Narrative:

[The] crew [requested] a mechanic. I had arrived at the aircraft with passengers boarding. The captain's concern was that the cockpit door was placed on an MEL that he had questions about. He stated that the cockpit door was operating fine for him without any problems. I told him I didn't know the particular reason for this but that it may be intermittent. After briefly discussing the MEL he had pointed out to me that the door had not been deactivated; or made 'inoperative;' as the MEL stated to do so. At this point the passengers had finished boarding and one of the flight attendants had begun making some announcements.I started feeling anxious and a little nervous so I stopped looking at the MEL and felt that maybe what the captain was trying to tell me was correct about the automatic door lock having to be 'inoperative' to make this MEL correct. At this time I made a phone call to one of the mechanics and asked how a cockpit door was deactivated for this type of MEL. I briefly described the captain's findings and the determination to quickly solve this problem without any delay. The call lasted only moments as it was the busiest time of the morning push and [the mechanic] was already rushing to get the next aircraft to the gate with the other mechanics.I quickly deactivated the [door] keypad. I misinterpreted the MEL requiring the crews ability to secure the door lock manually while in the cockpit and being able to unlock the door manually to exit the cockpit. The captain was aware of this and had observed these requirements and with no further questions about the MEL. He went about his duties to prepare for the pushback. At this time I thought that I had fixed a minor issue and corrected a simple MEL discrepancy and quickly exited the aircraft. I had just made another mistake. I had not entered a discrepancy in the logbook and failed to catch it. On my way back to the hanger the aircraft pushed back and taxied off. [When] I got back to the hangar; maintenance control advised me that I may have made an error by deactivating the keypad. Now that I finally had time to look at the MEL in the office without any pressure or time constraints I had finally seen what I failed to catch reading the MEL on the hammerhead; that the captain was showing me in the busy cockpit and environment around me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Line Mechanic reported he failed to make a logbook write-up after deactivating a cockpit door keypad.

Narrative: [The] crew [requested] a Mechanic. I had arrived at the aircraft with passengers boarding. The Captain's concern was that the cockpit door was placed on an MEL that he had questions about. He stated that the cockpit door was operating fine for him without any problems. I told him I didn't know the particular reason for this but that it may be intermittent. After briefly discussing the MEL he had pointed out to me that the door had not been deactivated; or made 'inoperative;' as the MEL stated to do so. At this point the passengers had finished boarding and one of the flight attendants had begun making some announcements.I started feeling anxious and a little nervous so I stopped looking at the MEL and felt that maybe what the Captain was trying to tell me was correct about the automatic door lock having to be 'inoperative' to make this MEL correct. At this time I made a phone call to one of the mechanics and asked how a cockpit door was deactivated for this type of MEL. I briefly described the Captain's findings and the determination to quickly solve this problem without any delay. The call lasted only moments as it was the busiest time of the morning push and [the Mechanic] was already rushing to get the next aircraft to the gate with the other mechanics.I quickly deactivated the [door] keypad. I misinterpreted the MEL requiring the crews ability to secure the door lock manually while in the cockpit and being able to unlock the door manually to exit the cockpit. The Captain was aware of this and had observed these requirements and with no further questions about the MEL. He went about his duties to prepare for the pushback. At this time I thought that I had fixed a minor issue and corrected a simple MEL discrepancy and quickly exited the aircraft. I had just made another mistake. I had not entered a discrepancy in the logbook and failed to catch it. On my way back to the hanger the aircraft pushed back and taxied off. [When] I got back to the hangar; Maintenance Control advised me that I may have made an error by deactivating the keypad. Now that I finally had time to look at the MEL in the office without any pressure or time constraints I had finally seen what I failed to catch reading the MEL on the hammerhead; that the Captain was showing me in the busy cockpit and environment around me.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.