37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 922262 |
Time | |
Date | 201012 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
We began the day at xa:45 eastern with the van ride and landed our second leg 5 minutes early at xg:29 eastern. The weather was bad and the runway was contaminated. Braking action fair. We were scheduled for a xh:15 eastern departure. Everyone went to get lunch because the next leg would not land until xj:53 eastern. We were told we only had 16 passengers with 40 minutes ground time. I came back to my aircraft to eat in the cockpit because the weather was getting worse. The visibility had dropped from 3 NM to between 1 1/2 and 1/2. It had been snowing for a couple of days. I discussed the cold weather operations with the first officer and was finishing my lunch. The agent came in about 15 minutes prior to departure and began the rushing. With only 16 passengers; she finished early. She was now trying to tell me to push early. I stopped my conversation with the first officer and told her we had plenty of time. I was going to finish my eating and my briefing with the first officer. I did not want anyone trying to rush us. I pointed out the weather and when people rush - they make mistakes. I then handed her the load plan for the bags and told her 'see; here is a mistake right there. The wrong aircraft number is on this sheet.' she apologized and began with the excuses. We closed the door 6 minutes early. The taxi was uneventful to the deice pad. The south apron is located next to the runway in use. I made contact with the deice person and they confirmed they were using type I and type iv. The ATIS had changed 3 times by this point. The snow went from light to moderate and the visibility had dropped to 3;000 RVR. The preferred configuration is APU shutdown; both engines running. After about 10 or 15 minutes; contact was made and I was told 'all aircraft surfaces are clean and the start / end time; employee name and number.' I looked out L2 and can only see the last slat and the winglets. L3 was covered in fluid. The small part of the wing that was visible to me looked green and clear. We changed frequencies and contacted the follow me truck to lead us off the ramp. We had multiple aircraft and deice trucks on both sides of us. We began to power up and the follow me truck called and stopped me before we began to move. He stated; 'captain; you have a lot of ice and snow build up on your wing and engines.' I leaned my face up against the frame of the L1 and looked out. The first officer looked out and said his was not bad. I then opened my window. The snow and fumes came into the cockpit. But; I was able to see the leading edge of the wing briefly and it was nothing but snow and ice. One section was approximately 6 -8 ft along the leading edge and about 1-2 ft back. It was a jagged line. The wing surface could not be seen. The follow me truck then stated there were other areas that had snow and ice build up on the wings. I told him we needed to do the whole procedure again. The trucks came back and told us they were sorry and then stated to me; 'captain; we need to hurry because the runway is about to close again for cleaning and it takes about 20 minutes.' more pressure. They finished about 10-12 minutes later. We began the taxi off the ramp. We were holding short of the runway end pad. I had the first officer go back and look at the wings and engines. We were now finally in a position to do a required run up of the engines. The engines had been running for nearly an hour and I had not been in an area to do the 70% N1 for 30 seconds every 30 minutes - clearing. The first officer returned with all clear. When I did the engine power up the first officer became vocal about being uncomfortable with the engines running so high on the surface snow. He asked me why I was doing it and stated that he had been on the airplane since a new hire and never once witnessed anyone doing it. He said people only do it momentarily on the runway before take off. We were feeling rushed. The tower told us we needed to hurry because there was an aircrafton final and they were trying to let us take off and another aircraft behind me before they closed the runways. Also; the first officer was curious why I wanted to keep the APU running for the take off. He asked me the same question when I landed on the contaminated runway. I told him I would discuss it after we took off. From the time we left the deice pad and was given line up and wait the ATIS changed 2 times. The visibility had went from 3/4 to 1/2 and had been reporting freezing fog and moderate snow. The runway was mostly white except for the three tracks from where the aircraft wheels had been operating during take offs and landings. Those areas were turning into wet snow and slush. The tower issued an unusual departure for 1L and cleared us for 'immediate take off'. Then he began at about 200 ft to ask us to tell him if we were in the turn yet. He did that twice. The departure states to climb to 2;000 before any turn to assigned heading. I had been doing this for years. The whole event was challenging. Cold weather operations is constantly changing with bulletins. Because of money; we are now compromising safety and going against the studies of the national weather service and the NTSB. Because of money and the constant intimidation from management I am bombarded with a steady flow of threats from everyone I must rely on in this fast pace environment. When the hazardous weather appears; I must slow down. When I do however; I meet agitated employee groups that distract me with arguments or questions. This creates new threats due to the interruption of my thoughts. I think our system is set up for an accident. The company has removed the requirement to have the first officer go back and inspect the wings and engines prior to departure. It is now only an option. When you make something an option - laziness and complacency prevails and it will now no longer be done. The contractor (who knows their actual experience level; pressure or distractions they were under) said my airplane was completely clean. Why did we remove the airmets out of the flight plans? Dispatch told me that it was because it is all mostly little airplane stuff. Really!? Moderate turbulence FL280 to FL350 is little airplane stuff. Now; I just come to work and try to stay alive and not get violated because the environment is hostile and full of threats from all the failed procedures.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737 Captain reported an environment in which flight crews are forced by ATC; ground personnel; their company and other crew members to cut corners when complicated operations require deliberate conservative responses especially during severe weather deice and flight preparations.
Narrative: We began the day at XA:45 eastern with the van ride and landed our second leg 5 minutes early at XG:29 eastern. The weather was bad and the runway was contaminated. Braking action fair. We were scheduled for a XH:15 eastern departure. Everyone went to get lunch because the next leg would not land until XJ:53 eastern. We were told we only had 16 passengers with 40 minutes ground time. I came back to my aircraft to eat in the cockpit because the weather was getting worse. The visibility had dropped from 3 NM to between 1 1/2 and 1/2. It had been snowing for a couple of days. I discussed the cold weather operations with the First Officer and was finishing my lunch. The agent came in about 15 minutes prior to departure and began the rushing. With only 16 passengers; she finished early. She was now trying to tell me to push early. I stopped my conversation with the First Officer and told her we had plenty of time. I was going to finish my eating and my briefing with the First Officer. I did not want anyone trying to rush us. I pointed out the weather and when people rush - they make mistakes. I then handed her the load plan for the bags and told her 'See; here is a mistake right there. The wrong aircraft number is on this sheet.' She apologized and began with the excuses. We closed the door 6 minutes early. The taxi was uneventful to the deice pad. The south apron is located next to the runway in use. I made contact with the deice person and they confirmed they were using Type I and Type IV. The ATIS had changed 3 times by this point. The snow went from light to moderate and the visibility had dropped to 3;000 RVR. The preferred configuration is APU shutdown; both engines running. After about 10 or 15 minutes; contact was made and I was told 'ALL AIRCRAFT SURFACES ARE CLEAN AND THE START / END TIME; EMPLOYEE NAME AND NUMBER.' I looked out L2 and can only see the last slat and the winglets. L3 was covered in fluid. The small part of the wing that was visible to me looked green and clear. We changed frequencies and contacted the follow me truck to lead us off the ramp. We had multiple aircraft and deice trucks on both sides of us. We began to power up and the follow me truck called and stopped me before we began to move. He stated; 'Captain; you have a lot of ice and snow build up on your wing and engines.' I leaned my face up against the frame of the L1 and looked out. The First Officer looked out and said his was not bad. I then opened my window. The snow and fumes came into the cockpit. But; I was able to see the leading edge of the wing briefly and it was nothing but snow and ice. One section was approximately 6 -8 FT along the leading edge and about 1-2 FT back. It was a jagged line. The wing surface could not be seen. The follow me truck then stated there were other areas that had snow and ice build up on the wings. I told him we needed to do the whole procedure again. The trucks came back and told us they were sorry and then stated to me; 'CAPTAIN; WE NEED TO HURRY BECAUSE THE RUNWAY IS ABOUT TO CLOSE AGAIN FOR CLEANING AND IT TAKES ABOUT 20 MINUTES.' More pressure. They finished about 10-12 minutes later. We began the taxi off the ramp. We were holding short of the runway end pad. I had the First Officer go back and look at the wings and engines. We were now finally in a position to do a required run up of the engines. The engines had been running for nearly an hour and I had not been in an area to do the 70% N1 for 30 seconds every 30 minutes - clearing. The First Officer returned with all clear. When I did the engine power up the First Officer became vocal about being uncomfortable with the engines running so high on the surface snow. He asked me why I was doing it and stated that he had been on the airplane since a new hire and never ONCE witnessed anyone doing it. He said people only do it momentarily on the runway before take off. We were feeling rushed. The Tower told us we needed to hurry because there was an aircrafton final and they were trying to let us take off and another aircraft behind me before they closed the runways. Also; the First Officer was curious why I wanted to keep the APU running for the take off. He asked me the same question when I landed on the contaminated runway. I told him I would discuss it after we took off. From the time we left the deice pad and was given line up and wait the ATIS changed 2 times. The visibility had went from 3/4 to 1/2 and had been reporting Freezing Fog and Moderate Snow. The runway was mostly white except for the three tracks from where the aircraft wheels had been operating during take offs and landings. Those areas were turning into wet snow and slush. The Tower issued an unusual departure for 1L and cleared us for 'IMMEDIATE TAKE OFF'. Then he began at about 200 FT to ask us to tell him if we were in the turn yet. He did that twice. The Departure states to climb to 2;000 before any turn to assigned heading. I had been doing this for years. The whole event was challenging. Cold weather operations is constantly changing with bulletins. Because of money; we are now compromising safety and going against the studies of the National Weather Service and the NTSB. Because of money and the constant intimidation from management I am bombarded with a steady flow of threats from everyone I must rely on in this fast pace environment. When the hazardous weather appears; I must slow down. When I do however; I meet agitated employee groups that distract me with arguments or questions. This creates new threats due to the interruption of my thoughts. I think our system is set up for an accident. The company has removed the requirement to have the First Officer go back and inspect the wings and engines prior to departure. It is now only an option. When you make something an option - laziness and complacency prevails and it will now no longer be done. The contractor (who knows their actual experience level; pressure or distractions they were under) said my airplane was completely clean. Why did we remove the AIRMETS out of the flight plans? Dispatch told me that it was because it is all mostly little airplane stuff. Really!? Moderate turbulence FL280 to FL350 is little airplane stuff. Now; I just come to work and try to stay alive and not get violated because the environment is hostile and full of threats from all the failed procedures.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.