Narrative:

To start our day; we showed up at the airport and discovered that our flight was delayed. There was also a gate change that was not reflected on the flight status boards. I got a call from scheduling asking where we were. So at that point we hurried to the new gate to prepare for the flight. When boarded our aircraft; I received a briefing from the inbound captain in which he notified me that he had written up and deferred the cabin PA system. Also about that time I was notified of an FAA cockpit jumpseater that was there to do line check on us. This added to the pressure of the already late departure. I stowed my belongings and began to do my cockpit preflight and setup. After that was complete; I reviewed the applicable MEL items; including the inoperative PA system. This particular item required a thorough flight attendant briefing; which I was about to give; when the first officer entered the flight deck from his preflight and informed me that the nosewheel strut was somewhat deflated. I acknowledged him and said that I would get back to it after my flight attendant briefing. I exited the flight deck and briefed the flight attendants and returned to the flight deck where I was met by the FAA inspector; who was waiting to see my credentials. I provided them; during which I neglected to inspect the nose gear. This may or may not have contributed to the problem later. I briefed the FAA inspector on cockpit procedures; and then we closed up and pushed back. The push and taxi were uneventful. We took off and after the gear was selected up (about 200 ft AGL) we received a yellow steering inoperative caution message; followed by a red gear disagree warning message. The annunciator for the nose gear was intermittent red as well. I continued the takeoff profile through the after takeoff check; after which I called for the gear disagree abnormal checklist; followed by the steering inoperative abnormal checklist. We completed both checklists. The checklist guided us to lower the landing gear and land at the nearest suitable airport. We advised ATC that we would need to hold somewhere to burn off fuel; since we were about 8;000 pounds over maximum landing weight; and then informed him of our need to return. He granted our requests and cleared us to a fix on the final approach course for the longest runway and told us to hold there. We held for over an hour (fully configured) until we had burned enough fuel to be under maximum landing weight. During our hold; I gave a thorough briefing on the approach and landing; which included my decision to exit the runway using differential thrust and brakes; and then call for the tug to come get us. Also during our wait; I briefed the forward flight attendant on our situation so he could make a passenger PA informing them what was going on. The inoperative PA was definitely hindering me from doing that part of my job. I also briefed the first officer and the flight attendant that we were not declaring an emergency; since the gear was down and locked. We also decided that we would not need arff trucks waiting for us when we landed. The landing and rollout were smooth and uneventful; and I exited the runway about half way down and steered it to the parallel taxiway. We then called operations to come tug us to the gate. When the ramp agents arrived with the tug; I asked how the nose gear looked and they told me that it was fully compressed. We shut down and they towed us to the gate where we deplaned the passengers. Maintenance was waiting for us and completed their inspection of the nose gear; which confirmed the ramp agent's statement. I wrote it up; and on site maintenance filled the strut with nitrogen and performed the necessary paperwork. Then; a taxi check was required so we performed that. In the interim; they canceled our flight and told us that we were going to reposition the aircraft with the gear down; which we did uneventfully.the event occurred because of an aircraft malfunction; but perhaps could have been mitigated or avoided if better crew communication could have been facilitated. Due to all of the circumstances; this was a very difficult task. Perhaps better prioritization of tasks on my part would have helped greatly; since an aircraft condition; such as the strut; is more of a pressing issue that the flight attendant briefing; having the FAA inspector looking over our shoulders; while this didn't cause anything; was certainly a big distraction and perhaps clouded my judgment a bit. Also; the inoperative PA system complicated the situation; distracting me and not allowing me to perform part of my job in a normal fashion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 flight crew experienced a steering inop caution after takeoff and a gear disagree caution when the gear was retracted. A low nose wheel strut was noted by the First Officer during preflight and reported but not addressed prior to takeoff due delays; MEL procedures and an FAA inspector on the jump seat.

Narrative: To start our day; we showed up at the airport and discovered that our flight was delayed. There was also a gate change that was not reflected on the flight status boards. I got a call from Scheduling asking where we were. So at that point we hurried to the new gate to prepare for the flight. When boarded our aircraft; I received a briefing from the inbound Captain in which he notified me that he had written up and deferred the Cabin PA system. Also about that time I was notified of an FAA cockpit jumpseater that was there to do line check on us. This added to the pressure of the already late departure. I stowed my belongings and began to do my cockpit preflight and setup. After that was complete; I reviewed the applicable MEL items; including the inoperative PA system. This particular item required a thorough flight attendant briefing; which I was about to give; when the First Officer entered the flight deck from his preflight and informed me that the nosewheel strut was somewhat deflated. I acknowledged him and said that I would get back to it after my flight attendant briefing. I exited the flight deck and briefed the Flight Attendants and returned to the flight deck where I was met by the FAA Inspector; who was waiting to see my credentials. I provided them; during which I neglected to inspect the nose gear. This may or may not have contributed to the problem later. I briefed the FAA Inspector on cockpit procedures; and then we closed up and pushed back. The push and taxi were uneventful. We took off and after the gear was selected up (about 200 FT AGL) we received a yellow STEERING INOP caution message; followed by a red GEAR DISAGREE warning message. The annunciator for the nose gear was intermittent red as well. I continued the takeoff profile through the After Takeoff check; after which I called for the GEAR DISAGREE abnormal checklist; followed by the STEERING INOP abnormal checklist. We completed both checklists. The checklist guided us to lower the landing gear and land at the nearest suitable airport. We advised ATC that we would need to hold somewhere to burn off fuel; since we were about 8;000 LBS over maximum landing weight; and then informed him of our need to return. He granted our requests and cleared us to a fix on the final approach course for the longest runway and told us to hold there. We held for over an hour (fully configured) until we had burned enough fuel to be under maximum landing weight. During our hold; I gave a thorough briefing on the approach and landing; which included my decision to exit the runway using differential thrust and brakes; and then call for the tug to come get us. Also during our wait; I briefed the forward Flight Attendant on our situation so he could make a passenger PA informing them what was going on. The inoperative PA was definitely hindering me from doing that part of my job. I also briefed the First Officer and the Flight Attendant that we were not declaring an emergency; since the gear was down and locked. We also decided that we would not need ARFF trucks waiting for us when we landed. The landing and rollout were smooth and uneventful; and I exited the runway about half way down and steered it to the parallel taxiway. We then called operations to come tug us to the gate. When the ramp agents arrived with the tug; I asked how the nose gear looked and they told me that it was fully compressed. We shut down and they towed us to the gate where we deplaned the passengers. Maintenance was waiting for us and completed their inspection of the nose gear; which confirmed the ramp agent's statement. I wrote it up; and on site Maintenance filled the strut with nitrogen and performed the necessary paperwork. Then; a taxi check was required so we performed that. In the interim; they canceled our flight and told us that we were going to reposition the aircraft with the gear down; which we did uneventfully.The event occurred because of an aircraft malfunction; but perhaps could have been mitigated or avoided if better crew communication could have been facilitated. Due to all of the circumstances; this was a very difficult task. Perhaps better prioritization of tasks on my part would have helped greatly; since an aircraft condition; such as the strut; is more of a pressing issue that the flight attendant briefing; having the FAA Inspector looking over our shoulders; while this didn't cause anything; was certainly a big distraction and perhaps clouded my judgment a bit. Also; the inoperative PA system complicated the situation; distracting me and not allowing me to perform part of my job in a normal fashion.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.