Narrative:

Two F16's doing a practice ILS to runway 2L at fai; were issued relatively standard climb outs of heading 032 and maintain 5;000 ft. A medium large transport (medium-large transport) was inbound to hold over the chena NDB (cun) at 4;000 ft. Preceding departure off runway 2L was a PA31; climbing on initial departure heading of 032; issued direct bettles (btt) leaving 3;400 ft. Basically; I got boxed into a situation and the choice I made to attempt to remedy the situation was not good enough. The PA31 was still climbing out on the 032 heading when the F16's reported their missed approach on my frequency. At that time the medium large transport was still southeast of cun and level at 4;000 ft. I was relatively certain I would lose separation with the PA31 had I left the F16's climbing out on the 032 heading; so I chose to anticipate that the climb rate of the F16s would be good enough to top the medium large transport if I turned them out of 3;400 ft. When I observed their climb rate it was not as anticipated and it was too late to make another choice; so I attempted to establish visual separation and called traffic to the medium large transport; reference F16 flight. He acknowledged my transmission but did not report the traffic in sight. I immediately issued traffic to the F16's reference the medium large transport and asked him to report the traffic in sight; thinking often military aircraft are better at visually acquiring other aircraft. The F16's responded that flight visibility was less than a mile at his location. By now the F16's were 3-4 NM from the medium large transport and climbing through 4;000 ft; so I immediately told the F16's no delay climbing to 5;000 ft. The F16's acknowledged the instruction; but did not report level at 5;000 ft until after there was no longer 3 NM of lateral separation. It is important to understand that our IFR departures off runway 2L are initially assigned a heading of 032 degrees and we are unable to turn those aircraft until they are at or above the MVA. While the MVA initially off the runway end is 2;200 ft; it increases to 3;400 ft within 4NM. With departing mlgs; C208s; and PA31s this means that we usually cannot turn the aircraft until they are above 3;400 ft. I am not privy to what; if any; discussion occurred in the tower cab with regard to local control's responsibility to provide initial IFR separation between successive departures. I clearly understand that it is the responsibility of the radar controller to protect the departure corridor as well as any required separation once control instructions off the initial departure instructions are issued. With that in mind; had I been working local control in this situation; I would not have allowed PA31 to depart in front of F16's on the approach given the weather conditions and the performance characteristics of the F-16s after completing their option. This is particularly true given the limitations on the radar controller with regard to turning aircraft off the initial departure heading due to the mvas with a lack of diverse vectoring area or any other approved initial headings for IFR departures. Recommendation; I could have attempted to attain diverging courses by putting the PA31 on a vector away from the departure corridor and left the F16's on the initial departure heading; although I believe the speed differential might still have closed the gap before the PA31 reached 3;400 ft for the turn. On initial contact I could have instructed the F16's to climb without delay and that might have attained the desired climb rate and subsequently the required vertical separation. I could have descended the medium large transport in an attempt to increase the vertical separation sooner. I could have vectored the medium large transport in an attempt to archive diverging courses between the medium large transport and the F16's on a vector. Had local control not launched the PA31 in front of F16's on approach; the situation would not have existed and F16's would have climbed out on the 032 heading until above the medium large transport. I believe the most important recommendation would be to either restore a diverse vectoring area tofai; or at least provide more than one heading for IFR departures to fly initially on departure. This would provide both the tower and radar controllers more options to safely and efficiently move the traffic. In this case; had I been able to assign the F16's a different climb-out then I believe I could have prevented the incident completely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAI Controller described a loss of separation event when attempting to out climb conflicting traffic; noting training was being accomplished on adjacent sectors and limited turning availability due to terrain.

Narrative: Two F16's doing a practice ILS to Runway 2L at FAI; were issued relatively standard climb outs of heading 032 and maintain 5;000 FT. A MLG (Medium-Large Transport) was inbound to hold over the Chena NDB (CUN) at 4;000 FT. Preceding departure off Runway 2L was a PA31; climbing on initial departure heading of 032; issued direct Bettles (BTT) leaving 3;400 FT. Basically; I got boxed into a situation and the choice I made to attempt to remedy the situation was not good enough. The PA31 was still climbing out on the 032 heading when the F16's reported their missed approach on my frequency. At that time the MLG was still SE of CUN and level at 4;000 FT. I was relatively certain I would lose separation with the PA31 had I left the F16's climbing out on the 032 heading; so I chose to anticipate that the climb rate of the F16s would be good enough to top the MLG if I turned them out of 3;400 FT. When I observed their climb rate it was not as anticipated and it was too late to make another choice; so I attempted to establish visual separation and called traffic to the MLG; reference F16 flight. He acknowledged my transmission but did not report the traffic in sight. I immediately issued traffic to the F16's reference the MLG and asked him to report the traffic in sight; thinking often military aircraft are better at visually acquiring other aircraft. The F16's responded that flight visibility was less than a mile at his location. By now the F16's were 3-4 NM from the MLG and climbing through 4;000 FT; so I immediately told the F16's no delay climbing to 5;000 FT. The F16's acknowledged the instruction; but did not report level at 5;000 FT until after there was no longer 3 NM of lateral separation. It is important to understand that our IFR departures off Runway 2L are initially assigned a heading of 032 degrees and we are unable to turn those aircraft until they are at or above the MVA. While the MVA initially off the runway end is 2;200 FT; it increases to 3;400 FT within 4NM. With departing MLGs; C208s; and PA31s this means that we usually cannot turn the aircraft until they are above 3;400 FT. I am not privy to what; if any; discussion occurred in the Tower Cab with regard to Local Control's responsibility to provide initial IFR separation between successive departures. I clearly understand that it is the responsibility of the RADAR Controller to protect the departure corridor as well as any required separation once control instructions off the initial departure instructions are issued. With that in mind; had I been working Local Control in this situation; I would not have allowed PA31 to depart in front of F16's on the approach given the weather conditions and the performance characteristics of the F-16s after completing their option. This is particularly true given the limitations on the RADAR Controller with regard to turning aircraft off the initial departure heading due to the MVAs with a lack of diverse vectoring area or any other approved initial headings for IFR departures. Recommendation; I could have attempted to attain diverging courses by putting the PA31 on a vector away from the departure corridor and left the F16's on the initial departure heading; although I believe the speed differential might still have closed the gap before the PA31 reached 3;400 FT for the turn. On initial contact I could have instructed the F16's to climb without delay and that might have attained the desired climb rate and subsequently the required vertical separation. I could have descended the MLG in an attempt to increase the vertical separation sooner. I could have vectored the MLG in an attempt to archive diverging courses between the MLG and the F16's on a vector. Had Local Control not launched the PA31 in front of F16's on approach; the situation would not have existed and F16's would have climbed out on the 032 heading until above the MLG. I believe the most important recommendation would be to either restore a diverse vectoring area toFAI; or at least provide more than one heading for IFR departures to fly initially on departure. This would provide both the Tower and RADAR Controllers more options to safely and efficiently move the traffic. In this case; had I been able to assign the F16's a different climb-out then I believe I could have prevented the incident completely.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.