37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 917093 |
Time | |
Date | 201010 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-83 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | AC Generator/Alternator |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
It was first officer's leg and passing about 27;000 ft; the first thing we noticed was that the auto-throttles disconnected. After a couple seconds of wondering why that happened; the autopilot disconnected and first officer lost all his instruments. Then overhead annunciator panel began filling with lights; and the aural warning horn for slat overspeed kept sounding. First officer passed the control of the airplane over to me and I was suddenly hand flying with just my basic instruments. It was impossible to maintain an altitude and try and help first officer analyze the fluctuating annunciator panel. It seemed like an eternity; but first officer was the first to identify that we had experienced a right generator failure followed by an AC cross tie lockout. Our flight attendants called us in the process; because they had lost galley power and the lights went out in the cabin. Fortunately the weather was clear along the entire route and it was already daylight. Once we got systems restored via the AC cross tie lockout checklist; the autopilot back on and returned to an acceptable ATC route and altitude clearance we switched roles. That made me the pilot not flying. We reviewed the situation again; ensuring we accomplished the correct checklist in the correct order. We called dispatch on the handy new wifi phone; and with their concurrence; decided to continue to our destination as planned. We basically had everything back except the right generator and the AC cross tie. Not knowing the real cause of the fault; we kept the emergency status in place; closely keeping tabs on possible divert airports as they went by. Even though we had clear conditions of the generator shutdown during the AC cross tie lockout QRH procedure the CSD temperatures rose out of limits calling for an immediate CSD disconnect; which we accomplished via the QRH instructions. These temperatures did not immediately drop to zero after disconnecting the CSD and that did give us concern but our destination was by now the nearest suitable destination. It took about fifteen minutes to notice some cooling of the CSD temperatures from the time of the disconnection while in the descent. Because I kept the emergency aircraft status all the way to landing; I told the passengers in advance that we could expect to be followed and inspected by the rescue crews after landing and before arrival at the gate. Upon stopping at the taxiway intersection from our runway high-speed exit for the fire department's inspection I made the P/a for the flight attendant's and passengers to remain in their seats. Once on tower frequency and in contact with the operational support and the fire department; we reminded them that the issue was with the right engine for their thermal inspection. The fire department's chief granted us permission to the gate; followed us in; and met us in the cockpit for the resolution of the emergency. When they opened the cowling at the gate we were all shocked at the damage the generator had caused inside the engine. I cannot say enough about how first officer was able to read to me what was happening on the annunciator panel and follow the QRH at the same time in the midst of the simultaneous alarms and lights. I had no EPR gauges and just got handed a manually flown airplane still in the climb.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An MD80 right generator failure followed by a Cross Tie Lockout and CSD overheat led to an emergency declaration. After landing at destination engine damage caused by the failure was discovered.
Narrative: It was First Officer's leg and passing about 27;000 FT; the first thing we noticed was that the auto-throttles disconnected. After a couple seconds of wondering why that happened; the autopilot disconnected and First Officer lost all his instruments. Then overhead annunciator panel began filling with lights; and the aural warning horn for slat overspeed kept sounding. First Officer passed the control of the airplane over to me and I was suddenly hand flying with just my basic instruments. It was impossible to maintain an altitude and try and help First Officer analyze the fluctuating annunciator panel. It seemed like an eternity; but First Officer was the first to identify that we had experienced a right generator failure followed by an AC Cross Tie Lockout. Our Flight Attendants called us in the process; because they had lost galley power and the lights went out in the cabin. Fortunately the weather was clear along the entire route and it was already daylight. Once we got systems restored via the AC Cross Tie Lockout checklist; the autopilot back on and returned to an acceptable ATC route and altitude clearance we switched roles. That made me the pilot not flying. We reviewed the situation again; ensuring we accomplished the correct checklist in the correct order. We called Dispatch on the handy new WiFi phone; and with their concurrence; decided to continue to our destination as planned. We basically had everything back except the right generator and the AC Cross Tie. Not knowing the real cause of the fault; we kept the emergency status in place; closely keeping tabs on possible divert airports as they went by. Even though we had clear conditions of the generator shutdown during the AC Cross Tie Lockout QRH procedure the CSD temperatures rose out of limits calling for an immediate CSD disconnect; which we accomplished via the QRH instructions. These temperatures did not immediately drop to zero after disconnecting the CSD and that did give us concern but our destination was by now the nearest suitable destination. It took about fifteen minutes to notice some cooling of the CSD temperatures from the time of the disconnection while in the descent. Because I kept the emergency aircraft status all the way to landing; I told the passengers in advance that we could expect to be followed and inspected by the rescue crews after landing and before arrival at the gate. Upon stopping at the taxiway intersection from our runway high-speed exit for the Fire Department's inspection I made the P/A for the Flight Attendant's and passengers to remain in their seats. Once on Tower frequency and in contact with the Operational Support and the Fire Department; we reminded them that the issue was with the right engine for their thermal inspection. The Fire Department's Chief granted us permission to the gate; followed us in; and met us in the cockpit for the resolution of the emergency. When they opened the cowling at the gate we were all shocked at the damage the generator had caused inside the engine. I cannot say enough about how First Officer was able to read to me what was happening on the annunciator panel and follow the QRH at the same time in the midst of the simultaneous alarms and lights. I had no EPR gauges and just got handed a manually flown airplane still in the climb.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.