Narrative:

Our aircraft was dispatched with the auto throttle system inoperative due to previous write-up. The MEL was reviewed to determine the crew's operational requirements. The flight crew's preflight briefing and before takeoff briefings included crew actions for manual throttle use. We were assigned HAROB3 departure with instructions to climb and maintain 9;000 which were set in MCP. The first officer executed the takeoff and commenced climb with autopilot engaged and LNAV and VNAV selected.while in IMC the autopilot began level-off approaching 9;000 ft. ATC reported crossing traffic at 10 o'clock position and 10 miles and requested that we 'report the traffic in sight'. At that time we were leveling in the tops of an overcast/broken cloud layer. The captain searched visually for crossing traffic and reported it in sight.as the captain completed the traffic report and returned attention to monitoring flight instruments the first officer declared 'I have the throttles back and can't slow down!' the captain observed the airspeed at 290 KTS and increasing and immediately extended the speed brakes. The aircraft stopped accelerating and began to slow from 300 KTS. ATC then issued a clearance to climb and maintain 15;000. The first officer reset the MCP altitude to 15;000 and commenced a slow climb using VNAV. The captain selected vertical speed on the MCP and increased rate-of-climb to further slow the airplane to 250 KTS. Passing 9;500 the aircraft had slowed to 250 KTS and VNAV was reengaged. The flight continued without incident.despite the fact the crew researched and properly briefed operation without auto throttles; the first officer failed to properly operate the aircraft with reduced automation and failed to take proper corrective action upon recognizing the speed increase and did not immediately alert the captain of the deviation. The captain failed to properly monitor flight instruments as part of his pilot not flying duties. His fixation on searching for crossing traffic resulted in the breakdown of normal monitoring scan.once aware of the deviation; the captain took corrective actions without properly addressing assumption or relinquishing of aircraft control. The first officer closed the throttles. The captain took further corrective action by deploying speed brakes. When the altitude change was received the first officer took action by initiating climb. The captain took additional action during altitude change by increasing climb rate to decelerate.line crews are seldom faced with operation of aircraft with reduced automation. Although they may quickly become proficient during simulator training they will require a 'ramp-up' when first confronted with this scenario. A more extensive briefing on each phase of flight with emphasis on aircraft characteristics would help to ramp-up the crews for the operation. The pilot monitoring should be especially vigilant during transitions such as leveling after a climb or descent; or following a configuration change; as this is when the greatest change in thrust required occurs. Partial automation such as using the autopilot with LNAV and VNAV during an RNAV departure serves to partially disconnect the flying pilot from the 'feel' of the aircraft and may reduce the perceived need to scan all flight and performance instruments.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When dispatched with the auto throttles deferred inoperative; a B767-300ER flight crew failed to maintain airspeed below 250 KTS when leveling at 9;000 as cleared.

Narrative: Our aircraft was dispatched with the auto throttle system inoperative due to previous write-up. The MEL was reviewed to determine the crew's operational requirements. The flight crew's preflight briefing and before takeoff briefings included crew actions for manual throttle use. We were assigned HAROB3 Departure with instructions to climb and maintain 9;000 which were set in MCP. The First Officer executed the takeoff and commenced climb with autopilot engaged and LNAV and VNAV selected.While in IMC the autopilot began level-off approaching 9;000 FT. ATC reported crossing traffic at 10 o'clock position and 10 miles and requested that we 'Report the traffic in Sight'. At that time we were leveling in the tops of an overcast/broken cloud layer. The Captain searched visually for crossing traffic and reported it in sight.As the Captain completed the traffic report and returned attention to monitoring flight instruments the First Officer declared 'I have the throttles back and can't slow down!' The Captain observed the airspeed at 290 KTS and increasing and immediately extended the speed brakes. The aircraft stopped accelerating and began to slow from 300 KTS. ATC then issued a clearance to climb and maintain 15;000. The First Officer reset the MCP altitude to 15;000 and commenced a slow climb using VNAV. The Captain selected Vertical Speed on the MCP and increased rate-of-climb to further slow the airplane to 250 KTS. Passing 9;500 the aircraft had slowed to 250 KTS and VNAV was reengaged. The flight continued without incident.Despite the fact the crew researched and properly briefed operation without auto throttles; the First Officer failed to properly operate the aircraft with reduced automation and failed to take proper corrective action upon recognizing the speed increase and did not immediately alert the Captain of the deviation. The Captain failed to properly monitor Flight Instruments as part of his pilot not flying duties. His fixation on searching for crossing traffic resulted in the breakdown of normal monitoring scan.Once aware of the deviation; the Captain took corrective actions without properly addressing assumption or relinquishing of aircraft control. The First Officer closed the throttles. The Captain took further corrective action by deploying speed brakes. When the altitude change was received the First Officer took action by initiating climb. The Captain took additional action during altitude change by increasing climb rate to decelerate.Line crews are seldom faced with operation of aircraft with reduced automation. Although they may quickly become proficient during simulator training they will require a 'ramp-up' when first confronted with this scenario. A more extensive briefing on each phase of flight with emphasis on aircraft characteristics would help to ramp-up the crews for the operation. The pilot monitoring should be especially vigilant during transitions such as leveling after a climb or descent; or following a configuration change; as this is when the greatest change in thrust required occurs. Partial automation such as using the autopilot with LNAV and VNAV during an RNAV departure serves to partially disconnect the flying pilot from the 'feel' of the aircraft and may reduce the perceived need to scan all flight and performance instruments.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.