Narrative:

Upon takeoff on runway 13 in lga the aircraft reported an EFIS comp which we checked with both primary displays and the magnetic compass and they showed correct runway heading. Upon take off the captain; whom was pilot flying; began a right turn at 400 feet to 180. At 2.5 DME from lga VOR we began a left turn back to 040 when ATC queried our procedure and heading. I noticed before ATC questioned that we were south of the citi field which seemed off to me. The aircraft had flown right of course and ATC issued a right turn to 270. The captain had turned on the autopilot and began a right turn to 270. I noticed now that we had a heading disagreement. Since the captain's side had failed I noticed a large difference in our headings and later a red mag on his heading indicator. As I proceeded to talk with ATC and work with them I became distracted by the captain repeatedly turning on the autopilot and having it kick off hard due to the ahrs failure on his side. I also noticed after it occurred he had over sped the aircraft to 300 kts. Continuously talking with ATC; I made the mistake of not working with the pilot flying to fly the aircraft first and admit that error. After both and captain and I came to the conclusion that my side matched the magnetic compass I took over as pilot flying but had ATC give us start stop turns to be on the safe side for traffic avoidance. As I flew the plane the captain began trying to contact operations and maintenance to resolve the problem and consulted the flight manual. At this point I knew not to distract him from resolving the issue but I queried him to let the passengers know what is going on but also that it was more pertinent to solve the problem first. After 20 minutes of being unable to resolve the issue in the air; I suggested it would be unwise to continue and that fuel alone is now a major factor for continuing. The captain; after several attempts to suggest we go back; agreed and took back the controls for a visual 22 circle to land 13 back into lga. Once on the ground we taxied into the gate and worked with maintenance to understand the issue and where to go from there with the flight and passengers. We ended up changing aircraft. I believe the event and errors occurred for a couple of reasons. The captain was very senior with the company and on tdy from another base. His unfamiliarity with the airport's departure procedure was one reason that led to the navigational error as well as his need to use the autopilot instead of hand flying the aircraft. I had prior 121 experience and had flown the procedure quite a few times however I had little experience in the aircraft and still getting use to how it performed and therefore was tactically still learning my situational awareness in the aircraft. Once the initial event occurred the pilot flying I believe became panicked due to his unfamiliarity and lack of situational awareness which led to more heading and airspeed deviations. I also became under a high workload and did not react correctly fast enough or in the correct order which led to bad CRM and management of the aircraft. I believe after having experienced the situation; my course of action should have been more aggressive and with more intelligent intentions and hierarchy to prioritizing what would needed to be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ700 flight crew experienced a number 1 AHRS failure during departure from LGA with the Captain flying. Both pilots were slow to recognize the failure and track and speed deviations occur before the first Officer assumed the flying duties.

Narrative: Upon takeoff on Runway 13 in LGA the aircraft reported an EFIS comp which we checked with both primary displays and the magnetic compass and they showed correct runway heading. Upon take off the Captain; whom was pilot flying; began a right turn at 400 feet to 180. At 2.5 DME from LGA VOR we began a left turn back to 040 when ATC queried our procedure and heading. I noticed before ATC questioned that we were South of the Citi field which seemed off to me. The aircraft had flown right of course and ATC issued a right turn to 270. The Captain had turned on the autopilot and began a right turn to 270. I noticed now that we had a heading disagreement. Since the Captain's side had failed I noticed a large difference in our headings and later a red mag on his heading indicator. As I proceeded to talk with ATC and work with them I became distracted by the Captain repeatedly turning on the autopilot and having it kick off hard due to the AHRS failure on his side. I also noticed after it occurred he had over sped the aircraft to 300 kts. Continuously talking with ATC; I made the mistake of not working with the pilot flying to fly the aircraft first and admit that error. After both and Captain and I came to the conclusion that my side matched the magnetic compass I took over as pilot flying but had ATC give us start stop turns to be on the safe side for traffic avoidance. As I flew the plane the Captain began trying to contact Operations and Maintenance to resolve the problem and consulted the flight manual. At this point I knew not to distract him from resolving the issue but I queried him to let the passengers know what is going on but also that it was more pertinent to solve the problem first. After 20 minutes of being unable to resolve the issue in the air; I suggested it would be unwise to continue and that fuel alone is now a major factor for continuing. The Captain; after several attempts to suggest we go back; agreed and took back the controls for a visual 22 circle to land 13 back into LGA. Once on the ground we taxied into the gate and worked with maintenance to understand the issue and where to go from there with the flight and passengers. We ended up changing aircraft. I believe the event and errors occurred for a couple of reasons. The Captain was very senior with the company and on TDY from another base. His unfamiliarity with the airport's departure procedure was one reason that led to the navigational error as well as his need to use the autopilot instead of hand flying the aircraft. I had prior 121 experience and had flown the procedure quite a few times however I had little experience in the aircraft and still getting use to how it performed and therefore was tactically still learning my situational awareness in the aircraft. Once the initial event occurred the pilot flying I believe became panicked due to his unfamiliarity and lack of situational awareness which led to more heading and airspeed deviations. I also became under a high workload and did not react correctly fast enough or in the correct order which led to bad CRM and management of the aircraft. I believe after having experienced the situation; my course of action should have been more aggressive and with more intelligent intentions and hierarchy to prioritizing what would needed to be done.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.