Narrative:

I met my first officer approximately one hour prior to the scheduled departure and we reviewed the dispatch paperwork. The first officer commented that there was an MEL related to the fuel system and proceeded to print the MEL and review it with me. At the aircraft I reviewed the logbook and noted that the MEL relating to the fuel system was the result of an inflight divert to an airport where our company does not have scheduled service. I knew that the deferral may have been performed by contract maintenance and I wanted to insure that the dispatch maintenance procedure [dmp] had been properly performed. I also noticed that the deferral log had not been properly signed off by the mechanic; so after completing my walk around inspection of the aircraft; I asked the mechanic to come up and complete the deferral log. While he was in the cockpit he assured me that if it was signed off then it had been performed correctly. So; trusting the mechanic was correct; I continued with my normal preflight procedures. We pushed back and were cleared to start engines. During the engine start sequence we received a level 2 engine pump off alert while initiating each engine start. During this time we realized that they had switched runways and were now landing and taking off to the south. I instructed the first officer to rerun the takeoff data while I completed the engine starts. I received the same level 2 alert during each engine start but continued with the start sequence without investigating the cause of the alert. We proceeded to taxi to the assigned runway for take off. The first officer completed the runway change procedure and I verified the numbers as he entered them into the FMS. He briefed the takeoff and at the completion of the brief; I noticed that there was a level 1 air message and noticed that the econ switch had been selected. I asked if we had dry ice on board and he said no and he returned the switch to its normal position. I noticed that the level one air message extinguished and we were left with only the level one fuel alert; which was explained by the fact that we were operating the fuel system in the manual mode.I then called for the before takeoff checklist and the first officer completed that checklist. I felt that we had missed something and asked the first officer if all the manual procedures relating to the fuel system had been completed and he responded they had. We were then cleared into position for takeoff. I still felt that we were missing something and again asked that first officer while on the runway if we had completed all the manual procedures for the fuel system and he removed his checklist and looked at it and responded affirmatively.we were cleared for takeoff and departed. We were initially cleared to 5;000 ft and runway heading. I completed the after take off checklist from memory and then we were cleared to further climb to 10;000 ft and cleared on course. I executed those changes along with a frequency change and checked in with the new controller. I then took the checklist out and reviewed that I had completed the normal after takeoff items and proceeded to complete the manual procedures listed on the reverse side of the checklist.in the process of completing these procedures I realized that the number two engine had rolled back and we got a level two engine 2 low RPM message. I directed the first officer to continue flying while I read the checklist. It was at this point that we realized that we had not selected the engine fuel pumps on prior to starting the engines. As soon as I noticed the number two engine had rolled back I asked ATC if we could level at 230 instead of 330 while we worked a problem. They re-cleared us to 230. We completed the inflight engine start checklist and achieved a successful restart of the number two engine. We remained at 230 for five minutes with the number two engine in idle. After five minutes we verified that the engine was operating normally and requested a climb to 330; which was our planned cruising altitude. I did not declare an emergency because the engine was operating normally by the time I thought to advise ATC.the flight proceeded normally until we received a level 2 fuel unbalance alert in cruise. We completed the fuel crossfeed checklist as directed. I discontinued crossfeed operation on final approach and we landed with an indicated 1;200 pound fuel imbalance. When we blocked in the indicated imbalance was 2;500 pounds. Maintenance later informed us that the imbalance increased to over 4;000 pounds just prior to refueling. They indicated this was to be expected with the fuel system deferral that was in effect. They did agree to perform the dmp again to insure that it had been done correctly. We did not experience any abnormal fuel imbalance during the return flight.several things contributed to our problems on this trip. First; I was distracted by my concern that the fuel system dmp had not been properly performed and that caused me to neglect my own procedures by failing to address the abnormal fuel message. Second; I cut my first officer out of the loop when I asked him to recalculate the take off performance data while I completed the engine start sequence. Third; I neglected to resolve my feeling that we had missed performing the manual fuel procedures. Fourth; during the return flight the first officer informed me that he had significant hearing loss in his left ear and that he often had trouble hearing me. I don't know that I ever effectively communicated to him that I felt we had missed the manual fuel procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An MD11 flight crew encountered a variety of partially self-inflicted fuel system related anomalies--including a #2 Engine flame out during the climb; when the Captain allowed himself to be distracted by operational and administrative problems rather than ensuring that the fuel system issues were properly resolved.

Narrative: I met my First Officer approximately one hour prior to the scheduled departure and we reviewed the dispatch paperwork. The First Officer commented that there was an MEL related to the fuel system and proceeded to print the MEL and review it with me. At the aircraft I reviewed the logbook and noted that the MEL relating to the fuel system was the result of an inflight divert to an airport where our company does not have scheduled service. I knew that the deferral may have been performed by contract maintenance and I wanted to insure that the Dispatch Maintenance Procedure [DMP] had been properly performed. I also noticed that the deferral log had not been properly signed off by the mechanic; so after completing my walk around inspection of the aircraft; I asked the mechanic to come up and complete the deferral log. While he was in the cockpit he assured me that if it was signed off then it had been performed correctly. So; trusting the mechanic was correct; I continued with my normal preflight procedures. We pushed back and were cleared to start engines. During the engine start sequence we received a level 2 engine pump off alert while initiating each engine start. During this time we realized that they had switched runways and were now landing and taking off to the south. I instructed the First Officer to rerun the takeoff data while I completed the engine starts. I received the same level 2 alert during each engine start but continued with the start sequence without investigating the cause of the alert. We proceeded to taxi to the assigned runway for take off. The First Officer completed the runway change procedure and I verified the numbers as he entered them into the FMS. He briefed the takeoff and at the completion of the brief; I noticed that there was a level 1 air message and noticed that the econ switch had been selected. I asked if we had dry ice on board and he said no and he returned the switch to its normal position. I noticed that the level one air message extinguished and we were left with only the level one fuel alert; which was explained by the fact that we were operating the fuel system in the manual mode.I then called for the before takeoff checklist and the First Officer completed that checklist. I felt that we had missed something and asked the First Officer if all the manual procedures relating to the fuel system had been completed and he responded they had. We were then cleared into position for takeoff. I still felt that we were missing something and again asked that First Officer while on the runway if we had completed all the manual procedures for the fuel system and he removed his checklist and looked at it and responded affirmatively.We were cleared for takeoff and departed. We were initially cleared to 5;000 FT and runway heading. I completed the after take off checklist from memory and then we were cleared to further climb to 10;000 FT and cleared on course. I executed those changes along with a frequency change and checked in with the new controller. I then took the checklist out and reviewed that I had completed the normal after takeoff items and proceeded to complete the manual procedures listed on the reverse side of the checklist.In the process of completing these procedures I realized that the number two engine had rolled back and we got a level two engine 2 low RPM message. I directed the First Officer to continue flying while I read the checklist. It was at this point that we realized that we had not selected the engine fuel pumps on prior to starting the engines. As soon as I noticed the number two engine had rolled back I asked ATC if we could level at 230 instead of 330 while we worked a problem. They re-cleared us to 230. We completed the inflight engine start checklist and achieved a successful restart of the number two engine. We remained at 230 for five minutes with the number two engine in idle. After five minutes we verified that the engine was operating normally and requested a climb to 330; which was our planned cruising altitude. I did not declare an emergency because the engine was operating normally by the time I thought to advise ATC.The flight proceeded normally until we received a level 2 fuel unbalance alert in cruise. We completed the fuel crossfeed checklist as directed. I discontinued crossfeed operation on final approach and we landed with an indicated 1;200 LB fuel imbalance. When we blocked in the indicated imbalance was 2;500 LBS. Maintenance later informed us that the imbalance increased to over 4;000 LBS just prior to refueling. They indicated this was to be expected with the fuel system deferral that was in effect. They did agree to perform the DMP again to insure that it had been done correctly. We did not experience any abnormal fuel imbalance during the return flight.Several things contributed to our problems on this trip. First; I was distracted by my concern that the fuel system DMP had not been properly performed and that caused me to neglect my own procedures by failing to address the abnormal fuel message. Second; I cut my First Officer out of the loop when I asked him to recalculate the take off performance data while I completed the engine start sequence. Third; I neglected to resolve my feeling that we had missed performing the manual fuel procedures. Fourth; during the return flight the First Officer informed me that he had significant hearing loss in his left ear and that he often had trouble hearing me. I don't know that I ever effectively communicated to him that I felt we had missed the manual fuel procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.