Narrative:

During the later part of cruise; we lost our right emergency AC bus. The loss of this bus causes a level one alert with no consequences listed. Additionally this causes the loss of the three display units on the first officer's side: the IRU 2; the global navigation system 2; central air data computer 2; along with several other engine and fuel alerts. We methodically worked through the QRH for each of the alerts and concluded that the aircraft; engines; fuel system; long range navigation and category 1 capabilities were still intact. We notified our dispatcher of our situation and checked weather. The dispatcher in consultation with the duty officer suggested we change our alternate and gave us time and burn to the new alternate. After receiving the response from the dispatcher and after discussing the situation with the first officer and relief first officer; I felt that landing at our planned destination was safe and that we would immediately divert to our new alternate if needed. We all agreed on this conclusion. I briefed our plan to the crew and the approach and landing at our scheduled destination were uneventful. We had multiple alerts and many issues to deal with. In my effort to deal with the safety and legal issues; I neglected to notify ATC that we lost required equipment for rvsm. We were on autopilot 1; using central air data computer 1 for the entire flight. There were no traffic conflicts as far as I know. We had multiple alerts and many issues to deal with. None of the QRH procedures that we worked with mention the possible loss of rvsm capability. This may be a helpful addition to the QRH; as it might help the crew to remember this issue during a situation with multiple failures and issues; similar to ours. Adding notes to consider loss of rvsm capability to the sections of the QRH that pertain to rvsm equipment would be helpful. It was a long process in determining that we were still safely aviating and navigating; coordinating with our dispatcher; gathering weather information and soliciting ideas and opinions from the crew. Again; the airplane was still fully functional; category 1 capable with all of the instruments on the captain's side and 2 functional autopilots. It was decided that declaring an emergency was not necessary in the current situation. We would declare an emergency if things deteriorated. It is possible that in the process of declaring an emergency; ATC would have asked what equipment we had lost or specifically if we were still rvsm capable. Declaring an emergency would also have allowed us to deviate from rvsm minimum equipment requirement as well as any other regulations that may have been at issue with our flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An MD11's right emergency AC bus failed in flight. The QRH procedures for the systems lost was completed and the flight continued to its destination but the crew failed to notify ATC about its lost RVSM capabilities.

Narrative: During the later part of cruise; we lost our right emergency AC bus. The loss of this bus causes a level one alert with no consequences listed. Additionally this causes the loss of the three display units on the First Officer's side: the IRU 2; the global navigation system 2; central air data computer 2; along with several other engine and fuel alerts. We methodically worked through the QRH for each of the alerts and concluded that the aircraft; engines; fuel system; long range navigation and Category 1 capabilities were still intact. We notified our Dispatcher of our situation and checked weather. The Dispatcher in consultation with the Duty Officer suggested we change our alternate and gave us time and burn to the new alternate. After receiving the response from the Dispatcher and after discussing the situation with the First Officer and Relief First Officer; I felt that landing at our planned destination was safe and that we would immediately divert to our new alternate if needed. We all agreed on this conclusion. I briefed our plan to the crew and the approach and landing at our scheduled destination were uneventful. We had multiple alerts and many issues to deal with. In my effort to deal with the safety and legal issues; I neglected to notify ATC that we lost required equipment for RVSM. We were on autopilot 1; using central air data computer 1 for the entire flight. There were no traffic conflicts as far as I know. We had multiple alerts and many issues to deal with. None of the QRH procedures that we worked with mention the possible loss of RVSM capability. This may be a helpful addition to the QRH; as it might help the crew to remember this issue during a situation with multiple failures and issues; similar to ours. Adding notes to consider loss of RVSM capability to the sections of the QRH that pertain to RVSM equipment would be helpful. It was a long process in determining that we were still safely aviating and navigating; coordinating with our Dispatcher; gathering weather information and soliciting ideas and opinions from the crew. Again; the airplane was still fully functional; Category 1 capable with all of the instruments on the Captain's side and 2 functional autopilots. It was decided that declaring an emergency was not necessary in the current situation. We would declare an emergency if things deteriorated. It is possible that in the process of declaring an emergency; ATC would have asked what equipment we had lost or specifically if we were still RVSM capable. Declaring an emergency would also have allowed us to deviate from RVSM minimum equipment requirement as well as any other regulations that may have been at issue with our flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.