Narrative:

I departed cdw from runway 22 in VMC. I made a climbing right turn to remain north and above the class D airspace surrounding mmu. While doing so; I inadvertently climbed into class B airspace before exiting to the west. The lower shelf is 3;000 ft MSL. I climbed to about 4;000 ft MSL and was approximately 5 or 6 NM inside the class B when I realized my mistake. I discovered my mistake when rechecking the VFR chart to make sure I was clear of nmu and was looking for additional airspace. I was over boontown reservoir and north of mmu when I realized I had mistaken the outer class B ring for the 30 NM mode C ring. I immediately exited the class B to the west via the shortest distance. Contributing factors: while there are several; the first dumb decision I made to depart VFR. This was the single most important factor; but several others were made that when all added together; resulted in my inadvertent trip into the class B airspace. Another factor was that I travel frequently to this area (teb; mnu; hvn; isp and others); I am familiar with the area and it was a nice sunny day; so I had no misgivings about departing VFR. (It is also my last!) another factor was the use of an approved efb. It is not the efb; but my improper use of it; which I had never considered until now. The efb is an excellent tool and provides instance access to all the charts. The problem I discovered; albeit too late; is that when used in the 'night mode' it changes the colors on the VFR chart. I had been using the efb in the night mode and had never used the VFR chart in this mode before. While it depicts all the information; it is not in a color we are used to seeing and recognizing instantly. I believe this significantly contributed to me making the mistake of identifying the class B ring as the 30 NM mode C ring. It wasn't until I started studying the chart the second time for additional airspace ahead; that I discovered my mistake. Another factor is that I had not initially planned on departing VFR. Human performance considerations: I can say from this experience that human performance is interwoven with the chain of events. The decisions I made to depart VFR and using efb in the night mode on the VFR chart for the first time all contributed and led to the inadvertent chain of events. It doesn't make me feel any better about what happened; but has provided an experience I'll never repeat again. Some other human factors that played a part in making these bad decisions were personal events outside of this trip; that have a way of taking your mind off the task at hand. My daughter (who is a cancer survivor) was having a biopsy on a lump in her breast at the very same time I was originally scheduled to depart. I was due to arrive my home at the same time she would be getting out of the procedure. I was anxious to say the least. My departure was 2 and 1/2 hours later than expected and I had no word on the biopsy. Frankly; I found myself thinking more about this than my departure. The good news is that it was benign!! How to make sure this doesn't happen again: first of all; always take advantage of the resources available which I didn't do. Study a VFR departure as much as I do my IFR departures. Don't allow outside events compromise the way I plan and conduct each flight. I was one who resisted the notion of an efb for years; but have embraced them as very useful tools; but now also have a better understanding of their limitations. My flights are 99.99% under an IFR flight plan and I had never used the efb in night mode with a VFR chart. I now have become an expert in the use and limitations of this efb!

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot departed CDW VFR using an EFB in the night mode which changed the airspace coding colors so penetrated restricted airspace before realizing his error. The pilot was also distracted by personal life events.

Narrative: I departed CDW from Runway 22 in VMC. I made a climbing right turn to remain north and above the Class D airspace surrounding MMU. While doing so; I inadvertently climbed into Class B airspace before exiting to the west. The lower shelf is 3;000 FT MSL. I climbed to about 4;000 FT MSL and was approximately 5 or 6 NM inside the Class B when I realized my mistake. I discovered my mistake when rechecking the VFR chart to make sure I was clear of NMU and was looking for additional airspace. I was over Boontown Reservoir and north of MMU when I realized I had mistaken the outer Class B ring for the 30 NM mode C ring. I immediately exited the Class B to the west via the shortest distance. Contributing Factors: While there are several; the first dumb decision I made to depart VFR. This was the single most important factor; but several others were made that when all added together; resulted in my inadvertent trip into the Class B airspace. Another factor was that I travel frequently to this area (TEB; MNU; HVN; ISP and others); I am familiar with the area and it was a nice sunny day; so I had no misgivings about departing VFR. (It is also my last!) Another factor was the use of an approved EFB. It is not the EFB; but my improper use of it; which I had never considered until now. The EFB is an excellent tool and provides instance access to all the charts. The problem I discovered; albeit too late; is that when used in the 'night mode' it changes the colors on the VFR chart. I had been using the EFB in the night mode and had never used the VFR chart in this mode before. While it depicts all the information; it is not in a color we are used to seeing and recognizing instantly. I believe this significantly contributed to me making the mistake of identifying the Class B ring as the 30 NM mode C ring. It wasn't until I started studying the chart the second time for additional airspace ahead; that I discovered my mistake. Another factor is that I had not initially planned on departing VFR. Human Performance Considerations: I can say from this experience that human performance is interwoven with the chain of events. The decisions I made to depart VFR and using EFB in the night mode on the VFR chart for the first time all contributed and led to the inadvertent chain of events. It doesn't make me feel any better about what happened; but has provided an experience I'll never repeat again. Some other human factors that played a part in making these bad decisions were personal events outside of this trip; that have a way of taking your mind off the task at hand. My daughter (who is a cancer survivor) was having a biopsy on a lump in her breast at the very same time I was originally scheduled to depart. I was due to arrive my home at the same time she would be getting out of the procedure. I was anxious to say the least. My departure was 2 and 1/2 hours later than expected and I had no word on the biopsy. Frankly; I found myself thinking more about this than my departure. The good news is that it was benign!! How to make sure this doesn't happen again: First of all; always take advantage of the resources available which I didn't do. Study a VFR departure as much as I do my IFR departures. Don't allow outside events compromise the way I plan and conduct each flight. I was one who resisted the notion of an EFB for years; but have embraced them as very useful tools; but now also have a better understanding of their limitations. My flights are 99.99% under an IFR flight plan and I had never used the EFB in night mode with a VFR chart. I now have become an expert in the use and limitations of this EFB!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.