Narrative:

Two en route aircraft both assigned 8000' flying through the mci approach control area. One aircraft, small aircraft X, was nwbnd and the other small transport Y was swbnd on crossing courses. The merging traffic was originally noted by controller when 40 mi apart. Got involved with other traffic that was not of routine nature. Controller again noticed the aircraft when they were approximately 5 mi apart. The controller watching a trnee immediately advised the trnee to turn X left to a heading of 180 degrees which was acknowledged. Then, the trnee advised Y to turn right to a heading of 270 degrees which was acknowledged. Neither aircraft seemed to be turning, so the trnee and controller both keyed their mics and advised X to turn left immediately to a heading of 180 degrees, which was acknowledged. Y was advised to turn heading 360 degrees which he acknowledged. The pilots seemed very slow and lax in taking the heading. The override jack appeared to not be working and the controller and trnee were cutting each other out when both keyed in. The pilots took no evasive actions on their own. Lack of awareness on the controller's part. Working with trnee controller who he was unfamiliar with. Pilot's lack of cooperation when given turns as if they had all kinds of time. Assigning a trnee to a controller that had to recertify after many yrs in staff duty when his job was abolished and he was reassigned to controller duty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN 2 GA ACFT. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: TWO ENRTE ACFT BOTH ASSIGNED 8000' FLYING THROUGH THE MCI APCH CTL AREA. ONE ACFT, SMA X, WAS NWBND AND THE OTHER SMT Y WAS SWBND ON XING COURSES. THE MERGING TFC WAS ORIGINALLY NOTED BY CTLR WHEN 40 MI APART. GOT INVOLVED WITH OTHER TFC THAT WAS NOT OF ROUTINE NATURE. CTLR AGAIN NOTICED THE ACFT WHEN THEY WERE APPROX 5 MI APART. THE CTLR WATCHING A TRNEE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THE TRNEE TO TURN X LEFT TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. THEN, THE TRNEE ADVISED Y TO TURN RIGHT TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. NEITHER ACFT SEEMED TO BE TURNING, SO THE TRNEE AND CTLR BOTH KEYED THEIR MICS AND ADVISED X TO TURN LEFT IMMEDIATELY TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS, WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. Y WAS ADVISED TO TURN HDG 360 DEGS WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED. THE PLTS SEEMED VERY SLOW AND LAX IN TAKING THE HDG. THE OVERRIDE JACK APPEARED TO NOT BE WORKING AND THE CTLR AND TRNEE WERE CUTTING EACH OTHER OUT WHEN BOTH KEYED IN. THE PLTS TOOK NO EVASIVE ACTIONS ON THEIR OWN. LACK OF AWARENESS ON THE CTLR'S PART. WORKING WITH TRNEE CTLR WHO HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH. PLT'S LACK OF COOPERATION WHEN GIVEN TURNS AS IF THEY HAD ALL KINDS OF TIME. ASSIGNING A TRNEE TO A CTLR THAT HAD TO RECERTIFY AFTER MANY YRS IN STAFF DUTY WHEN HIS JOB WAS ABOLISHED AND HE WAS REASSIGNED TO CTLR DUTY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.