Narrative:

I was working final and valley combined in visual conditions. I had a flight check king air conducting ILS approaches to 34L. Behind the king air I had a DA40 followed by a C425 then a B737; all expecting 34L. The DA40 was in an IFR training flight and requesting an ILS approach. The flight check required a 18 mile final to conduct his approach. I took the flight check out the appropriate distance and turned his base for the approach. I then descended the DA40 from 11;000 to 10;000. I normally give aircraft 9;000 but I was using caution for the 10;000 MVA just west of the downwind. The flight check then proceeded to question me about some map that we are supposed to have because he wanted to check its accuracy. I had not been briefed on these new maps so I called the supervisor over and and asked if he knew anything about them. He had not been briefed either so we then went into a frenzy trying to figure out what the map numbers could be. Meanwhile the C425 had checked in. I had decided to put him on 32 because there was no way he was going to stay behind the DA40; 34R was full and 35 was closed for routine maintenance. I called local east and got approval to clear the C425 for 32. I then coordinated to pass over the top of traffic for 32. I would like to note that I was still looking for this map that nobody had been briefed on; because the flight check was rapidly approaching the fix that he wanted to check. The adjacent controller had a citation a 9;000 on the approach for 34R so I descended C425 from 11;000 to 10;000 thinking I was good with the DA40 in front of him because I has given him 9;000 instead of 10;000. A B737 then checked in behind the C425 and I decide to coordinate with the adjacent controller to put him on 34R; because this was his requested runway and again I didn't know if the aircraft would be able to stay behind the DA40. I turned the DA40's base still thinking for some reason that he was at 9;000 not 10;000. At this point I was planning on turning the C425 over the top of the DA40 and the citation for 34R who was no longer a factor. I look at the DA40's altitude to make sure I can base and observe that he is still at 10;000 with the C425 also at 10;000 on a converging heading. I told the DA40 to descend to 9;000 immediately and pointed out traffic to the C425 who reported traffic in sight. I end up clearing the DA40 for a visual approach to 34L instead of his requested ILS. The C425 got an extended downwind for 32. The B737 ended up going to 34L instead of 34R; and I still don't know the map number for flight check. Recommendation; I talked to another controller who had seen the event; after the fact. We both agreed that the DA40 should have been sequenced behind the C425 and the B737. We came to this conclusion mainly because he was so slow; requesting an ILS and being sequenced behind the flight check who required an 18 mile final. Traffic management was not in the room at the time. We could have been better prepared for flight check. When he started asking about this new map that he wanted to check; this was the first I was hearing about it. Flight check said that he had talked to someone upstairs and they said we would be prepared. This information never made it to the supervisor or the floor. I spent a lot of time trying to find these maps instead of paying attention to my traffic like I should have done. In my personal opinion this was one of the key factors resulting in the the operational error (oe). I stopped the DA40 at 10;000 instead of 9;000 like I normally do. I should have made some sort of note in his data block to remind myself. This oe would not have happened if I had remembered that I gave the DA40 10;000. I should have asked for help; or at least an extra set of eyes. The supervisor was busy trying to find this map for flight check and not paying attention. I was also distracted looking for the map. I really should have said the heck with the map and just worked my traffic. Taking aircraft off the downwind and putting them on 32 is not routine. I knew I was already busy and had no assistance; but chose to go to 32 and do all of the coordination myself anyway. This took even more of my attention away from my traffic. I could have cleared the DA40 for a visual right behind the flight check instead of trying to vector him for an ILS. There was no wake turbulence involved and it would have moved things along a lot quicker.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: S56 Controller described a loss of separation event; listing a major distraction caused by a Flight Check aircraft asking questions regarding a map; noting no briefing was made available regarding this subject map.

Narrative: I was working Final and Valley combined in visual conditions. I had a flight check King Air conducting ILS approaches to 34L. Behind the King Air I had a DA40 followed by a C425 then a B737; all expecting 34L. The DA40 was in an IFR training flight and requesting an ILS approach. The Flight Check required a 18 mile final to conduct his approach. I took the Flight Check out the appropriate distance and turned his base for the approach. I then descended the DA40 from 11;000 to 10;000. I normally give aircraft 9;000 but I was using caution for the 10;000 MVA just west of the downwind. The Flight Check then proceeded to question me about some map that we are supposed to have because he wanted to check its accuracy. I had not been briefed on these new maps so I called the Supervisor over and and asked if he knew anything about them. He had not been briefed either so we then went into a frenzy trying to figure out what the map numbers could be. Meanwhile the C425 had checked in. I had decided to put him on 32 because there was no way he was going to stay behind the DA40; 34R was full and 35 was closed for routine maintenance. I called Local East and got approval to clear the C425 for 32. I then coordinated to pass over the top of traffic for 32. I would like to note that I was still looking for this map that nobody had been briefed on; because the Flight Check was rapidly approaching the fix that he wanted to check. The adjacent controller had a Citation a 9;000 on the approach for 34R so I descended C425 from 11;000 to 10;000 thinking I was good with the DA40 in front of him because I has given him 9;000 instead of 10;000. A B737 then checked in behind the C425 and I decide to coordinate with the adjacent controller to put him on 34R; because this was his requested runway and again I didn't know if the aircraft would be able to stay behind the DA40. I turned the DA40's base still thinking for some reason that he was at 9;000 not 10;000. At this point I was planning on turning the C425 over the top of the DA40 and the Citation for 34R who was no longer a factor. I look at the DA40's altitude to make sure I can base and observe that he is still at 10;000 with the C425 also at 10;000 on a converging heading. I told the DA40 to descend to 9;000 immediately and pointed out traffic to the C425 who reported traffic in sight. I end up clearing the DA40 for a Visual Approach to 34L instead of his requested ILS. The C425 got an extended downwind for 32. The B737 ended up going to 34L instead of 34R; and I still don't know the map number for flight check. Recommendation; I talked to another controller who had seen the event; after the fact. We both agreed that the DA40 should have been sequenced behind the C425 and the B737. We came to this conclusion mainly because he was so slow; requesting an ILS and being sequenced behind the Flight Check who required an 18 mile final. Traffic Management was not in the room at the time. We could have been better prepared for Flight Check. When he started asking about this new map that he wanted to check; this was the first I was hearing about it. Flight Check said that he had talked to someone upstairs and they said we would be prepared. This information never made it to the Supervisor or the floor. I spent a lot of time trying to find these maps instead of paying attention to my traffic like I should have done. In my personal opinion this was one of the key factors resulting in the the Operational Error (OE). I stopped the DA40 at 10;000 instead of 9;000 like I normally do. I should have made some sort of note in his Data Block to remind myself. This OE would not have happened if I had remembered that I gave the DA40 10;000. I should have asked for help; or at least an extra set of eyes. The Supervisor was busy trying to find this map for flight check and not paying attention. I was also distracted looking for the map. I really should have said the heck with the map and just worked my traffic. Taking aircraft off the downwind and putting them on 32 is not routine. I knew I was already busy and had no assistance; but chose to go to 32 and do all of the coordination myself anyway. This took even more of my attention away from my traffic. I could have cleared the DA40 for a visual right behind the flight check instead of trying to vector him for an ILS. There was no wake turbulence involved and it would have moved things along a lot quicker.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.