Narrative:

I continue to have very in depth conversations with local maintenance personnel concerning B737-800 thrust reverser problems. This plane had the same thrust reverser (TR) problem as others in our fleet. I requested in the log entry that the item not be signed off until proven the reverser was properly repaired. I explained in detail how this malfunction can be reproduced; as in advancing the throttles without TR activation. Bottom line; we have an endemic issue throughout the fleet on; in my estimation; about 10% of our planes in regards to the 737 thrust reversers. I will say again; as I said in my previous report; same problem; same plane. The 737 TR system requires 'multiple malfunctions' to allow TR deployment in flight. TR deployment in flight I might add; will most likely result in a hull loss. The above described issue is one of the 'required multiple malfunctions' necessary for an in-flight deployment. We are being forced to fly potentially unsafe planes since corporate maintenance managers fail to heed warnings and recommendations by one of their maintenance rated captains.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reports chronic issues with thrust reversers in some aircraft in his company's fleet. The thrust reverser fault light can be made to illuminate and remain so by advancing the thrust lever toward the takeoff position then retarding it to idle.

Narrative: I continue to have very in depth conversations with Local Maintenance personnel concerning B737-800 thrust reverser problems. This plane had the same thrust reverser (TR) problem as others in our fleet. I requested in the log entry that the item NOT be signed off until proven the reverser was properly repaired. I explained in detail how this malfunction can be reproduced; as in advancing the throttles without TR activation. Bottom line; we have an endemic issue throughout the fleet on; in my estimation; about 10% of our planes in regards to the 737 thrust reversers. I will say again; as I said in my previous report; same problem; same plane. The 737 TR system requires 'multiple malfunctions' to allow TR deployment in flight. TR deployment in flight I might add; will most likely result in a hull loss. The above described issue is one of the 'required multiple malfunctions' necessary for an in-flight deployment. We are being forced to fly potentially unsafe planes since Corporate Maintenance Managers fail to heed warnings and recommendations by one of their maintenance rated Captains.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.