Narrative:

We experienced a loss of the green hydraulic system shortly after flap retraction. The reservoir 'low press' light illuminated followed by the green system 'main pump low press' and 'elec pump' associated with a 'hydraulic' on the map. At this point; I identified the problem and advised first officer this was not part of training and we will work together to resolve the problem. We referenced the 'loss of the green system' checklist in the hydraulic; landing gear section of the emb-120 QRH. In reference to the checklist; we turned the green system electric hydraulic pump to off. The checklist then referenced us to the 'gear extension by freefall' procedure. We performed the freefall and received a six green indication. After completing the freefall checklist; we returned to the 'loss of the green system' checklist. There is a caution note stating not to lower the landing gear handle with loss of the green hydraulic system. However; in accordance with the freefall checklist; it is required to lower the handle after the freefall is complete. This caution note should be clarified to state prior to the free fall checklist; do not place the landing gear lever down. The caution note should also be moved above the line where it refers to the freefall checklist; where it actually applies. We continued the 'loss of the green system' checklist and were reviewing the corrections to approach speeds. It states: 'for flaps 0-15 . . . Vref 45+35 and for flaps 15-44 . . . Vref 45+35'. This is in contradiction to the emb-120 fsm emergency procedures 'loss of the green system' which states 'for flaps 15-44 . . . Vref 45+10'. Adding 35 KTS to flap settings 15-44 has the potential of exceeding the vfe of the most extended flap pairs by as much as 15-20 KTS. Continuing with the checklist; the last few items include 'if a gear up landing is to be performed pull the taws (terrain awareness and warning system) circuit breaker'. Under this it states for aircraft serial numbers XXX and above; reset circuit breakers for the 'a' and 'B' landing indication system. Placing this below the 'gear up landing' caused some confusion on whether this applies to all aircraft serial numbers XXX and above or just the aircraft performing a gear up landing. The emb-120 fsm emergency procedures do not state anything regarding the taws or landing indication circuit breakers. We contacted the arff unit through CTAF and advised him of our situation. For precautionary reasons; we had fire/EMS services standing by. We landed without incident and stopped the aircraft after clearing the runway. We shut down the aircraft and placed the landing gear pins in. Maintenance personnel met the aircraft and repositioned it to the maintenance hangar. Upon postflight; we created discrepancies for a hydraulic leak under the nose gear along with several other writeups in connection with this emergency. Upon inspection by maintenance; they found a break in a hydraulic line going to the nose gear right hand door. Unfortunately breaks in hydraulic lines [are] inevitable; however we can change the procedures for dealing with it to be more understandable. I have spoken with [operations personnel] regarding the inconsistencies with the checklists and have spoken on how best to correct the errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-120 Captain giving a check ride experienced loss of green hydraulic system upon flap retraction. The procedures were run; some inconsistencies in the procedures were noted; an emergency declared; and the flight diverted to the nearest suitable airport.

Narrative: We experienced a loss of the green hydraulic system shortly after flap retraction. The reservoir 'LOW PRESS' light illuminated followed by the green system 'MAIN PUMP LOW PRESS' and 'ELEC PUMP' associated with a 'HYD' on the MAP. At this point; I identified the problem and advised First Officer this was not part of training and we will work together to resolve the problem. We referenced the 'LOSS OF THE GREEN SYSTEM' checklist in the hydraulic; landing gear section of the EMB-120 QRH. In reference to the checklist; we turned the green system electric hydraulic pump to OFF. The checklist then referenced us to the 'GEAR EXTENSION BY FREEFALL' procedure. We performed the freefall and received a six green indication. After completing the freefall checklist; we returned to the 'LOSS OF THE GREEN SYSTEM' checklist. There is a caution note stating not to lower the landing gear handle with loss of the green hydraulic system. However; in accordance with the freefall checklist; it is required to lower the handle after the freefall is complete. This caution note should be clarified to state prior to the free fall checklist; do not place the landing gear lever down. The caution note should also be moved above the line where it refers to the freefall checklist; where it actually applies. We continued the 'LOSS OF THE GREEN SYSTEM' checklist and were reviewing the corrections to approach speeds. It states: 'for flaps 0-15 . . . Vref 45+35 and for flaps 15-44 . . . Vref 45+35'. This is in contradiction to the EMB-120 FSM Emergency Procedures 'LOSS OF THE GREEN SYSTEM' which states 'for flaps 15-44 . . . Vref 45+10'. Adding 35 KTS to flap settings 15-44 has the potential of exceeding the Vfe of the most extended flap pairs by as much as 15-20 KTS. Continuing with the checklist; the last few items include 'if a gear up landing is to be performed pull the TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) circuit breaker'. Under this it states for aircraft serial numbers XXX and above; reset circuit breakers for the 'A' and 'B' landing indication system. Placing this below the 'gear up landing' caused some confusion on whether this applies to all aircraft serial numbers XXX and above or just the aircraft performing a gear up landing. The EMB-120 FSM Emergency Procedures do not state anything regarding the TAWS or landing indication circuit breakers. We contacted the ARFF unit through CTAF and advised him of our situation. For precautionary reasons; we had fire/EMS services standing by. We landed without incident and stopped the aircraft after clearing the runway. We shut down the aircraft and placed the landing gear pins in. Maintenance personnel met the aircraft and repositioned it to the maintenance hangar. Upon postflight; we created discrepancies for a hydraulic leak under the nose gear along with several other writeups in connection with this emergency. Upon inspection by maintenance; they found a break in a hydraulic line going to the nose gear right hand door. Unfortunately breaks in hydraulic lines [are] inevitable; however we can change the procedures for dealing with it to be more understandable. I have spoken with [operations personnel] regarding the inconsistencies with the checklists and have spoken on how best to correct the errors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.