Narrative:

Shortly after liftoff; I realized the caravan's right cowling was not secured. I told the tower that I would make a left 180 and land on the parallel runway. I did that. The mistake was mine in not insuring that the cowling was secure before departure. The cowling had been opened to accept a heater hose to warm the engine. The hose had been removed and the heater pulled away from the aircraft before I walked out with my passengers. Normally I'd run my hand down the side of the caravan touching and looking at what needed to be latched; secured; or stowed before climbing into the aircraft. This is important because I'm not the only person loading or putting heat on the airplane. On this day I helped a young mother with three small children out to the aircraft. I walked past the cowling with her; the kids and an arm full of small children paraphernalia. After I loaded her and the kids; the father came out in a hurry and slipped near the door dropping the family's lunch. I helped the father pickup their lunch and finished my walk around from there. The key here seems to be watch for the unusual. Let the unusual be the alert to pay closer attention or start again from the beginning. The landing was accomplished safely. I taxied off the runway; secured the cowling and returned to company for a maintenance check of the aircraft.I called the tower to tell them why I had done what I'd done while the mechanics were looking at the cowling. The controller I spoke to told me they'd noticed the cowling was open about a second before I called and that they understood why I'd done what I'd done. I explained that I figured I had three options: 1. I could land straight ahead on the 'ski strip' but I didn't know what the surface was like.2. I could stay in the pattern with right traffic and land on the departure runway but I really didn't want to continue with the cowling moving up and down any longer than I needed to.3. I could make a left 180 from the altitude I was at and land on the long runway to my left adjacent to the fire station. I knew that there were no inbound aircraft for the long parallel runway. I also knew that an airport service vehicle had requested access to the long runway; the runway I intended to land on. I heard two tower voices. One that cleared me for takeoff and another while I was on my modified base leg and then the original voice that told me to go-around as I was flaring on the long parallel runway. I think I was told to go around because there was an airport service vehicle on the runway; I saw his headlights as I was landing. I didn't go around because I wanted to get on the ground. I was in distress and figured the tower would sort out the rest. I do not believe the airport service vehicle and my aircraft were a hazard to each other. In this case neither of us was required to take immediate corrective action to avoid a collision. I understand there is heightened concern regarding runway incursions. I believe that the direction to go around was intended to mitigate a runway incursion did not apply to my situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C208 pilot reports departing with the engine cowl not latched and requesting a 180 degree turn to land on the parallel runway. The pilot is issued a go around in the flare by the Tower due to an airport vehicle on the runway; which is ignored.

Narrative: Shortly after liftoff; I realized the Caravan's right cowling was not secured. I told the Tower that I would make a left 180 and land on the parallel runway. I did that. The mistake was mine in not insuring that the cowling was secure before departure. The cowling had been opened to accept a heater hose to warm the engine. The hose had been removed and the heater pulled away from the aircraft before I walked out with my passengers. Normally I'd run my hand down the side of the Caravan touching and looking at what needed to be latched; secured; or stowed before climbing into the aircraft. This is important because I'm not the only person loading or putting heat on the airplane. On this day I helped a young mother with three small children out to the aircraft. I walked past the cowling with her; the kids and an arm full of small children paraphernalia. After I loaded her and the kids; the father came out in a hurry and slipped near the door dropping the family's lunch. I helped the father pickup their lunch and finished my walk around from there. The key here seems to be watch for the unusual. Let the unusual be the alert to pay closer attention or start again from the beginning. The landing was accomplished safely. I taxied off the runway; secured the cowling and returned to company for a maintenance check of the aircraft.I called the Tower to tell them why I had done what I'd done while the mechanics were looking at the cowling. The Controller I spoke to told me they'd noticed the cowling was open about a second before I called and that they understood why I'd done what I'd done. I explained that I figured I had three options: 1. I could land straight ahead on the 'Ski Strip' but I didn't know what the surface was like.2. I could stay in the pattern with right traffic and land on the departure runway but I really didn't want to continue with the cowling moving up and down any longer than I needed to.3. I could make a left 180 from the altitude I was at and land on the long runway to my left adjacent to the fire station. I knew that there were no inbound aircraft for the long parallel runway. I also knew that an airport service vehicle had requested access to the long runway; the runway I intended to land on. I heard two Tower voices. One that cleared me for takeoff and another while I was on my modified base leg and then the original voice that told me to go-around as I was flaring on the long parallel runway. I think I was told to go around because there was an airport service vehicle on the runway; I saw his headlights as I was landing. I didn't go around because I wanted to get on the ground. I was in distress and figured the Tower would sort out the rest. I do not believe the airport service vehicle and my aircraft were a hazard to each other. In this case neither of us was required to take immediate corrective action to avoid a collision. I understand there is heightened concern regarding runway incursions. I believe that the direction to go around was intended to mitigate a runway incursion did not apply to my situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.