Narrative:

During this phase of flight the flap/slat handle was selected to 5 degrees while 15 degrees was required. This improper selection was initially missed on the checklist, however was corrected before the taxi checklist was called complete. The entire flight was normal west/O any operation contrary to the federal aviation regulations. Such positioning errors may be a result of 1 or more of the following: when the flight crew operated 3 series of aircraft within a single aircraft type with variations on each aircraft within each series. Operating these different aircraft on a daily basis. Transfer of crewmembers from aircraft to aircraft on a rapid fast moving flight schedule. Such errors may be reduced with some of the following suggestions: a type of regulatory environment for cockpit standards. Flight crew scheduling flts with aircraft with minor differences and variations. Cockpit standards or lack thereof has resulted in various areas throughout the cockpit. Careful review of the cockpit checklist corrected the flap setting. Such may not always be the case. An example seems to be developing in the advanced automated cockpit consisting of FMS/insecond officermega long range navigation systems. It has been my experience the many keyboard differences to accomplish the same function not only occurs between aircraft type and series, but now may result within the same cockpit. Some type of regulation governing cockpit/keyboard standards may provide the answer. As always, careful checklist review by the flight crew is always required.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF FLAP SETTING IN ERROR. CAUGHT BY FLT CREW BEFORE TKOF.

Narrative: DURING THIS PHASE OF FLT THE FLAP/SLAT HANDLE WAS SELECTED TO 5 DEGS WHILE 15 DEGS WAS REQUIRED. THIS IMPROPER SELECTION WAS INITIALLY MISSED ON THE CHKLIST, HOWEVER WAS CORRECTED BEFORE THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS CALLED COMPLETE. THE ENTIRE FLT WAS NORMAL W/O ANY OPERATION CONTRARY TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGS. SUCH POSITIONING ERRORS MAY BE A RESULT OF 1 OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING: WHEN THE FLT CREW OPERATED 3 SERIES OF ACFT WITHIN A SINGLE ACFT TYPE WITH VARIATIONS ON EACH ACFT WITHIN EACH SERIES. OPERATING THESE DIFFERENT ACFT ON A DAILY BASIS. TRANSFER OF CREWMEMBERS FROM ACFT TO ACFT ON A RAPID FAST MOVING FLT SCHEDULE. SUCH ERRORS MAY BE REDUCED WITH SOME OF THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: A TYPE OF REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR COCKPIT STANDARDS. FLT CREW SCHEDULING FLTS WITH ACFT WITH MINOR DIFFERENCES AND VARIATIONS. COCKPIT STANDARDS OR LACK THEREOF HAS RESULTED IN VARIOUS AREAS THROUGHOUT THE COCKPIT. CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE COCKPIT CHKLIST CORRECTED THE FLAP SETTING. SUCH MAY NOT ALWAYS BE THE CASE. AN EXAMPLE SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING IN THE ADVANCED AUTOMATED COCKPIT CONSISTING OF FMS/INS/OMEGA LONG RANGE NAV SYSTEMS. IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THE MANY KEYBOARD DIFFERENCES TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME FUNCTION NOT ONLY OCCURS BTWN ACFT TYPE AND SERIES, BUT NOW MAY RESULT WITHIN THE SAME COCKPIT. SOME TYPE OF REG GOVERNING COCKPIT/KEYBOARD STANDARDS MAY PROVIDE THE ANSWER. AS ALWAYS, CAREFUL CHKLIST REVIEW BY THE FLT CREW IS ALWAYS REQUIRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.