Narrative:

[We had a] normal approach and landing; ILS to runway 03. During landing rollout; a loud bang was heard in the cockpit. Eids showed a red ball for engine #2. The egt indication was off scale high; the entire gage was red with the overtemp. At the time of the occurrence; N1 for engine #2 was at 75% while the engine was in reverse. I was requested during the landing rollout to motor the engine by the captain; which I did using my left hand to hold the switch. I was using my right hand to run the checklist and get the APU (auxiliary power unit) started. The captain brought the aircraft to a stop on taxiway fox; and we performed the after landing checklist. We were called by the tower at this turning point and they said we had a problem with the #2 engine. They asked us if we wanted the fire department to respond; and the captain declined. Then the captain started to taxi the airplane to the parking spot; which is very close to the exit onto fox taxiway. As we taxied onto the parking spot; we experienced an engine fire warning on the #2 engine; and at this point the captain directed the first officer and I to run the engine fire checklist; which we did. We discharged the one fire bottle; then as per the checklist; discharged the other one. At this point the fire department was at the airplane and put the fire out with water. At this point the first officer and I also ran the evacuation checklist; but everyone was off the airplane at this point. The captain had at this juncture went downstairs to assess the situation. I feel our judgment and performance were poor. We were operating at 20+ hours at this point. A look back we should have declared fatigue before we flew across the ocean. This put me into a situation where we flew through our normal sleep cycle; and at the end of the trip. If there is a catastrophic event; in this case a compressor stall accompanied by excessive egt that the fire department should respond immediately until they clear you for operations. When we were clear of the runway; we should have stopped the operation; shut down the engine and not moved until cleared by the fire department. Inaction on the crew's behalf to recognize the severity of the situation; not being proactive about the emergency; led to the engine fire. Crew coordination; communication; and CRM were all affected by the long crew duty day. Safe operations require the entire crew to be on top of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 had an engine compressor stall on landing which turned into a fire as the aircraft was taxied to the ramp after a twenty hour duty day. ATC identified the engine problem before the fire warning but the crew elected no assistance.

Narrative: [We had a] normal approach and landing; ILS to Runway 03. During landing rollout; a loud bang was heard in the cockpit. EIDS showed a red ball for engine #2. The EGT indication was off scale high; the entire gage was red with the overtemp. At the time of the occurrence; N1 for engine #2 was at 75% while the engine was in reverse. I was requested during the landing rollout to motor the engine by the Captain; which I did using my left hand to hold the switch. I was using my right hand to run the checklist and get the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) started. The Captain brought the aircraft to a stop on Taxiway Fox; and we performed the After Landing checklist. We were called by the Tower at this turning point and they said we had a problem with the #2 engine. They asked us if we wanted the Fire Department to respond; and the Captain declined. Then the Captain started to taxi the airplane to the parking spot; which is very close to the exit onto Fox Taxiway. As we taxied onto the parking spot; we experienced an engine fire warning on the #2 engine; and at this point the Captain directed the First Officer and I to run the Engine Fire Checklist; which we did. We discharged the one fire bottle; then as per the checklist; discharged the other one. At this point the Fire Department was at the airplane and put the fire out with water. At this point the First Officer and I also ran the Evacuation checklist; but everyone was off the airplane at this point. The Captain had at this juncture went downstairs to assess the situation. I feel our judgment and performance were poor. We were operating at 20+ hours at this point. A look back we should have declared fatigue before we flew across the ocean. This put me into a situation where we flew through our normal sleep cycle; and at the end of the trip. If there is a catastrophic event; in this case a compressor stall accompanied by excessive EGT that the Fire Department should respond immediately until they clear you for operations. When we were clear of the runway; we should have stopped the operation; shut down the engine and not moved until cleared by the Fire Department. Inaction on the crew's behalf to recognize the severity of the situation; not being proactive about the emergency; led to the engine fire. Crew coordination; communication; and CRM were all affected by the long crew duty day. Safe operations require the entire crew to be on top of the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.