37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 923806 |
Time | |
Date | 201012 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LAX.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types |
Narrative:
I was working flm position. I heard on the over-ride speaker the parallel monitor cancel a B747's approach clearance to runway 25L for insufficient spacing and told to maintain 2;000. There was training on the LC1 position. The LA1 position was staffed. After about 30 seconds; I saw no action being taken by the LC1 controllers. I said to LC1 and LA1 did you hear they canceled the B747's approach clearance. At that point the instructor started telling the developmental what to say. The B747 was on a mile to mile and half final. A CRJ7 was on departure roll on runway 25R. The developmental climbed the B747 to 3;000 ft. The aircraft did not react. When the B747 was at the threshold of runway 25L the developmental instructed the B747 to turn to a 200 heading. The developmental went to the CRJ7 and stopped their climb at 2;000 ft. The B747 started a slow climb to 3;000 and a slow turn to 200 heading but it appeared that they had altitude of 1;000 ft until 15 degree divergence was established. Though this was not a smooth operation; I believed there was no loss of separation. I discussed the event with the instructor; developmental and the LA1 controller on how the operation could have been run more smoothly. Contributing factors: 1. Developmental was training for the first time on that position. The instructor should have taken over the position. 2. At the time the parallel monitor canceled the B747's approach clearance both the LC1 position and LA1 position were off line coordinating with other controllers and did not react to the situation until I asked if they heard the approach clearance get canceled. 3. As the flm on duty; I observed the operation and believed that although not a good operation that no separation was lost. My decision was based on numerous previous events that were investigated and found that no separation was lost. I believe that the 7110.65 does not give clear guidance on and what separation criteria should be applied between a missed approach/go around aircraft and a departure from either the same runway or complex. I have seen and been told of many ways on how separation should be applied from this situation and it appears that it can be very subjective. I recommend: 1. Due to the significant amount of training being performed in the system; the instructors need to be very in tune with their developmental's experience level and capabilities for the developmental's time on position. 2. A better understanding from the parallel monitor of what the local controller should be doing after an approach clearance has been canceled. So if there is a lack of action by the local controller; the parallel monitor controller could be a team player and ensure that local heard the approach clearance cancellation. 3. More training on proper techniques to handle missed approaches and go-arounds. I think recurring refresher training should be mandatory.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A LAX Supervisor described a go around that had a potential conflict with a previous departure. Training; improved Parallel Monitoring and a lack of instructor intervention were noted as contributing factors.
Narrative: I was working FLM position. I heard on the over-ride speaker the Parallel Monitor cancel a B747's approach clearance to Runway 25L for insufficient spacing and told to maintain 2;000. There was training on the LC1 position. The LA1 position was staffed. After about 30 seconds; I saw no action being taken by the LC1 Controllers. I said to LC1 and LA1 did you hear they canceled the B747's approach clearance. At that point the instructor started telling the developmental what to say. The B747 was on a mile to mile and half final. A CRJ7 was on departure roll on Runway 25R. The developmental climbed the B747 to 3;000 FT. The aircraft did not react. When the B747 was at the threshold of Runway 25L the Developmental instructed the B747 to turn to a 200 heading. The Developmental went to the CRJ7 and stopped their climb at 2;000 FT. The B747 started a slow climb to 3;000 and a slow turn to 200 heading but it appeared that they had altitude of 1;000 FT until 15 degree divergence was established. Though this was not a smooth operation; I believed there was no loss of separation. I discussed the event with the instructor; developmental and the LA1 Controller on how the operation could have been run more smoothly. Contributing factors: 1. Developmental was training for the first time on that position. The instructor should have taken over the position. 2. At the time the Parallel Monitor canceled the B747's approach clearance both the LC1 position and LA1 position were off line coordinating with other controllers and did not react to the situation until I asked if they heard the approach clearance get canceled. 3. As the FLM on duty; I observed the operation and believed that although not a good operation that no separation was lost. My decision was based on numerous previous events that were investigated and found that no separation was lost. I believe that the 7110.65 does not give clear guidance on and what separation criteria should be applied between a missed approach/go around aircraft and a departure from either the same runway or complex. I have seen and been told of many ways on how separation should be applied from this situation and it appears that it can be very subjective. I recommend: 1. Due to the significant amount of training being performed in the system; the instructors need to be very in tune with their Developmental's experience level and capabilities for the Developmental's time on position. 2. A better understanding from the Parallel Monitor of what the Local Controller should be doing after an approach clearance has been canceled. So if there is a lack of action by the Local Controller; the Parallel Monitor Controller could be a team player and ensure that Local heard the approach clearance cancellation. 3. More training on proper techniques to handle missed approaches and go-arounds. I think recurring refresher training should be mandatory.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.