Narrative:

A low pass (1010' AGL) occurred at animas airpark en route to durango, co, from grand junction, co, in an medium large transport advanced. After passing manca intersection, aircraft turned east on V211 (dro 272/025). Denver center cleared aircraft out of 17000 MSL to 11000 MSL. Passing 13000 MSL, descending out of overcast ceiling, captain visually acquired 14,246 MSL. Mt wilson to the north and durango airport approximately 16 NM to the east. Captain advised center 'field in sight.' first officer, who was flying, acknowledged he saw the field. Denver center cleared aircraft for visual approach to durango. (Reported visibility: 75 NM. Actually may have been 25-30 due to clouds, shadows, late afternoon light.) at this point, captain initiated radio calls to company operations and durango unicom, while monitoring denver center. Extreme difficulty was encountered in communicating with company due to broken unreadable xmissions. Unicom advised 1 light aircraft in runway 20 pattern. This aircraft did not respond to captain's radio calls over unicom, but finally transmitted 'eastbound, downwind,' in a foreign accent, hesitantly. While trying to verify this aircraft's position and also picking up arrival calls from an air carrier medium large transport, captain advised first officer to extend downwind as aircraft appeared high for a left base leg. Unicom advised aircraft departing eastbound, initially denied, then confirmed by company operations. After several further exchanges, company declared area clear, during which time first officer turned north to final, and aircraft was confirmed for landing. At this time, perhaps 7-8 NM final, captain overheard cabin attendants PA advising cabin they were about to make a final collection of trash and loose items. Captain immediately made PA to advise attendants to take seats, as landing was 2 mins away. Captain switched VOR #1 to durango localizer while continuing to scan for 2 known aircraft in the area. Upon looking at field, about 3-4 NM final, captain realized and stated, 'that's not durango,' and verified off flags on localizer. First officer completed go around. A 180 degree right climbing turn was executed, over animas airpark, to a left downwind for runway 2 at durango, the landing checklist re-accomplished and intentions announced to company, unicom, and center. A normal landing at durango runway 2 occurred at xa:37 pm local time. After clearing runway, first officer cancelled IFR with center. Company FAA approved operations specifications require the monitoring of 3 frequencys (with 2 radios) vice the normal 1 (ie, approach or tower) at airports with no operating control tower. This attempt to make up for the lack of radar/tower observers by communications overkill, contributes to the non-flying pilot's workload excessively. It also exposes the possibility of a poor radio, causing additional confusion, as in this case. It is apparent that while captain and first officer both had airports in sight, they were 2 different facilities. Additionally, the less experienced first officer was denied the benefit of a depiction of the animas airpark on his durango ILS DME runway 2 approach plate. The airports are both single runway, nearly parallel, and only 6 1/2 NM apart-both lying along V211. Yet, animas does not appear on the plate. The captain was sufficiently busy with radio work and traffic scanning that he was not ready to observe the final approach view of the runway until 4 NM final. Fortunately, being very familiar with durango, the captain recognized immediately upon sighting the field for which the aircraft was aligned, that it was not the correct airport, thereby averting a landing at animas airpark. While the first officer had doubts due to NAVAID indication, he decided to wait until the captain had concluded the required (but excessive and unnecessary) communications to be confirmed in his suspicions. To prevent future misarrivals at durango airport, I recommend: add animas airpark depiction to durango approach plates, delete the requirement for company operations communication at uncontrolled fields since this procedure is redundant, less accurate, and possibly in opposition to unicom information, causes excessive pilot workload, and is not monitored by other aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 93677. I saw flags in the ADI and HSI, but the captain was too busy to identify the ILS for me. He switched over to the ILS shortly after. Here I lost my azimuth to the dro VOR located at the end of the landing runway. After completing the landing checklist, we both realized that we were aligned with the wrong runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: APCH IN VISUAL CONDITIONS TO WRONG ARPT. GO AROUND EXECUTED BEFORE LNDG.

Narrative: A LOW PASS (1010' AGL) OCCURRED AT ANIMAS AIRPARK ENRTE TO DURANGO, CO, FROM GRAND JUNCTION, CO, IN AN MLG ADVANCED. AFTER PASSING MANCA INTXN, ACFT TURNED E ON V211 (DRO 272/025). DENVER CENTER CLRED ACFT OUT OF 17000 MSL TO 11000 MSL. PASSING 13000 MSL, DSNDING OUT OF OVCST CEILING, CAPT VISUALLY ACQUIRED 14,246 MSL. MT WILSON TO THE N AND DURANGO ARPT APPROX 16 NM TO THE E. CAPT ADVISED CENTER 'FIELD IN SIGHT.' F/O, WHO WAS FLYING, ACKNOWLEDGED HE SAW THE FIELD. DENVER CENTER CLRED ACFT FOR VISUAL APCH TO DURANGO. (RPTED VISIBILITY: 75 NM. ACTUALLY MAY HAVE BEEN 25-30 DUE TO CLOUDS, SHADOWS, LATE AFTERNOON LIGHT.) AT THIS POINT, CAPT INITIATED RADIO CALLS TO COMPANY OPS AND DURANGO UNICOM, WHILE MONITORING DENVER CENTER. EXTREME DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED IN COMMUNICATING WITH COMPANY DUE TO BROKEN UNREADABLE XMISSIONS. UNICOM ADVISED 1 LIGHT ACFT IN RWY 20 PATTERN. THIS ACFT DID NOT RESPOND TO CAPT'S RADIO CALLS OVER UNICOM, BUT FINALLY XMITTED 'EBND, DOWNWIND,' IN A FOREIGN ACCENT, HESITANTLY. WHILE TRYING TO VERIFY THIS ACFT'S POS AND ALSO PICKING UP ARRIVAL CALLS FROM AN ACR MLG, CAPT ADVISED F/O TO EXTEND DOWNWIND AS ACFT APPEARED HIGH FOR A LEFT BASE LEG. UNICOM ADVISED ACFT DEPARTING EBND, INITIALLY DENIED, THEN CONFIRMED BY COMPANY OPS. AFTER SEVERAL FURTHER EXCHANGES, COMPANY DECLARED AREA CLR, DURING WHICH TIME F/O TURNED N TO FINAL, AND ACFT WAS CONFIRMED FOR LNDG. AT THIS TIME, PERHAPS 7-8 NM FINAL, CAPT OVERHEARD CABIN ATTENDANTS PA ADVISING CABIN THEY WERE ABOUT TO MAKE A FINAL COLLECTION OF TRASH AND LOOSE ITEMS. CAPT IMMEDIATELY MADE PA TO ADVISE ATTENDANTS TO TAKE SEATS, AS LNDG WAS 2 MINS AWAY. CAPT SWITCHED VOR #1 TO DURANGO LOC WHILE CONTINUING TO SCAN FOR 2 KNOWN ACFT IN THE AREA. UPON LOOKING AT FIELD, ABOUT 3-4 NM FINAL, CAPT REALIZED AND STATED, 'THAT'S NOT DURANGO,' AND VERIFIED OFF FLAGS ON LOC. F/O COMPLETED GO AROUND. A 180 DEG RIGHT CLBING TURN WAS EXECUTED, OVER ANIMAS AIRPARK, TO A LEFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 2 AT DURANGO, THE LNDG CHKLIST RE-ACCOMPLISHED AND INTENTIONS ANNOUNCED TO COMPANY, UNICOM, AND CENTER. A NORMAL LNDG AT DURANGO RWY 2 OCCURRED AT XA:37 PM LOCAL TIME. AFTER CLRING RWY, F/O CANCELLED IFR WITH CENTER. COMPANY FAA APPROVED OPS SPECS REQUIRE THE MONITORING OF 3 FREQS (WITH 2 RADIOS) VICE THE NORMAL 1 (IE, APCH OR TWR) AT ARPTS WITH NO OPERATING CTL TWR. THIS ATTEMPT TO MAKE UP FOR THE LACK OF RADAR/TWR OBSERVERS BY COMS OVERKILL, CONTRIBUTES TO THE NON-FLYING PLT'S WORKLOAD EXCESSIVELY. IT ALSO EXPOSES THE POSSIBILITY OF A POOR RADIO, CAUSING ADDITIONAL CONFUSION, AS IN THIS CASE. IT IS APPARENT THAT WHILE CAPT AND F/O BOTH HAD ARPTS IN SIGHT, THEY WERE 2 DIFFERENT FACILITIES. ADDITIONALLY, THE LESS EXPERIENCED F/O WAS DENIED THE BENEFIT OF A DEPICTION OF THE ANIMAS AIRPARK ON HIS DURANGO ILS DME RWY 2 APCH PLATE. THE ARPTS ARE BOTH SINGLE RWY, NEARLY PARALLEL, AND ONLY 6 1/2 NM APART-BOTH LYING ALONG V211. YET, ANIMAS DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE PLATE. THE CAPT WAS SUFFICIENTLY BUSY WITH RADIO WORK AND TFC SCANNING THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO OBSERVE THE FINAL APCH VIEW OF THE RWY UNTIL 4 NM FINAL. FORTUNATELY, BEING VERY FAMILIAR WITH DURANGO, THE CAPT RECOGNIZED IMMEDIATELY UPON SIGHTING THE FIELD FOR WHICH THE ACFT WAS ALIGNED, THAT IT WAS NOT THE CORRECT ARPT, THEREBY AVERTING A LNDG AT ANIMAS AIRPARK. WHILE THE F/O HAD DOUBTS DUE TO NAVAID INDICATION, HE DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL THE CAPT HAD CONCLUDED THE REQUIRED (BUT EXCESSIVE AND UNNECESSARY) COMS TO BE CONFIRMED IN HIS SUSPICIONS. TO PREVENT FUTURE MISARRIVALS AT DURANGO ARPT, I RECOMMEND: ADD ANIMAS AIRPARK DEPICTION TO DURANGO APCH PLATES, DELETE THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMPANY OPS COM AT UNCONTROLLED FIELDS SINCE THIS PROC IS REDUNDANT, LESS ACCURATE, AND POSSIBLY IN OPPOSITION TO UNICOM INFO, CAUSES EXCESSIVE PLT WORKLOAD, AND IS NOT MONITORED BY OTHER ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 93677. I SAW FLAGS IN THE ADI AND HSI, BUT THE CAPT WAS TOO BUSY TO IDENTIFY THE ILS FOR ME. HE SWITCHED OVER TO THE ILS SHORTLY AFTER. HERE I LOST MY AZIMUTH TO THE DRO VOR LOCATED AT THE END OF THE LNDG RWY. AFTER COMPLETING THE LNDG CHKLIST, WE BOTH REALIZED THAT WE WERE ALIGNED WITH THE WRONG RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.