Narrative:

I was monitoring the quake sector. The controller is newly rated as I understand either today or yesterday. The controller issued direct avenal VOR leaving 9;000. Outside air temperature was 31 celsius and aircraft were climbing out very slowly. This control instruction turned the aircraft into the boulder sector. Boulder goes up to 12;000 and quake owns 13;000 and above. I observed that the aircraft was not going to top the sector. I went over to the controller and told him that a point-out was required. He initiated an auto-point out to the boulder controller. Boulder did not respond. The quake controller allowed the aircraft to enter boulder's airspace while the point-out was still flashing. Boulder acknowledged the point-out as the aircraft was climbing through 12;500 well inside boulder airspace. What causes me concern about this seemingly innocuous incident is the conversation I had with the controller after he/she was relieved from the sector. I asked the controller if he/she knew where boulder's airspace was. The controller replied 'yes'. I asked why a point had not been initiated to boulder if he/she was aware of the airspace boundary. The response was 'I don't know.' I asked why he allowed the aircraft to enter boulder airspace without approval even after I asked him to get the required point-out. The response was 'I don't know.' I informed the controller that the actual 'flash' is not approval to enter. If the receiving controller has not responded; verbal coordination needs to be made. The controller did not know this. The controller didn't know that entering another controller's airspace without prior approval is a loss of separation and constitutes an operational deviation. How this individual was certified not understanding what a point-out is; I can't answer except to say the training program is failing. This individual is not the only newly rated controller having these problems. Street hires at this facility do not appreciate the seriousness of operational deviations and errors. Self identifying reporting programs exacerbates this because there are no consequences to their poor performance. Operational supervisors look the other way when performance issues arise; at least in my area. Fifty percent of them are so operationally incompetent; they don't even recognize the deviation or error is occurring. The union and peers come down all over individuals who raise the safety flag on controllers who consistently perform not just poorly; but dangerously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NCT Controller witnessed an unauthorized airspace entry event where the Controller in question had a poor understanding of point outs and airspace restrictions.

Narrative: I was monitoring the Quake Sector. The Controller is newly rated as I understand either today or yesterday. The Controller issued direct Avenal VOR leaving 9;000. Outside air temperature was 31 Celsius and aircraft were climbing out very slowly. This control instruction turned the aircraft into the Boulder Sector. Boulder goes up to 12;000 and Quake owns 13;000 and above. I observed that the aircraft was not going to top the sector. I went over to the Controller and told him that a point-out was required. He initiated an auto-point out to the Boulder Controller. Boulder did not respond. The Quake Controller allowed the aircraft to enter Boulder's airspace while the point-out was still flashing. Boulder acknowledged the point-out as the aircraft was climbing through 12;500 well inside Boulder airspace. What causes me concern about this seemingly innocuous incident is the conversation I had with the Controller after he/she was relieved from the sector. I asked the Controller if he/she knew where Boulder's airspace was. The Controller replied 'yes'. I asked why a point had not been initiated to Boulder if he/she was aware of the airspace boundary. The response was 'I don't know.' I asked why he allowed the aircraft to enter Boulder airspace without approval even after I asked him to get the required point-out. The response was 'I don't know.' I informed the Controller that the actual 'flash' is not approval to enter. If the Receiving Controller has not responded; verbal coordination needs to be made. The Controller did not know this. The Controller didn't know that entering another Controller's airspace without prior approval is a loss of separation and constitutes an operational deviation. How this individual was certified not understanding what a point-out is; I can't answer except to say the training program is failing. This individual is not the only newly rated controller having these problems. Street hires at this facility do not appreciate the seriousness of operational deviations and errors. Self identifying reporting programs exacerbates this because there are no consequences to their poor performance. Operational Supervisors look the other way when performance issues arise; at least in my area. Fifty percent of them are so operationally incompetent; they don't even recognize the deviation or error is occurring. The Union and peers come down all over individuals who raise the safety flag on controllers who consistently perform not just poorly; but dangerously.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.