Narrative:

Upon blocking in at [the] gate in hnl we awaited ground power to be plugged in. The aircraft was configured with the left engine at idle power and the right engine shutdown. After approximately two minutes of waiting for the jetway to be brought to the aircraft; and no apparent signs of getting a ground power connection from our ground crews; I chose to start the APU. During the APU startup a signal from the ground crew that external power was now available even with the jetway off the aircraft. Change over to ground power and shutdown of the left engine followed. During the deplaning phase a contract mechanic came into the cockpit and told us that while we were waiting for ground power a contract employee working the ramp walked in front of the idling left engine and placed an orange safety cone in front of that engine to only watch that engine immediately ingest the safety cone. Fortunately for all; the employee got away unharmed. It should also be noted that there was no urgent shutdown signal given to us by any of the ground crew. The subsequent write-up: during the parking and shutdown of the aircraft in hnl; while the left engine only was operating at idle waiting for ground power plug in; a safety cone was inadvertently placed in front of that engine and consequently ingested by the left engine. No unusual engine indications noted prior to shutdown. First factor: the inexperienced and untrained ground crew was either being in a hurry or not being cognitive of his dangerous surroundings. Secondly; the sense I receive from our station manager in hnl is that more times than not they see our aircraft arrive with the APU running and ready followed by prompt shutdown of all engines at gate block in. Suggestions: having a specific standard enforced at all stations which is exclusive to that station and that the use of this narrative to be highlighted not only in the [on board] manuals but station manuals as well. Procedurally this is something I believe is already being done but perhaps could use more emphasis at this time. Finally; our use of contract employees will always be a challenge to ensuring that SOP's are followed and that the quality control in our training will continue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 Captain reported that; after reaching the gate in HNL; a ramp employee walked in front of the still running right engine and placed a cone there. It was promptly ingested.

Narrative: Upon blocking in at [the] gate in HNL we awaited ground power to be plugged in. The aircraft was configured with the left engine at idle power and the right engine shutdown. After approximately two minutes of waiting for the jetway to be brought to the aircraft; and no apparent signs of getting a ground power connection from our ground crews; I chose to start the APU. During the APU startup a signal from the ground crew that external power was now available even with the jetway off the aircraft. Change over to ground power and shutdown of the left engine followed. During the deplaning phase a Contract Mechanic came into the cockpit and told us that while we were waiting for ground power a contract employee working the ramp walked in front of the idling left engine and placed an orange safety cone in front of that engine to only watch that engine immediately ingest the safety cone. Fortunately for all; the employee got away unharmed. It should also be noted that there was no urgent shutdown signal given to us by any of the ground crew. The subsequent write-up: During the parking and shutdown of the aircraft in HNL; while the left engine only was operating at idle waiting for ground power plug in; a safety cone was inadvertently placed in front of that engine and consequently ingested by the left engine. No unusual engine indications noted prior to shutdown. First factor: The inexperienced and untrained ground crew was either being in a hurry or not being cognitive of his dangerous surroundings. Secondly; the sense I receive from our Station Manager in HNL is that more times than not they see our aircraft arrive with the APU running and ready followed by prompt shutdown of all engines at gate block in. Suggestions: Having a specific standard enforced at all stations which is exclusive to that station and that the use of this narrative to be highlighted not only in the [on board] manuals but station manuals as well. Procedurally this is something I believe is already being done but perhaps could use more emphasis at this time. Finally; our use of contract employees will always be a challenge to ensuring that SOP's are followed and that the quality control in our training will continue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.