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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 925588 |
Time | |
Date | 201012 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Generator Drive |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 253 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 227 Flight Crew Type 9200 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
The flight departed approximately thirty minutes late due to deferring the APU generator (still could use air). We'd been at FL360 for approximately thirty minutes when the oil low pressure light on the number one engine generator CSD came on. I was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot not flying. The captain got the QRH; read the procedure for CSD low oil pressure; and proceeded to disconnect the number one engine generator. Since the APU generator was deferred; we were down to one generator. Load shedding of non-essential electric items ensued; including one left fuel pump; right electric hydraulic pump; the captain's forward window heat; the first officer's side window heat and several cabin items including galleys; lavatories; and some lights. The weather going at our destination was IMC with rain and icing in the descent. We followed the QRH procedures for CSD and the QRH procedures were followed for the remaining caution items related to the generator disconnect. All follow-on procedures were complied with. Regarding the fuel pump low pressure; we began a precautionary descent from FL360 in an effort to avoid fuel starvation to the number one engine. This was not in accordance with the QRH. (The QRH directs the descent if both fuel pumps are inoperable.) since the workload was relatively high (short time of flight remaining; communication with dispatch; QRH procedures; crew/passenger briefing; and landing tasks); we felt this to be a prudent call. Read and follow the QRH procedure to the letter. Get better rest the night before. I (the first officer) had a poor night's rest; and had gotten up very early to drive in to start the trip; and therefore was not at the top of my game. I felt the captain was much more on top of things than I was.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-300's left generator CSD low oil pressure light illuminated in flight with the APU generator on MEL. The CSD was disconnected; an emergency was declared and the flight continued to the planned destination.
Narrative: The flight departed approximately thirty minutes late due to deferring the APU generator (still could use air). We'd been at FL360 for approximately thirty minutes when the oil low pressure light on the number one engine generator CSD came on. I was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot not flying. The Captain got the QRH; read the procedure for CSD low oil pressure; and proceeded to disconnect the number one engine generator. Since the APU generator was deferred; we were down to one generator. Load shedding of non-essential electric items ensued; including one left fuel pump; right electric hydraulic pump; the Captain's forward window heat; the First Officer's side window heat and several cabin items including galleys; lavatories; and some lights. The weather going at our destination was IMC with rain and icing in the descent. We followed the QRH procedures for CSD and the QRH procedures were followed for the remaining caution items related to the generator disconnect. All follow-on procedures were complied with. Regarding the fuel pump low pressure; we began a precautionary descent from FL360 in an effort to avoid fuel starvation to the number one engine. This was not in accordance with the QRH. (The QRH directs the descent if both fuel pumps are inoperable.) Since the workload was relatively high (short time of flight remaining; communication with Dispatch; QRH procedures; crew/passenger briefing; and landing tasks); we felt this to be a prudent call. Read and follow the QRH procedure to the letter. Get better rest the night before. I (the First Officer) had a poor night's rest; and had gotten up very early to drive in to start the trip; and therefore was not at the top of my game. I felt the Captain was much more on top of things than I was.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.