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Attributes | |
ACN | 927728 |
Time | |
Date | 201101 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | IAD.Airport |
State Reference | DC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A330 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Saab 340 Undifferentiated |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was working all three finals at dulles combined; having just relieved another controller. During the briefing the controller advised me that a SF34; approaching the airport from the west; had been 'cleared for the visual'. I incorrectly assumed he meant cleared for the visual to 01C; when in fact he had been cleared for the visual to 01R. Had I checked the scratch pad I would've realized this; or had I picked up on something he added at the end of the briefing; that 01C was now open but had been closed and so I could expect several aircraft to be tagged for 01R no matter where they were approaching from. Unfortunately; I didn't realize the problem and turned the SF34 in for 01R; believing the A330 was heading to 01C. After I had cleared the SF34 for the visual reference the airport I realized the issue and called traffic to the SF34 in an attempt to gain visual separation. He eventually sighted the A330; but at this point separation had diminished to below 2.5 miles lateral; I'm not sure what the vertical separation was. Additionally; the SF34 was significantly faster than the A330 and advised that he was slowing to his approach speed. I acknowledge his transmission and switched him to the tower; but lateral separation continued to diminish; eventually forcing a go-around. This error was the result of inattention to briefing items on my part and an incomplete briefing from the relieved controller. However; the responsibility must lie with me to verify the landing runway assignment of all aircraft when assuming control of the position. Relieved controllers should advise specifically of any unusual situations; such as an aircraft cleared for; an other than; expected runway. Relieving controllers must verify all scratch pad data and ask for any clarification if there is doubt about a particular aircraft's plan.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PCT Controller described a loss of separation event during visual approach procedures to the Runway 01 complex; noting the failure of a proper relief briefing and data block observance as causal factors.
Narrative: I was working all three finals at Dulles combined; having just relieved another Controller. During the briefing the Controller advised me that a SF34; approaching the airport from the west; had been 'cleared for the visual'. I incorrectly assumed he meant cleared for the visual to 01C; when in fact he had been cleared for the visual to 01R. Had I checked the scratch pad I would've realized this; or had I picked up on something he added at the end of the briefing; that 01C was now open but had been closed and so I could expect several aircraft to be tagged for 01R no matter where they were approaching from. Unfortunately; I didn't realize the problem and turned the SF34 in for 01R; believing the A330 was heading to 01C. After I had cleared the SF34 for the visual reference the airport I realized the issue and called traffic to the SF34 in an attempt to gain visual separation. He eventually sighted the A330; but at this point separation had diminished to below 2.5 miles lateral; I'm not sure what the vertical separation was. Additionally; the SF34 was significantly faster than the A330 and advised that he was slowing to his approach speed. I acknowledge his transmission and switched him to the Tower; but lateral separation continued to diminish; eventually forcing a go-around. This error was the result of inattention to briefing items on my part and an incomplete briefing from the Relieved Controller. However; the responsibility must lie with me to verify the landing runway assignment of all aircraft when assuming control of the position. Relieved Controllers should advise specifically of any unusual situations; such as an aircraft cleared for; an other than; expected runway. Relieving Controllers must verify all scratch pad data and ask for any clarification if there is doubt about a particular aircraft's plan.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.