Narrative:

We were cleared into position and hold runway 34L, #2 for takeoff behind medium large transport Y on runway 34R. The tower controller said, 'large transport X, cleared for takeoff, maintain visual sep from medium large transport Y off the right.' we started the takeoff roll. I was flying. About 100 KTS I noticed medium large transport Y sliding over toward the centerline of runway 34L, my runway. (The sea 1 SID has traffic off either runway 34L or 34R flying out the sea VOR 338 degree right. That radial is essentially the extension of runway 34L centerline.) at lift off, medium large transport Y was straight ahead about 1 mi, maybe 1 1/2 mi. At about 200' AGL I made a gentle turn to the left to about a 320 degree heading to avoid a midair collision and/or wake turbulence and jet blast. The controller said. 'Large transport X explain your turn.' we said, 'we're maintaining visual sep from the aircraft ahead.' the controller said, 'large transport X return to the 338 degree right for noise abatement.' (for noise abatement!? I am maneuvering 200' off the ground to avoid a midair collision and wake turbulence and the controller is concerned about noise abatement!) I maintained the 320 degree heading. We asked, 'who is providing sep?' no response. (Perhaps we were covered.) we repeated, 'who is providing sep?' the controller said, 'large transport X, contact departure.' at this time I made a gentle turn to about 345 degree heading, aiming right at medium large transport Y. I am also executing an unusual maneuver to effect sep, that is, 15 degree flaps, 160 KTS, climb EPR. (Normally we would be cleaning up, accelerating to 220 KTS and reducing to quiet EPR.) we switched to departure and signed on. We then asked, 'who is providing sep, you or us?' (medium large transport Y was about 2 mi ahead about the same altitude and path). The controller said, 'I'll provide sep.' we asked, 'what is our spacing?' the controller said, '3 mi.' I would have estimated 2 mi, my engineer who flies with the air force reserve said, 'he's lying.' a collision hazard existed in this incident. The immediate problem is the unestablished, hazardous visual departure procedure which sea is using. The controllers think they are using visual sep. However, the phraseology used in this procedure does not conform to visual sep phraseology. Additionally, as this incident points out, the controllers are expecting the pilots to not maneuver their aircraft to effect sep as visual sep prescribes--but instead what they really want and expect is for the pilot to fly the SID as published and accept hazardous, substandard sep and hope no midair collision occurs or they are not upset by wake turbulence. While the odds are good that all will work out, this is west/O question, a very bad gamble because the stakes are so high, that is, human lives. (It is interesting to note, in such cases, responsibility of a midair collision or a crash resulting from an upset rests fully with the pilot, and none with the controller because the pilot has accepted visual sep.) there are a lot of unanswered questions and a great deal of confusion regarding this unestablished procedure on the parts of both the pilots and the controllers. For example: if the pilot loses visual contact before V1, does he abort? In this critical phase of flight, which pilot should concentrate on keeping track of the traffic? PF? PNF? The engineer? When does the sep responsibility shift from the pilot to the controller? Altitude? Time? Distance? Fix? Is the departure controller expecting to be handed an aircraft with substandard sep? Is the departure controller expecting the pilot to provide sep? For how long? Does the 'maintain visual sep' clearance cancel all or part of any SID? If the pilot departs from the SID to effect sep, is it a far violation? Another important aspect of this unestablished procedure is the imposition of an additional and unnecessary task requiring considerable concentration at a most critical phase of flight. In my judgement, the flight crew should be concentrating on the takeoff, not concentrating on maintaining visual sep. The root problem is FAA ATC facility mgrs who, in their zeal to improve airport acceptance rate, have lost sight of the importance of safety. This same unestablished hazardous, stop gap procedure is being used, or misused I should say, at dfw, phx, lax, las, sea and probably many other airports by now. It is true the procedure improves the departure rate. But,in doing so, the procedure degrades air safety and endangers human lives. Not a good trade, I would say. The solution to the problem is to improve the capacity of the nation's air traffic system by building more airports and more runways, and installing improved approach and ATC facs. In the mean time, we need to respect the safe limits of the existing system by using safe, established procedures along with positive control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CAPT COMPLAINT ABOUT CTLR'S USE OF VISUAL SEPARATION FOR 2 DEPS FROM PARALLEL RWYS ON SAME SID.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 34L, #2 FOR TKOF BEHIND MLG Y ON RWY 34R. THE TWR CTLR SAID, 'LGT X, CLRED FOR TKOF, MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM MLG Y OFF THE RIGHT.' WE STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. I WAS FLYING. ABOUT 100 KTS I NOTICED MLG Y SLIDING OVER TOWARD THE CENTERLINE OF RWY 34L, MY RWY. (THE SEA 1 SID HAS TFC OFF EITHER RWY 34L OR 34R FLYING OUT THE SEA VOR 338 DEG R. THAT RADIAL IS ESSENTIALLY THE EXTENSION OF RWY 34L CENTERLINE.) AT LIFT OFF, MLG Y WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD ABOUT 1 MI, MAYBE 1 1/2 MI. AT ABOUT 200' AGL I MADE A GENTLE TURN TO THE LEFT TO ABOUT A 320 DEG HDG TO AVOID A MIDAIR COLLISION AND/OR WAKE TURB AND JET BLAST. THE CTLR SAID. 'LGT X EXPLAIN YOUR TURN.' WE SAID, 'WE'RE MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP FROM THE ACFT AHEAD.' THE CTLR SAID, 'LGT X RETURN TO THE 338 DEG R FOR NOISE ABATEMENT.' (FOR NOISE ABATEMENT!? I AM MANEUVERING 200' OFF THE GND TO AVOID A MIDAIR COLLISION AND WAKE TURB AND THE CTLR IS CONCERNED ABOUT NOISE ABATEMENT!) I MAINTAINED THE 320 DEG HDG. WE ASKED, 'WHO IS PROVIDING SEP?' NO RESPONSE. (PERHAPS WE WERE COVERED.) WE REPEATED, 'WHO IS PROVIDING SEP?' THE CTLR SAID, 'LGT X, CONTACT DEP.' AT THIS TIME I MADE A GENTLE TURN TO ABOUT 345 DEG HDG, AIMING RIGHT AT MLG Y. I AM ALSO EXECUTING AN UNUSUAL MANEUVER TO EFFECT SEP, THAT IS, 15 DEG FLAPS, 160 KTS, CLB EPR. (NORMALLY WE WOULD BE CLEANING UP, ACCELERATING TO 220 KTS AND REDUCING TO QUIET EPR.) WE SWITCHED TO DEP AND SIGNED ON. WE THEN ASKED, 'WHO IS PROVIDING SEP, YOU OR US?' (MLG Y WAS ABOUT 2 MI AHEAD ABOUT THE SAME ALT AND PATH). THE CTLR SAID, 'I'LL PROVIDE SEP.' WE ASKED, 'WHAT IS OUR SPACING?' THE CTLR SAID, '3 MI.' I WOULD HAVE ESTIMATED 2 MI, MY ENGINEER WHO FLIES WITH THE AIR FORCE RESERVE SAID, 'HE'S LYING.' A COLLISION HAZARD EXISTED IN THIS INCIDENT. THE IMMEDIATE PROB IS THE UNESTABLISHED, HAZARDOUS VISUAL DEP PROC WHICH SEA IS USING. THE CTLRS THINK THEY ARE USING VISUAL SEP. HOWEVER, THE PHRASEOLOGY USED IN THIS PROC DOES NOT CONFORM TO VISUAL SEP PHRASEOLOGY. ADDITIONALLY, AS THIS INCIDENT POINTS OUT, THE CTLRS ARE EXPECTING THE PLTS TO NOT MANEUVER THEIR ACFT TO EFFECT SEP AS VISUAL SEP PRESCRIBES--BUT INSTEAD WHAT THEY REALLY WANT AND EXPECT IS FOR THE PLT TO FLY THE SID AS PUBLISHED AND ACCEPT HAZARDOUS, SUBSTANDARD SEP AND HOPE NO MIDAIR COLLISION OCCURS OR THEY ARE NOT UPSET BY WAKE TURB. WHILE THE ODDS ARE GOOD THAT ALL WILL WORK OUT, THIS IS W/O QUESTION, A VERY BAD GAMBLE BECAUSE THE STAKES ARE SO HIGH, THAT IS, HUMAN LIVES. (IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, IN SUCH CASES, RESPONSIBILITY OF A MIDAIR COLLISION OR A CRASH RESULTING FROM AN UPSET RESTS FULLY WITH THE PLT, AND NONE WITH THE CTLR BECAUSE THE PLT HAS ACCEPTED VISUAL SEP.) THERE ARE A LOT OF UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION REGARDING THIS UNESTABLISHED PROC ON THE PARTS OF BOTH THE PLTS AND THE CTLRS. FOR EXAMPLE: IF THE PLT LOSES VISUAL CONTACT BEFORE V1, DOES HE ABORT? IN THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, WHICH PLT SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON KEEPING TRACK OF THE TFC? PF? PNF? THE ENGINEER? WHEN DOES THE SEP RESPONSIBILITY SHIFT FROM THE PLT TO THE CTLR? ALT? TIME? DISTANCE? FIX? IS THE DEP CTLR EXPECTING TO BE HANDED AN ACFT WITH SUBSTANDARD SEP? IS THE DEP CTLR EXPECTING THE PLT TO PROVIDE SEP? FOR HOW LONG? DOES THE 'MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP' CLRNC CANCEL ALL OR PART OF ANY SID? IF THE PLT DEPARTS FROM THE SID TO EFFECT SEP, IS IT A FAR VIOLATION? ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS UNESTABLISHED PROC IS THE IMPOSITION OF AN ADDITIONAL AND UNNECESSARY TASK REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE CONCENTRATION AT A MOST CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE FLT CREW SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING ON THE TKOF, NOT CONCENTRATING ON MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP. THE ROOT PROB IS FAA ATC FAC MGRS WHO, IN THEIR ZEAL TO IMPROVE ARPT ACCEPTANCE RATE, HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY. THIS SAME UNESTABLISHED HAZARDOUS, STOP GAP PROC IS BEING USED, OR MISUSED I SHOULD SAY, AT DFW, PHX, LAX, LAS, SEA AND PROBABLY MANY OTHER ARPTS BY NOW. IT IS TRUE THE PROC IMPROVES THE DEP RATE. BUT,IN DOING SO, THE PROC DEGRADES AIR SAFETY AND ENDANGERS HUMAN LIVES. NOT A GOOD TRADE, I WOULD SAY. THE SOLUTION TO THE PROB IS TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY OF THE NATION'S AIR TFC SYS BY BUILDING MORE ARPTS AND MORE RWYS, AND INSTALLING IMPROVED APCH AND ATC FACS. IN THE MEAN TIME, WE NEED TO RESPECT THE SAFE LIMITS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM BY USING SAFE, ESTABLISHED PROCS ALONG WITH POSITIVE CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.