Narrative:

[We had an] incorrect deferral by maintenance. We arrived at the plane from the hotel for our first flight on the last day of a three day trip. The aircraft had three deferrals and one cdl. One of the deferrals was 36-21-06-05; bleed loops left. During the preflight planning and review of the deferrals I discovered a discrepancy between the wording of the original write-up in the logbook and the wording in the MEL book. The logbook and the MEL both said left engine bleed (left engine bleed) caution message. Both of those write-ups incorrectly referred to MEL #36-21-06-05. The release had the same MEL #36-21-06-05; and bleed loops left; with no mention of the MEL addressing the left engine bleed caution message. MEL #36-21-06-05 actually does go with the bleed loops left caution message in the MEL. By this time I was on the phone with maintenance control and our passengers were on board the plane. When the write-up occurred the crew actually got the left engine bleed caution message. However; maintenance control incorrectly deferred bleed loops left under MEL #36-21-06-05 and did not address the left engine bleed caution message. The airplane flew for five days without anyone addressing the actual write-up concerning the left engine prsov (pressure regulation shutoff valve) and hpv (high pressure valve) until the time that I got on the plane. A local mechanic came to the plane and found the left prsov had failed in the closed position. He found that no configuration of the bleeds or the bleed source would force that valve to open. Correcting this problem delayed our flight for two and one half hours and ultimately; made our next flight over four hours late. Due to zero staffing of any other crew as well as no spare aircraft to fly had there been a crew; our customers were shuffled for over four hours from gate to gate (a total of five gates in all) on three different concourses. Since the correct deferral of the prsov prohibits flight into icing conditions; which existed in the area and we actually experienced during our flight there; we were swapped to another plane. During arrival on the next leg approach control told us that the cell that was nine miles west; moving due east; and was now producing wind shear alerts of 35 KTS; 45 KTS; and 55 KTS. The ride was continuous moderate turbulence and occasionally somewhat worse. I asked for vectors back to a better ride while I coordinated with dispatch. Approach asked if we could hold for another hour and a half. We could not and after coordinating with dispatch; whom agreed we should; we diverted where; additionally; we had a bird strike at 1;000 ft during our visual approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ700 Captain reports an incorrect maintenance deferral for a L ENG BLEED caution message and chronicles the delays and a diversion that result.

Narrative: [We had an] incorrect deferral by Maintenance. We arrived at the plane from the hotel for our first flight on the last day of a three day trip. The aircraft had three deferrals and one CDL. One of the deferrals was 36-21-06-05; BLEED LOOPS LEFT. During the preflight planning and review of the deferrals I discovered a discrepancy between the wording of the original write-up in the logbook and the wording in the MEL book. The logbook and the MEL both said L ENG BLEED (Left Engine Bleed) caution message. Both of those write-ups incorrectly referred to MEL #36-21-06-05. The release had the same MEL #36-21-06-05; and BLEED LOOPS LEFT; with no mention of the MEL addressing the L ENG BLEED caution message. MEL #36-21-06-05 actually does go with the BLEED LOOPS LEFT caution message in the MEL. By this time I was on the phone with Maintenance Control and our passengers were on board the plane. When the write-up occurred the crew actually got the L ENG BLEED caution message. However; Maintenance Control incorrectly deferred BLEED LOOPS LEFT under MEL #36-21-06-05 and did not address the L ENG BLEED caution message. The airplane flew for five days without anyone addressing the actual write-up concerning the left engine PRSOV (Pressure Regulation Shutoff Valve) and HPV (High Pressure Valve) until the time that I got on the plane. A local mechanic came to the plane and found the left PRSOV had failed in the closed position. He found that no configuration of the bleeds or the bleed source would force that valve to open. Correcting this problem delayed our flight for two and one half hours and ultimately; made our next flight over four hours late. Due to zero staffing of any other crew as well as no spare aircraft to fly had there been a crew; our customers were shuffled for over four hours from gate to gate (A TOTAL OF FIVE GATES IN ALL) on three different concourses. Since the correct deferral of the PRSOV prohibits flight into icing conditions; which existed in the area and we actually experienced during our flight there; we were swapped to another plane. During arrival on the next leg Approach Control told us that the cell that was nine miles west; moving due east; and was now producing wind shear alerts of 35 KTS; 45 KTS; and 55 KTS. The ride was continuous moderate turbulence and occasionally somewhat worse. I asked for vectors back to a better ride while I coordinated with Dispatch. Approach asked if we could hold for another hour and a half. We could not and after coordinating with Dispatch; whom agreed we should; we diverted where; additionally; we had a bird strike at 1;000 FT during our visual approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.