Narrative:

Upon rotation, felt impact on fuselage. Tower reported tire debris on runway. Lost 2 of 4 hydraulic system. Elected to continue to lax as alternate. Las runway 25 reported closed. Declared emergency. Landed on runway 25R at lax. All tower, departure, en route and approach controllers were very helpful. Callback conversation with reporter acn 91731 revealed the following: aircraft was almost at maximum gross weight loaded for hnl. Double checked v-spds and determined they had not exceeded maximum tire speed. The B system was lost immediately after the tire blew and the D system short time later although D system only lost pressure and not fluid. B system is normal supply for gear and brakes and C system is alternate for brakes and flaps and nose steering. Unable to retract gear and lost some flight controls. Control still normal except lost about 40% of roll capability. When tire blew piece went through both upper and lower wing panel behind wing spar which is where hydraulic lines had been routed on purpose for protection. Initially were going to land las, but once stabilized and realized other 2 hydraulic systems intact and stable, and all checklist completed, had time to analyze situation. After considering everything, all engines running remaining hydraulic systems normal would have to remain in air considerable time dumping fuel. WX clear all the way to lax and several airports along way if necessary land immediately and no maintenance at las. Entire flight crew were asked and agreed to go to lax. Also at las with long runway closed an immediate landing would have been on the shorter runway which is a downgrade. Spoilers not available for stopping and a high temperature. After tire blew PIC flew aircraft and had the first officer and second officer run checklists. Captain knew the first officer, the reporter, had set up this air carrier training and taught the classes on this widebody transport and reporter felt this was why captain had first officer run emergency checklists as he felt he knew aircraft the best for trouble shooting problem. Stated second officer did excellent job and after completion of each checklist wrote down what ones completed so they could rechk what had been done already. Stated one problem was F/a procedure when told emergency landing imminent. Their procedure calls for cockpit door to be open. Only problem then all the F/a passenger announcements and emergency shouting made conversation in cockpit difficult. Reporter will work to get this changed. This air carrier poi investigated the incident and was not happy they went to lax instead of landing back at las, but after hearing their reasoning was satisfied and apparently is taking no action against crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB BLEW TIRE ON TKOF CAUSING LOSS OF 2 OF 4 HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS. EMERGENCY DECLARED, BUT WHEN SITUATION STABILIZED PROCEEDED TO ALT ARPT RATHER THAN RETURN AND LAND.

Narrative: UPON ROTATION, FELT IMPACT ON FUSELAGE. TWR RPTED TIRE DEBRIS ON RWY. LOST 2 OF 4 HYD SYS. ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO LAX AS ALTERNATE. LAS RWY 25 RPTED CLOSED. DECLARED EMER. LANDED ON RWY 25R AT LAX. ALL TWR, DEP, ENRTE AND APCH CTLRS WERE VERY HELPFUL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 91731 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: ACFT WAS ALMOST AT MAX GROSS WT LOADED FOR HNL. DOUBLE CHECKED V-SPDS AND DETERMINED THEY HAD NOT EXCEEDED MAX TIRE SPD. THE B SYS WAS LOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TIRE BLEW AND THE D SYS SHORT TIME LATER ALTHOUGH D SYS ONLY LOST PRESSURE AND NOT FLUID. B SYS IS NORMAL SUPPLY FOR GEAR AND BRAKES AND C SYS IS ALTERNATE FOR BRAKES AND FLAPS AND NOSE STEERING. UNABLE TO RETRACT GEAR AND LOST SOME FLT CTLS. CTL STILL NORMAL EXCEPT LOST ABOUT 40% OF ROLL CAPABILITY. WHEN TIRE BLEW PIECE WENT THROUGH BOTH UPPER AND LOWER WING PANEL BEHIND WING SPAR WHICH IS WHERE HYD LINES HAD BEEN ROUTED ON PURPOSE FOR PROTECTION. INITIALLY WERE GOING TO LAND LAS, BUT ONCE STABILIZED AND REALIZED OTHER 2 HYD SYSTEMS INTACT AND STABLE, AND ALL CHKLIST COMPLETED, HAD TIME TO ANALYZE SITUATION. AFTER CONSIDERING EVERYTHING, ALL ENGS RUNNING REMAINING HYD SYSTEMS NORMAL WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN IN AIR CONSIDERABLE TIME DUMPING FUEL. WX CLEAR ALL THE WAY TO LAX AND SEVERAL ARPTS ALONG WAY IF NECESSARY LAND IMMEDIATELY AND NO MAINT AT LAS. ENTIRE FLT CREW WERE ASKED AND AGREED TO GO TO LAX. ALSO AT LAS WITH LONG RWY CLOSED AN IMMEDIATE LNDG WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE SHORTER RWY WHICH IS A DOWNGRADE. SPOILERS NOT AVAILABLE FOR STOPPING AND A HIGH TEMP. AFTER TIRE BLEW PIC FLEW ACFT AND HAD THE F/O AND S/O RUN CHKLISTS. CAPT KNEW THE F/O, THE RPTR, HAD SET UP THIS ACR TRNING AND TAUGHT THE CLASSES ON THIS WDB AND RPTR FELT THIS WAS WHY CAPT HAD F/O RUN EMER CHKLISTS AS HE FELT HE KNEW ACFT THE BEST FOR TROUBLE SHOOTING PROB. STATED S/O DID EXCELLENT JOB AND AFTER COMPLETION OF EACH CHKLIST WROTE DOWN WHAT ONES COMPLETED SO THEY COULD RECHK WHAT HAD BEEN DONE ALREADY. STATED ONE PROB WAS F/A PROC WHEN TOLD EMER LNDG IMMINENT. THEIR PROC CALLS FOR COCKPIT DOOR TO BE OPEN. ONLY PROB THEN ALL THE F/A PAX ANNOUNCEMENTS AND EMER SHOUTING MADE CONVERSATION IN COCKPIT DIFFICULT. RPTR WILL WORK TO GET THIS CHANGED. THIS ACR POI INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AND WAS NOT HAPPY THEY WENT TO LAX INSTEAD OF LNDG BACK AT LAS, BUT AFTER HEARING THEIR REASONING WAS SATISFIED AND APPARENTLY IS TAKING NO ACTION AGAINST CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.