Narrative:

A security area went active. The area is an altitude airspace reservation above a local VOR that is used post 9/11. It was shift change and I had just arrived to work. I was instructed by the supervisor to relieve the controller from the affected area because he had not been briefed on the security area activity and it was to go active soon. I had received a prior written briefing and a subsequent quick update. The radar scope had been labeled with the block location being drawn with the altitudes. When I asked the supervisor about the area he said the one I was briefed on. When I called the approach controller they said it was expanded; different then what I was briefed on. There was little to no coordination of the altitudes of the active airspace or the functioning of it. The supervisor advised me that it is the same way that 'we' worked it for 8 years; meaning immediately following the sept. 11 attack. I then informed the supervisor that I was not a controller during that time; and had only worked the active airspace once or twice. The supervisor continued to watch the sector and ask questions; which weren't as important in the priority of duties as making hand offs and coordinating. I had to do multiple coordination calls in a very timely manner. As I was sitting down; the first tanker had begun to be handed off to me and I had to do a manual hand off to the approach control. The tanker received the incorrect frequency for the security area and returned for the correct one. Additionally; I was fielding calls via landlines on the status of the security area since the airspace had gone active and surrounding facilities had not been notified of the activity. I had arrivals and overflights that needed to descend to another altitude for the transition to local airports. The 'going active' of the restricted airspace was totally unsafe; and poorly planned. First of all; all controllers in the area should have been briefed so that they wouldn't have to have a last minute briefing as it is going hot. This is poor management of the area. The supervisors should have had everyone on the shift briefed. Additionally; the surrounding facilities should have been briefed on the activity and when it was going hot prior to me sitting down and having it go active. I should have been provided with an assistant to field some of the phone calls and help with the coordination. The supervisor knew the situation; and did nothing to mitigate it. This was a serious safety issue. Recommendation; management needs to make sure that coordination is made prior to any area activation. It went active at shift change; which is poor planning. Although it is out of the control of the supervisors when the security area goes active; it is their control and job to assign the position to someone who has been briefed prior to the airspace going active. A controller should have never been assigned that position without the briefing when the possibility of activity was imminent. It was poor decision making on the flm to assign a new controller to the position without a hand off controller at the exact time the security area was going active. Additionally; the surrounding sectors should have been notified of the activity before it went active.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller voiced concern regarding the lack of coordination; preparation and briefing related to the activation of a Security Area that restricted traffic and increased workload and operational complexities.

Narrative: A Security Area went active. The area is an altitude airspace reservation above a local VOR that is used post 9/11. It was shift change and I had just arrived to work. I was instructed by the Supervisor to relieve the Controller from the affected area because he had not been briefed on the security area activity and it was to go active soon. I had received a prior written briefing and a subsequent quick update. The RADAR scope had been labeled with the block location being drawn with the altitudes. When I asked the Supervisor about the area he said the one I was briefed on. When I called the Approach Controller they said it was expanded; different then what I was briefed on. There was little to no coordination of the altitudes of the active airspace or the functioning of it. The Supervisor advised me that it is the same way that 'we' worked it for 8 years; meaning immediately following the Sept. 11 attack. I then informed the Supervisor that I was NOT a Controller during that time; and had only worked the active airspace once or twice. The Supervisor continued to watch the sector and ask questions; which weren't as important in the priority of duties as making hand offs and coordinating. I had to do multiple coordination calls in a very timely manner. As I was sitting down; the first tanker had begun to be handed off to me and I had to do a manual hand off to the Approach Control. The tanker received the incorrect frequency for the Security Area and returned for the correct one. Additionally; I was fielding calls via landlines on the status of the Security Area since the airspace had gone active and surrounding facilities had not been notified of the activity. I had arrivals and overflights that needed to descend to another altitude for the transition to local airports. The 'GOING ACTIVE' of the restricted airspace was totally unsafe; and poorly planned. First of all; all controllers in the area should have been briefed so that they wouldn't have to have a last minute briefing as it is going hot. This is poor management of the area. The supervisors should have had everyone on the shift briefed. Additionally; the surrounding facilities should have been briefed on the activity and when it was going hot prior to me sitting down and having it go active. I should have been provided with an assistant to field some of the phone calls and help with the coordination. The Supervisor knew the situation; and did nothing to mitigate it. This was a serious safety issue. Recommendation; management needs to make sure that coordination is made prior to any area activation. It went active at shift change; which is poor planning. Although it is out of the control of the Supervisors when the Security Area goes active; it is their control and job to assign the position to someone who has been briefed prior to the airspace going active. A controller should have never been assigned that position without the briefing when the possibility of activity was imminent. It was poor decision making on the FLM to assign a new controller to the position without a hand off controller at the exact time the Security Area was going active. Additionally; the surrounding sectors should have been notified of the activity before it went active.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.