsible [for] the aircraft during towing I informed him that it was a joint responsibility between the captain and tow crew. When told to park the brake at the gate position I complied and asked him for his name the same time as my acknowledgment. He simply ignored the request and disconnected the headset.do not ignore this report and only add it to the trend information. That crew chief should not be allowed near an airplane. Total delay to park was around 36 minutes; not counting time holding off the ramp. If there is a larger area where the fueling cart may be safely parked then make the painted box larger!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain refused to taxi into his assigned gate because ground equipment was within the safety zone. The Lead Ramp Agent commanded the Captain to release the brakes for tow but the Captain refused until ground equipment was safely positioned.

Narrative: Approaching and aligned with the self parking system at my assigned gate I observed three items of ground equipment within the clearance lines (electric power cart entirely within; tow bar mostly within the clearance lines; and the fuel service cart half outside its 'box'). As I decelerated; a ground vehicle (baggage tug) entered the clearance area in front of the left wing and traveled under the left wing tip area and disappeared necessitating an immediate stop. No other ground personnel were in the gate area so Operations was advised of the equipment problem. To mitigate further risk to my passengers; crew; and aircraft I elected to shut down the engines. After about 17 minutes a Ramp Manager appeared and moved the tow bar outside of the clearance lines. He moved the electric cart toward the terminal and into the red fire lane but it remained entirely within the clearance lines as these two areas overlap. The fuel cart was not moved at this time.Operations was again notified of the need for a tow crew and we were notified they were on lunch break even though there were two ground men now in the gate area looking at the aircraft but doing nothing in spite of my flashing the nose gear light and the fact the engines were not running. About this time a manager finally connected a headset. I informed him to the specific equipment movement requirements and told him I was willing to restart the engines if ground men could be positioned to keep vehicles from entering the clearance area during taxi. He then told me the ground crew would be arriving in a few minutes and they would tow me to the gate.The ground crew arrived; hooked up the tractor; and gave the visual signal to release brakes. I did not as ground equipment was still positioned incorrectly as previously outlined. Eventually the Crew Chief connected his headset and ordered me to release the brakes. I informed him of the equipment positioning problem and asked him to position wing walkers as may be required. He then told me 'I am in command of this aircraft!' (I believe those words were very close to exactly what he said. Unbelievable!) [He] ordered me to release the brakes again. I did not release the brakes and informed him that I; not he; was the Captain in command of the aircraft and would not release the brakes until the equipment was moved. When he claimed he was entirely responsible [for] the aircraft during towing I informed him that it was a joint responsibility between the Captain and tow crew. When told to park the brake at the gate position I complied and asked him for his name the same time as my acknowledgment. He simply ignored the request and disconnected the headset.Do not ignore this report and only add it to the trend information. That Crew Chief should not be allowed near an airplane. Total delay to park was around 36 minutes; not counting time holding off the ramp. If there is a larger area where the fueling cart may be safely parked then make the painted box larger!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.