Narrative:

All checklist and procedures were completed and the aircraft blocked out 5 minutes early. Engines were started in the gate and the 'before taxi check' was completed. Ground control was contacted and clearance was given to taxi to runway 27. Leaving the ramp; the captain and I both were forced to hard brake the aircraft; stopping on the ramp approximately 5 ft from the starting point. During the right turn out I observed a belt loader parked in the 2 o'clock position. It was obscured from the captain's view by the nose of the aircraft. On the turn-out the captain did not perform a max angle turn because no obstructions were observed from his point of view. When I realized that we were closing on the belt loader; I informed the captain by saying 'stop; stop; stop' then we both (I believe) applied the brakes. Out of reflex; I picked up the PA and informed the passengers that 'a piece of ground equipment was parked too close to the airplane and we had to brake hard to avoid hitting it.' I apologized and said the equipment was being moved and we would be on our way shortly.taxi out to runway 27 was uneventful and totally normal. Turns were performed in both directions in the normal course of taxi and nothing was noted out of the ordinary. On takeoff; at approximately 110 KTS; a nose wheel vibration developed and continued until rotation. It sounded like a tire was severely out of balance. At rotation the vibration stopped and I remarked to the captain I think we just lost a nose wheel tire. I called back to the tower and informed them of our suspicion and suggest they check the runway for debris. They asked if we were ok and if we needed to perform a flyby of the tower so they could look. I said no; we were ok and that we would handle it at our destination. After we contacted center at approximately FL230 on climb out; the captain call the tower back to inquire and they confirmed that there was in fact rubber on the runway. We thanked them for their assistance. Center called and asked us to switch to another frequency and contact the company for a message. We spoke to dispatch and maintenance control about the situation and let them know what we suspected. They informed us they were in contact with our departure station and were gathering more information. After disconnecting; center informed us that our departure station had informed them that there was a lot of rubber on the runway and they thought we may have lost both tires. Shortly after dispatch called again and informed us they received pictures and there was only enough rubber for one tire. They also asked if we had informed the passengers yet. We conveyed our plan which was to inform the passengers about an hour out of our destination and that the flight attendants were informed and prepping via their procedures. During the flight; the lead flight attendant was kept informed and we discussed all the possibilities. We reviewed the emergency information and although the possibility of an evacuation was very remote; we planned on using the over wing and aft exits only due to the possibility of fire coming from the nose wheel. We planned to give 6 chimes about 30 seconds from landing for their situational awareness and against using the brace commands. We stated that we would use the 'stand by' command if we thought an evacuation was necessary. About an hour into the flight #2 flight attendant wanted to come to the cockpit to discuss the situation. We restated the plan and answered her questions. She seemed very concerned about a possible evacuation and again we explained that was the worst possible scenario and it was highly unlikely. She seemed satisfied. We then invited #3 flight attendant for a similar discussion. The above stated plan was effectively implemented. We briefed the passengers; declared an emergency to center and passed on the request for the longest runway. We planned a flaps 40 landing with minimum auto brakes with the plan to brake harder when thenose wheel came to the ground. We landed without incident. I maintained back pressure on the yoke through out the landing roll. The aircraft was controllable so the captain elected to take the high speed and exit the runway. The aircraft was stopped and inspected by fire and rescue. We coordinated with them directly via a discrete frequency and they informed us that we have lost the tread cap and that the tire was in one piece and still inflated. We they had our company maintenance inspect the tire and it was determined that we could taxi to the gate as is. The captain informed the passengers and we taxied to the gate with no problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC-9 flight crew had a nose wheel tire tread separate on takeoff. After confirmation from the Tower; they proceeded to their destination with consult from their company and had an uneventful landing.

Narrative: All checklist and procedures were completed and the aircraft blocked out 5 minutes early. Engines were started in the gate and the 'Before Taxi Check' was completed. Ground Control was contacted and clearance was given to taxi to Runway 27. Leaving the ramp; the Captain and I both were forced to hard brake the aircraft; stopping on the ramp approximately 5 FT from the starting point. During the right turn out I observed a belt loader parked in the 2 o'clock position. It was obscured from the Captain's view by the nose of the aircraft. On the turn-out the Captain did not perform a max angle turn because no obstructions were observed from his point of view. When I realized that we were closing on the belt loader; I informed the Captain by saying 'stop; stop; stop' then we both (I believe) applied the brakes. Out of reflex; I picked up the PA and informed the passengers that 'a piece of ground equipment was parked too close to the airplane and we had to brake hard to avoid hitting it.' I apologized and said the equipment was being moved and we would be on our way shortly.Taxi out to Runway 27 was uneventful and totally normal. Turns were performed in both directions in the normal course of taxi and nothing was noted out of the ordinary. On takeoff; at approximately 110 KTS; a nose wheel vibration developed and continued until rotation. It sounded like a tire was severely out of balance. At rotation the vibration stopped and I remarked to the Captain I think we just lost a nose wheel tire. I called back to the Tower and informed them of our suspicion and suggest they check the runway for debris. They asked if we were ok and if we needed to perform a flyby of the tower so they could look. I said no; we were OK and that we would handle it at our destination. After we contacted Center at approximately FL230 on climb out; the Captain call the Tower back to inquire and they confirmed that there was in fact rubber on the runway. We thanked them for their assistance. Center called and asked us to switch to another frequency and contact the company for a message. We spoke to Dispatch and Maintenance Control about the situation and let them know what we suspected. They informed us they were in contact with our departure station and were gathering more information. After disconnecting; Center informed us that our departure station had informed them that there was a lot of rubber on the runway and they thought we may have lost both tires. Shortly after Dispatch called again and informed us they received pictures and there was only enough rubber for one tire. They also asked if we had informed the passengers yet. We conveyed our plan which was to inform the passengers about an hour out of our destination and that the Flight Attendants were informed and prepping via their procedures. During the flight; the Lead Flight Attendant was kept informed and we discussed all the possibilities. We reviewed the emergency information and although the possibility of an evacuation was very remote; we planned on using the over wing and aft exits only due to the possibility of fire coming from the nose wheel. We planned to give 6 chimes about 30 seconds from landing for their situational awareness and against using the BRACE commands. We stated that we would use the 'STAND BY' command if we thought an evacuation was necessary. About an hour into the flight #2 Flight Attendant wanted to come to the cockpit to discuss the situation. We restated the plan and answered her questions. She seemed very concerned about a possible evacuation and again we explained that was the worst possible scenario and it was highly unlikely. She seemed satisfied. We then invited #3 Flight Attendant for a similar discussion. The above stated plan was effectively implemented. We briefed the passengers; declared an emergency to Center and passed on the request for the longest runway. We planned a flaps 40 landing with minimum auto brakes with the plan to brake harder when thenose wheel came to the ground. We landed without incident. I maintained back pressure on the yoke through out the landing roll. The aircraft was controllable so the Captain elected to take the high speed and exit the runway. The aircraft was stopped and inspected by fire and rescue. We coordinated with them directly via a discrete frequency and they informed us that we have lost the tread cap and that the tire was in one piece and still inflated. We they had our company maintenance inspect the tire and it was determined that we could taxi to the gate as is. The Captain informed the passengers and we taxied to the gate with no problems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.