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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 929319 |
Time | |
Date | 201101 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Generator Drive |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
On climbout; we experienced an intermittent idg 2 caution message. By the time we could start the QRH the message went away. We reviewed the QRH for idg 2 caution just in case it came back permanently. The directions involved disconnecting the idg in flight among other items. For redundancy in case the idg spontaneously failed; we left the APU running to avoid a single gen situation. We contacted dispatch informing them of the situation and asked them to have maintenance ready so we could continue our flying as soon as possible as we were already late. The idg disconnect procedure directs the mechanic to check the APU oil level and we confirmed with dispatch that the APU needed to be shut down for 20 minutes prior to oil check for accuracy. We shut the APU down 15 minutes prior to landing to expedite our turn around time. After parking at the gate; I started my flow to shut down the #2 engine leaving just #1 motor/gen online. Switching the gen 2 switch to off/reset; we lost all power to the aircraft and AC ess caution was displayed. I immediately turned gen 2 back on and restored power to the aircraft as we still had passengers on board. My first officer and I concluded that gen 1 did not pick up the load shed by gen 2 and in fact; removed itself as an available gen. We concentrated our attention on the AC elec page and I again switched off gen 2. Again; the aircraft went to battery power and gen 1 removed itself from availability. I tried this one more time for a total of 3 attempts to get gen 1 to auto transfer power to bus 2 and stay online with no success. By this time the jetway was hooked up but the ground power from the jetway was inoperative likely due to the cold according to the operations agent. Another power cart was hooked up shortly thereafter and we shut the engines down. I called maintenance with the write up for the idg 2 caution and after conferring with dispatch; he decided to MEL the idg. I told him we would be calling back after completing the long list of items required by the MEL and also informed him we had another issue with gen 1 we would be writing up after we secured the idg. After disconnecting the idg and completing the MEL items; I called maintenance back to let them know we had accomplished the required items and now had an additional write up I had mentioned the first time we spoke. This is when the conflict really began. Before I gave the official write up for the gen 1 auto transfer failure; I explained the problem to him exactly as it happened. He asked me if I had checked the gen switching during the MEL process for the idg. I said yes and told him we had no switching issues after disconnecting the idg. He became defensive and started to pressure me to take the aircraft because the 'resetting the aircraft obviously opened the sticky contacts'. I agreed that had worked but told him I had no guarantee that gen 1 would pick up the load in flight if we lost the APU. That would lead to an emergency power situation and a dropped air driven generator. At this point; he threatened to call the assistant chief pilot. I informed him that would be great and I would like to explain the situation to him. The assistant chief pilot didn't answer and the maintenance controller then threatened to call the chief pilot. Again; I said my stance wouldn't change and I would like to speak with him. At this point I was on hold for a few minutes and then got cut off. I called back and again and his attitude was significantly better this time and we proceeded to collectively put in a write up detailing the gen 1 situation. He asked me to have the mechanic call him for details. While on the phone; it was obvious the mechanic was being pressured into signing off the write up without examining any piece of equipment. The mechanic declined to sign it off citing no way to ensure the problem was corrected. After hanging up; the mechanic reiterated this information to me.I felt extremely threatened over the phone because of a legitimate write up concerning the safety of flight of one of our aircraft. When I mentioned 'safety of flight' to the controller; his exact words to me were; 'oh; so you are going to pull the safety card now?' there was absolutely no reason for him to verbally threaten and harass me by calling the assistant chief pilot or chief pilot. I understand it was a rough maintenance day but that is no reason to berate a crew into flying an unsafe aircraft. In the future; I would like to have a better working relationship with the maintenance controllers instead of the very adversarial one I experienced.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ200 First Officer reports intermittent IDG 2 caution message in flight. When the number 2 generator is shut down at the gate the number 1 generator will not pick up the load. After the number 2 IDG is disconnected and the APU is started the electrical systems transfers normally. The reporter has reservations however and declines the aircarft.
Narrative: On climbout; we experienced an intermittent IDG 2 caution message. By the time we could start the QRH the message went away. We reviewed the QRH for IDG 2 caution just in case it came back permanently. The directions involved disconnecting the IDG in flight among other items. For redundancy in case the IDG spontaneously failed; we left the APU running to avoid a single GEN situation. We contacted Dispatch informing them of the situation and asked them to have maintenance ready so we could continue our flying as soon as possible as we were already late. The IDG disconnect procedure directs the mechanic to check the APU oil level and we confirmed with Dispatch that the APU needed to be shut down for 20 minutes prior to oil check for accuracy. We shut the APU down 15 minutes prior to landing to expedite our turn around time. After parking at the gate; I started my flow to shut down the #2 engine leaving just #1 Motor/GEN online. Switching the GEN 2 switch to OFF/RESET; we lost all power to the aircraft and AC ESS caution was displayed. I immediately turned GEN 2 back on and restored power to the aircraft as we still had passengers on board. My First Officer and I concluded that GEN 1 did not pick up the load shed by GEN 2 and in fact; removed itself as an available GEN. We concentrated our attention on the AC ELEC page and I again switched off GEN 2. Again; the aircraft went to battery power and GEN 1 removed itself from availability. I tried this one more time for a total of 3 attempts to get GEN 1 to auto transfer power to BUS 2 and stay online with no success. By this time the jetway was hooked up but the ground power from the jetway was inoperative likely due to the cold according to the Operations Agent. Another power cart was hooked up shortly thereafter and we shut the engines down. I called Maintenance with the write up for the IDG 2 caution and after conferring with Dispatch; he decided to MEL the IDG. I told him we would be calling back after completing the long list of items required by the MEL and also informed him we had another issue with GEN 1 we would be writing up after we secured the IDG. After disconnecting the IDG and completing the MEL items; I called Maintenance back to let them know we had accomplished the required items and now had an additional write up I had mentioned the first time we spoke. This is when the conflict really began. Before I gave the official write up for the GEN 1 auto transfer failure; I explained the problem to him exactly as it happened. He asked me if I had checked the GEN switching during the MEL process for the IDG. I said yes and told him we had no switching issues after disconnecting the IDG. He became defensive and started to pressure me to take the aircraft because the 'resetting the aircraft obviously opened the sticky contacts'. I agreed that had worked but told him I had no guarantee that GEN 1 would pick up the load in flight if we lost the APU. That would lead to an EMER Power situation and a dropped ADG. At this point; he threatened to call the Assistant Chief Pilot. I informed him that would be great and I would like to explain the situation to him. The Assistant Chief Pilot didn't answer and the Maintenance Controller then threatened to call the Chief Pilot. Again; I said my stance wouldn't change and I would like to speak with him. At this point I was on hold for a few minutes and then got cut off. I called back and again and his attitude was significantly better this time and we proceeded to collectively put in a write up detailing the GEN 1 situation. He asked me to have the Mechanic call him for details. While on the phone; it was obvious the Mechanic was being pressured into signing off the write up without examining any piece of equipment. The Mechanic declined to sign it off citing no way to ensure the problem was corrected. After hanging up; the Mechanic reiterated this information to me.I felt extremely threatened over the phone because of a legitimate write up concerning the safety of flight of one of our aircraft. When I mentioned 'safety of flight' to the Controller; his exact words to me were; 'oh; so you are going to pull the safety card now?' There was absolutely no reason for him to verbally threaten and harass me by calling the Assistant Chief Pilot or Chief Pilot. I understand it was a rough maintenance day but that is no reason to berate a crew into flying an unsafe aircraft. In the future; I would like to have a better working relationship with the Maintenance Controllers instead of the very adversarial one I experienced.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.