Narrative:

While departing via the teterboro six departure for runway 24; situational awareness was lost by both flight crew members. I was the pilot flying and prior to engine start had reviewed the departure procedure; which calls for an initial climb heading 240 to 1;500 ft; then a right turn to heading 280; crossing 4.5 DME teb at 1500 ft; then maintain 2;000 ft. During taxi; this procedure was also discussed as part of the departure briefing. Immediately after departure; we encountered continuous moderate turbulence. I climbed via the 240 heading to 1;500 ft and leveled off; however I did not execute the right turn to a 280 heading. For some reason; I had decided that we were not to turn until crossing the 4.5 DME of teb VOR.the captain was switched to departure control prior to our level off; and reported our climb to 1;500 ft. After leveling off; and continuing on the 240 heading; a very irate controller asked if we were 'turning right; like you're supposed to?' at this point the pilot not flying advised that we were; and I immediately began a right turn to a 280 heading. The controller also advised us of a possible traffic conflict with a boeing 757 on approach to newark at our 11 O'clock; and 3/4 of a mile who would shortly be descending through our altitude if we didn't hasten the turn.neither the captain nor I had recognized the mistake; until it was brought to our attention by the controller. I was busy trying to keep the aircraft under control and maintain the altitude; and I believe the pilot not flying was too concerned with my struggles with the aircraft to recognize the problem as well. Had the controller not said anything; I believe we would have continued on the 240 heading until 4.5 DME; before executing the rest of the departure procedure.given the poor weather; and the congested nature of the airspace; I believe it would have been prudent to give up my leg of the flight to the more experienced pilot on the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE560 flight crew failed to comply with the track requirements of the Teterboro SID from TEB.

Narrative: While departing via the Teterboro Six departure for Runway 24; situational awareness was lost by both flight crew members. I was the pilot flying and prior to engine start had reviewed the departure procedure; which calls for an initial climb heading 240 to 1;500 FT; then a right turn to heading 280; crossing 4.5 DME TEB at 1500 FT; then maintain 2;000 FT. During taxi; this procedure was also discussed as part of the departure briefing. Immediately after departure; we encountered continuous moderate turbulence. I climbed via the 240 heading to 1;500 FT and leveled off; however I did not execute the right turn to a 280 heading. For some reason; I had decided that we were not to turn until crossing the 4.5 DME of TEB VOR.The Captain was switched to Departure Control prior to our level off; and reported our climb to 1;500 FT. After leveling off; and continuing on the 240 heading; a very irate Controller asked if we were 'turning right; like you're supposed to?' At this point the pilot not flying advised that we were; and I immediately began a right turn to a 280 heading. The Controller also advised us of a possible traffic conflict with a Boeing 757 on approach to Newark at our 11 O'clock; and 3/4 of a mile who would shortly be descending through our altitude if we didn't hasten the turn.Neither the Captain nor I had recognized the mistake; until it was brought to our attention by the Controller. I was busy trying to keep the aircraft under control and maintain the altitude; and I believe the pilot not flying was too concerned with my struggles with the aircraft to recognize the problem as well. Had the Controller not said anything; I believe we would have continued on the 240 heading until 4.5 DME; before executing the rest of the Departure Procedure.Given the poor weather; and the congested nature of the airspace; I believe it would have been prudent to give up my leg of the flight to the more experienced pilot on the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.