Narrative:

I was working local control and had cleared aircraft Y for takeoff off of runway 24. When I switched him to departure he said he had a problem and needed to return to the airport. I gave him right traffic for runway 19. I turned around and told my supervisor what was happening and then I called approach so they could slow down aircraft X that was on final. It took them a few times before they picked up the line so I was simultaneously trying to find out what the departure aircraft's problem was and if he needed assistance. I told aircraft Y to follow a global express on a 3 mile final for runway 19. When I talked to approach they said they had already switched aircraft X and I should do what I wanted with him.I reached out to aircraft X. I told him to reduce his speed because of traffic on the downwind and that I might need him to enter a right base for runway 24. He responded saying he was slowing to 110 KTS and that it wasn't a problem. I told aircraft Y to turn his base now to follow the global express and be inside of aircraft X. He said turning now. I told aircraft X to enter right base runway 24. At the same time TRACON was questioning what I was doing with aircraft X and I was explaining that aircraft Y was turning now inside of aircraft X who would be circling to runway 24.aircraft Y never turned. I gave a traffic call to aircraft Y on aircraft X and asked if he had traffic in sight. Aircraft Y reported traffic in sight. I told aircraft Y to follow that traffic; he would be number 2 now and cleared him to land runway 19. I immediately went back to aircraft X who was still tracking 19 and amended his instructions to continue for runway 19; that he was now number one and cleared him to land. Aircraft Y did not follow aircraft X as instructed and appeared to be cutting in front of him (this created the first conflict). As I observed this happening someone on the land line said I could turn aircraft X left and give him back to them. So I told aircraft X to start an immediate left turn to separate him from aircraft Y. As I gave him his instructions; aircraft Y appeared to be flying through the final for runway 19. I asked if he had runway 19 in sight and he said he just blew right through it. At this point aircraft X was in a left turnout northeast bound and aircraft Y was tracking eastbound. I asked aircraft Y if he had runway 24 in sight and he said yes. I cleared aircraft Y to land on runway 24. During all of the confusion with aircraft Y my supervisor was coordinating with someone on the 801 line about what to do with aircraft X. Aircraft X was heading 040 and my supervisor told me to climb him 3;000 ft and switch him to approach. I gave aircraft X the climb instructions and gave him traffic at 2;000 ft that appeared to be opposite direction of aircraft X. Then I noticed that traffic was climbing (2nd conflict) so I told aircraft X to turn right immediately. Aircraft X said he was already in the left turn and there was no conflict. So then I switched him to approach. After the switch my supervisor told me told to give him a 360 heading. I tried to issue him the heading but aircraft X had already switched. (After listening to the tapes; whoever coordinated with my supervisor to climb aircraft X to 3;000 ft then went back and said no keep him at 2. I did not hear that until I listened to the tapes and I climbed aircraft X to 3;000 as instructed.)I think teb and N90 should establish breakout procedures. It would reduce the amount of coordination as well as the confusion; and approach would know exactly what would happen when I tell think I am breaking someone out. If an event like this happened again I would try to do more of the coordination with approach myself. I was trying to figure out if aircraft Y had an emergency and was relying on my supervisor who was coordinating with approach. While I was trying to get information from aircraft Y I had several people calling on the land line asking whatwas going on and what I was doing with aircraft Y. I think it would also be better if we had two separate lines- one for departure and one for approach. Because so many people were calling on it I didn't know who I was talking to. I also think supervisors should be able to work the traffic that I am expected to work. They need to be more than just 'familiar with the operation' and should not be allowed to obtain their proficiency time on days the airport is closed. Most of the controllers at teb have less than three years experience and are being guided by supervisors who don't understand the operation. Besides the poor communication I don't know what else I should have done differently. Aircraft Y was just not listening to me. I could have turned aircraft Y for left traffic for runway 24 but he could have become a conflict with ewr arrivals overhead that were descending. And since he was not doing what he was told that could have been worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A departure aircraft anomaly requiring a return to busy TEB airport devolved into a variety of separation and communication issues between the Local Controller and four different aircraft.

Narrative: I was working Local Control and had cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff off of Runway 24. When I switched him to departure he said he had a problem and needed to return to the airport. I gave him right traffic for Runway 19. I turned around and told my Supervisor what was happening and then I called Approach so they could slow down Aircraft X that was on final. It took them a few times before they picked up the line so I was simultaneously trying to find out what the departure aircraft's problem was and if he needed assistance. I told Aircraft Y to follow a Global Express on a 3 mile final for Runway 19. When I talked to Approach they said they had already switched Aircraft X and I should do what I wanted with him.I reached out to Aircraft X. I told him to reduce his speed because of traffic on the downwind and that I might need him to enter a right base for Runway 24. He responded saying he was slowing to 110 KTS and that it wasn't a problem. I told Aircraft Y to turn his base now to follow the Global Express and be inside of Aircraft X. He said turning now. I told Aircraft X to enter right base Runway 24. At the same time TRACON was questioning what I was doing with Aircraft X and I was explaining that Aircraft Y was turning now inside of Aircraft X who would be circling to Runway 24.Aircraft Y never turned. I gave a traffic call to Aircraft Y on Aircraft X and asked if he had traffic in sight. Aircraft Y reported traffic in sight. I told Aircraft Y to follow that traffic; he would be number 2 now and cleared him to land Runway 19. I immediately went back to Aircraft X who was still tracking 19 and amended his instructions to continue for Runway 19; that he was now number one and cleared him to land. Aircraft Y did not follow Aircraft X as instructed and appeared to be cutting in front of him (this created the first conflict). As I observed this happening someone on the land line said I could turn Aircraft X left and give him back to them. So I told Aircraft X to start an immediate left turn to separate him from Aircraft Y. As I gave him his instructions; Aircraft Y appeared to be flying through the final for Runway 19. I asked if he had Runway 19 in sight and he said he just blew right through it. At this point Aircraft X was in a left turnout northeast bound and Aircraft Y was tracking eastbound. I asked Aircraft Y if he had Runway 24 in sight and he said yes. I cleared Aircraft Y to land on Runway 24. During all of the confusion with Aircraft Y my Supervisor was coordinating with someone on the 801 line about what to do with Aircraft X. Aircraft X was heading 040 and my Supervisor told me to climb him 3;000 FT and switch him to Approach. I gave Aircraft X the climb instructions and gave him traffic at 2;000 FT that appeared to be opposite direction of Aircraft X. Then I noticed that traffic was climbing (2nd conflict) so I told Aircraft X to turn right immediately. Aircraft X said he was already in the left turn and there was no conflict. So then I switched him to Approach. After the switch my Supervisor told me told to give him a 360 heading. I tried to issue him the heading but Aircraft X had already switched. (After listening to the tapes; whoever coordinated with my Supervisor to climb Aircraft X to 3;000 FT then went back and said no keep him at 2. I did not hear that until I listened to the tapes and I climbed Aircraft X to 3;000 as instructed.)I think TEB and N90 should establish breakout procedures. It would reduce the amount of coordination as well as the confusion; and Approach would know exactly what would happen when I tell think I am breaking someone out. If an event like this happened again I would try to do more of the coordination with Approach myself. I was trying to figure out if Aircraft Y had an emergency and was relying on my Supervisor who was coordinating with Approach. While I was trying to get information from Aircraft Y I had several people calling on the land line asking whatwas going on and what I was doing with Aircraft Y. I think it would also be better if we had two separate lines- one for Departure and one for Approach. Because so many people were calling on it I didn't know who I was talking to. I also think Supervisors should be able to work the traffic that I am expected to work. They need to be more than just 'familiar with the operation' and should not be allowed to obtain their proficiency time on days the airport is closed. Most of the Controllers at TEB have less than three years experience and are being guided by Supervisors who don't understand the operation. Besides the poor communication I don't know what else I should have done differently. Aircraft Y was just not listening to me. I could have turned Aircraft Y for left traffic for Runway 24 but he could have become a conflict with EWR arrivals overhead that were descending. And since he was not doing what he was told that could have been worse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.