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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 92026 |
Time | |
Date | 198808 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dlz |
State Reference | OH |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 0 msl bound upper : 2300 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 209 flight time total : 463 flight time type : 15 |
ASRS Report | 92026 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Cause of this accident, I think, was pilot error resulting from incomplete preflight action. I went on information from previous pilot and fuel gauges indication, which after engine failure no longer indicated full tanks. After engine first cut out I started on my restart procedures with no results. At that point I felt I was too low for further action, so I set up for my emergency landing in a farm field. There was no damage to pilot of aircraft. It was flown out the next day. Corrective action: I will make a more complete preflight of the aircraft, and take more time in doing so. I will never go by fuel gauge indications, only by what I can see in the tanks. I will, when in doubt, add more fuel, no matter what the price is at my departure point. I feel pilots need more instruction on emergency procedures, and need to know them better to pass chkrides. I'm not blaming anyone for my lack of knowledge except myself. It's a whole different ball game when you have to make a forced landing than when you're just simulating one. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: 4 fuel tanks involved. Reporter checked mains and was assured, though low, there was enough to fly to airport a few mi away to pick up passenger and refuel at that time. Once in cockpit, saw that tip tank gauges showed full. Switched to tip tank. When engine began to falter, pilot thought problem was from water in fuel since he had, during previous weeks, needed to drain to clear tanks of water. Never occurred to him gauges might be at fault. He switched to the other tip tank. FAA investigation and interview determined actual fuel on board complied with far reserve requirements. Only fault found was pilot did not have his certificate with him. Information forwarded to lawyers. Has received latter indicating no further action. Cause: fuel mismanagement.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMERGENCY LNDG, ENGINE FAILURE.
Narrative: CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT, I THINK, WAS PLT ERROR RESULTING FROM INCOMPLETE PREFLT ACTION. I WENT ON INFO FROM PREVIOUS PLT AND FUEL GAUGES INDICATION, WHICH AFTER ENG FAILURE NO LONGER INDICATED FULL TANKS. AFTER ENG FIRST CUT OUT I STARTED ON MY RESTART PROCS WITH NO RESULTS. AT THAT POINT I FELT I WAS TOO LOW FOR FURTHER ACTION, SO I SET UP FOR MY EMER LNDG IN A FARM FIELD. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO PLT OF ACFT. IT WAS FLOWN OUT THE NEXT DAY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: I WILL MAKE A MORE COMPLETE PREFLT OF THE ACFT, AND TAKE MORE TIME IN DOING SO. I WILL NEVER GO BY FUEL GAUGE INDICATIONS, ONLY BY WHAT I CAN SEE IN THE TANKS. I WILL, WHEN IN DOUBT, ADD MORE FUEL, NO MATTER WHAT THE PRICE IS AT MY DEP POINT. I FEEL PLTS NEED MORE INSTRUCTION ON EMER PROCS, AND NEED TO KNOW THEM BETTER TO PASS CHKRIDES. I'M NOT BLAMING ANYONE FOR MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE EXCEPT MYSELF. IT'S A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME WHEN YOU HAVE TO MAKE A FORCED LNDG THAN WHEN YOU'RE JUST SIMULATING ONE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: 4 FUEL TANKS INVOLVED. RPTR CHKED MAINS AND WAS ASSURED, THOUGH LOW, THERE WAS ENOUGH TO FLY TO ARPT A FEW MI AWAY TO PICK UP PAX AND REFUEL AT THAT TIME. ONCE IN COCKPIT, SAW THAT TIP TANK GAUGES SHOWED FULL. SWITCHED TO TIP TANK. WHEN ENG BEGAN TO FALTER, PLT THOUGHT PROB WAS FROM WATER IN FUEL SINCE HE HAD, DURING PREVIOUS WKS, NEEDED TO DRAIN TO CLEAR TANKS OF WATER. NEVER OCCURRED TO HIM GAUGES MIGHT BE AT FAULT. HE SWITCHED TO THE OTHER TIP TANK. FAA INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEW DETERMINED ACTUAL FUEL ON BOARD COMPLIED WITH FAR RESERVE REQUIREMENTS. ONLY FAULT FOUND WAS PLT DID NOT HAVE HIS CERTIFICATE WITH HIM. INFO FORWARDED TO LAWYERS. HAS RECEIVED LATTER INDICATING NO FURTHER ACTION. CAUSE: FUEL MISMANAGEMENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.