Narrative:

Upon arriving at the aircraft 'first flight of day' checks were started and it was immediately reported engine 1 was below limits on engine oil. It was displayed at 16 qts; with limit minimum being 17 qts. Maintenance notified. On 'walk around' a puddle of fresh oil was observed under the number 1 engine and the bottom of engine appeared wet from the drain mast area all the way rearward. Maintenance notified of this further observation. A contract mechanic arrived and crew did an engine start with the cowl open for maintenance purposes. The engine oil quantity got as low as 7 qts on start and stabilized well below our minimum. The engine was shut-down because crew did not feel comfortable running it with the parameters so far outside our limits. Contact mechanic discussed with maintenance and he stated he could find 'no active leaks'. Maintenance told crew that they would fill the engine with oil and dispatch the aircraft as there were no leaks. Crew disagreed and mentioned the oil slick on the ramp and the wet engine. Maintenance said oil was probably old and asked if we were refusing. I said no; not until we reviewed the maintenance paperwork if he signed it off. He said maybe another run would help; we said no as it made us uncomfortable to run an engine out of parameters. Maintenance mentioned many times it would take a visit from our airline's mechanics to run it at high speed; inferring the location made this an unsuitable alternative. The crew once again said the engine leak needed to be addressed prior to flight. Maintenance then said there was a leak; but 'internal' and within limits. We disagreed since the previous facts still held. The aircraft was inspected by airline techs and an engine change ordered. To conclude; safety should not be geographical or financially driven. It certainly appears maintenance was more concerned about where the aircraft was than its actual condition. To totally discount the opinions of the experienced crew is a recipe for disaster; if you ask me. Maintenance was asked by the crew what the reason for the engine change was and the crew was told 'after several high speed run-ups an oil leak was found from the angled gear box flange where it joins the engine. For safety reasons; an engine change was ordered at an out station. This is troubling for a number of reasons; the largest being we went from maintenance saying engine oil refill was all that was required to return the aircraft to service to ordering an engine change. This refill flew in the face of the prima facie evidence of the fresh oil on the ramp as well as the engine. The local mechanic performed a leak check during a low power run but it is obvious by the results of the high-power runs that this was the required diagnostic action for our engine leak. Does this invalidate the low power run that crews can do (according to fom guidance) in future situations since it was obviously inadequate in this case?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain reported discovering low engine oil quantity and evidence of an oil leak during the initial preflight. Company maintenance attempted to have the crew fly the aircraft but the crew objected and upon further inspection the engine was changed.

Narrative: Upon arriving at the aircraft 'first flight of day' checks were started and it was immediately reported engine 1 was below limits on engine oil. It was displayed at 16 QTS; with limit minimum being 17 QTS. Maintenance notified. On 'walk around' a puddle of fresh oil was observed under the number 1 engine and the bottom of engine appeared wet from the drain mast area all the way rearward. Maintenance notified of this further observation. A contract mechanic arrived and crew did an engine start with the cowl open for maintenance purposes. The engine oil quantity got as low as 7 QTS on start and stabilized well below our minimum. The engine was shut-down because crew did not feel comfortable running it with the parameters so far outside our limits. Contact mechanic discussed with maintenance and he stated he could find 'no active leaks'. Maintenance told crew that they would fill the engine with oil and dispatch the aircraft as there were no leaks. Crew disagreed and mentioned the oil slick on the ramp and the wet engine. Maintenance said oil was probably old and asked if we were refusing. I said no; not until we reviewed the maintenance paperwork if he signed it off. He said maybe another run would help; we said no as it made us uncomfortable to run an engine out of parameters. Maintenance mentioned many times it would take a visit from our airline's mechanics to run it at high speed; inferring the location made this an unsuitable alternative. The crew once again said the engine leak needed to be addressed prior to flight. Maintenance then said there was a leak; but 'internal' and within limits. We disagreed since the previous facts still held. The aircraft was inspected by airline techs and an engine change ordered. To conclude; safety should not be geographical or financially driven. It certainly appears Maintenance was more concerned about where the aircraft was than its actual condition. To totally discount the opinions of the experienced crew is a recipe for disaster; if you ask me. Maintenance was asked by the crew what the reason for the engine change was and the crew was told 'after several high speed run-ups an oil leak was found from the angled gear box flange where it joins the engine. For safety reasons; an engine change was ordered at an out station. This is troubling for a number of reasons; the largest being we went from Maintenance saying engine oil refill was all that was required to return the aircraft to service to ordering an engine change. This refill flew in the face of the prima facie evidence of the fresh oil on the ramp as well as the engine. The local mechanic performed a leak check during a low power run but it is obvious by the results of the high-power runs that this was the required diagnostic action for our engine leak. Does this invalidate the low power run that crews can do (according to FOM guidance) in future situations since it was obviously inadequate in this case?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.