Narrative:

Training was in progress with numerous aircraft of various types/speeds into the primary airport. We accepted a hand off from bhm approach on an aircraft that was southbound; leveling at 10;000 but would be climbing with ZTL sector 14. We accepted a hand off from ZTL 14 on a BE9L headed eastbound at 11;000 to cross the flight path of the point out. When the BE9L checked on; he asked for lower; in preparation for landing at a satellite airport well ahead. Our LOA with ZTL also requires that we descend aircraft as soon as possible. The trainee issued a clearance to the BE9L to descend; taking into account our requirement to descend traffic out of the center airspace and the pilots request for lower; expecting that the center would also climb the point-out aircraft. After about a mile; I observed that the BE9L was not descending very effectively and the other aircraft did not appear to be climbing. I told the radar data controller to call the center sector and coordinate to improve the situation and I told the BE9L to expedite his descent through 9;000 for crossing traffic and to turn 15 degrees right; the turn limitation authorized in the LOA with ZTL. This only improved the situation a little bit; because the BE9L turned and descended slowly. The ZTL sector had not answered the land line call and apparently the radar data controller had given up trying to make contact. I turned the BE9L further south for a total of about 90 degrees and got on the line to the center and announced that I was turning the traffic in their airspace reference the traffic that they were working in my airspace. When they finally answered the line; then they climbed the other traffic. The combined descent of one and the climb of the other and the turn resolved the situation. Recommendation; ZTL should not have switched the BE9L to us at 11;000 until he was past the 10;000 ft traffic that they were working in our airspace. ZTL was apparently too busy to answer landlines to coordinate. We should not have descended our traffic through the 10;000 ft point out; but this was done based on the expectation that the center would keep the point out climbing. I should have taken firmer action sooner to prevent the situation from developing as far as it did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MGM Controller providing OJT described a loss of separation event during a descent effort when the conflicting aircraft was on another sectors frequency.

Narrative: Training was in progress with numerous aircraft of various types/speeds into the primary airport. We accepted a hand off from BHM Approach on an aircraft that was southbound; leveling at 10;000 but would be climbing with ZTL Sector 14. We accepted a hand off from ZTL 14 on a BE9L headed eastbound at 11;000 to cross the flight path of the point out. When the BE9L checked on; he asked for lower; in preparation for landing at a satellite airport well ahead. Our LOA with ZTL also requires that we descend aircraft as soon as possible. The trainee issued a clearance to the BE9L to descend; taking into account our requirement to descend traffic out of the center airspace and the pilots request for lower; expecting that the Center would also climb the point-out aircraft. After about a mile; I observed that the BE9L was not descending very effectively and the other aircraft did not appear to be climbing. I told the RADAR Data Controller to call the Center sector and coordinate to improve the situation and I told the BE9L to expedite his descent through 9;000 for crossing traffic and to turn 15 degrees right; the turn limitation authorized in the LOA with ZTL. This only improved the situation a little bit; because the BE9L turned and descended slowly. The ZTL sector had not answered the land line call and apparently the RADAR Data Controller had given up trying to make contact. I turned the BE9L further south for a total of about 90 degrees and got on the line to the Center and announced that I was turning the traffic in their airspace reference the traffic that they were working in my airspace. When they finally answered the line; then they climbed the other traffic. The combined descent of one and the climb of the other and the turn resolved the situation. Recommendation; ZTL should not have switched the BE9L to us at 11;000 until he was past the 10;000 FT traffic that they were working in our airspace. ZTL was apparently too busy to answer landlines to coordinate. We should not have descended our traffic through the 10;000 FT point out; but this was done based on the expectation that the Center would keep the point out climbing. I should have taken firmer action sooner to prevent the situation from developing as far as it did.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.