Narrative:

On approach to atlanta we were vectored for runway 8L. The current ATIS was reporting 6 miles in haze and stated that approaches ILS prm 8L 9R and 10 were in use. My first officer briefed the ILS prm 8L expecting an ILS approach. Twenty miles from the airport we were asked if we had the airport in site. We advised approach that we did not and were instructed to join the localizer. We joined the localizer still expecting clearance for the ILS to 8L. After joining the localizer we were repeatedly asked if the airport was in sight; we did not. We were then advised that a crj was joining the approach ahead of us. Approach slowed us several times until we reached 164 KIAS; minimum speed for our weight at flaps 30. We advised ATC that we could not slow any more. We were than asked repeatedly if we had the traffic insight; we did not. The amount of times that the approach controller asked us if we hat the traffic insight made it clear that he had put the aircraft ahead of us with no plan to keep us separated; assuming that we would see it and separate ourselves. We were running at the top of the haze layer (5;000 MSL) and having a hard time finding the traffic or the airport. Eventually we were given a clearance to descend lower but we were full scale high on the glide slope. Descending to 4;000 we did get the airport in sight but it was clear that we were not in position to land. I was going to advise approach that we could not land from our current position but before I could; a different controller came on and advised us to stop our decent and fly a heading of 360. We were then re-vectored for the approach. On the downwind leg the controller who had vectored us off the approach gave us a phone number and asked us to call the tower after we landed. When we landed it became clear why approach control was rushing the arrivals. Aircraft were lined up to depart to the west and we were one of the last aircraft to land to the east. I called the number given after landing. I spoke to someone in atlanta. He/she didn't understand how other aircraft had seen the airport and we didn't. I don't know either; but find it irrelevant. My responsibility is the safety of my aircraft. He/she went on for several minutes saying he/she had to go over the tapes to determine what approach we were told to expect. Again I don't think this is important. Until we see the airport; and are in a position to land; a visual approach is not an option and it doesn't matter what we were told to expect and went on to say he/she was going to call the company. I don't know what he/she was trying to accomplish with this remark but it was clear that he/she was less than happy about how I operated my aircraft. Perhaps he/she was trying to intimidate me into accepting clearances that were; in my opinion; less than safe so they could speed up the last few approaches before they turned the airport around. It was clear that he/she was very frustrated but I feel he/she should have directed his frustration at the controller who set up this situation. Suggestions; approach controllers should not vector aircraft together expecting them to see each other and separate themselves. Until visual contact is made; there should be a plan to keep them separate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier landing ATL was issued a go around after not being able to sight the airport or preceding traffic; the reporter displeased with ATC handling of this visual approach attempt.

Narrative: On approach to Atlanta we were vectored for Runway 8L. The current ATIS was reporting 6 miles in haze and stated that approaches ILS PRM 8L 9R and 10 were in use. My First Officer briefed the ILS PRM 8L expecting an ILS approach. Twenty miles from the airport we were asked if we had the airport in site. We advised approach that we did not and were instructed to join the LOC. We joined the localizer still expecting clearance for the ILS to 8L. After joining the Localizer we were repeatedly asked if the airport was in sight; we did not. We were then advised that a CRJ was joining the approach ahead of us. Approach slowed us several times until we reached 164 KIAS; minimum speed for our weight at flaps 30. We advised ATC that we could not slow any more. We were than asked repeatedly if we had the traffic insight; we did not. The amount of times that the Approach Controller asked us if we hat the traffic insight made it clear that he had put the aircraft ahead of us with no plan to keep us separated; assuming that we would see it and separate ourselves. We were running at the top of the haze layer (5;000 MSL) and having a hard time finding the traffic or the airport. Eventually we were given a clearance to descend lower but we were full scale high on the glide slope. Descending to 4;000 we did get the airport in sight but it was clear that we were not in position to land. I was going to advise Approach that we could not land from our current position but before I could; a different Controller came on and advised us to stop our decent and fly a heading of 360. We were then re-vectored for the approach. On the downwind leg the Controller who had vectored us off the approach gave us a phone number and asked us to call the Tower after we landed. When we landed it became clear why Approach Control was rushing the arrivals. Aircraft were lined up to depart to the West and we were one of the last aircraft to land to the East. I called the number given after landing. I spoke to someone in Atlanta. He/she didn't understand how other aircraft had seen the airport and we didn't. I don't know either; but find it irrelevant. My responsibility is the safety of my aircraft. He/she went on for several minutes saying he/she had to go over the tapes to determine what approach we were told to expect. Again I don't think this is important. Until we see the airport; and are in a position to land; a visual approach is not an option and it doesn't matter what we were told to expect and went on to say he/she was going to call the company. I don't know what he/she was trying to accomplish with this remark but it was clear that he/she was less than happy about how I operated my aircraft. Perhaps he/she was trying to intimidate me into accepting clearances that were; in my opinion; less than safe so they could speed up the last few approaches before they turned the airport around. It was clear that he/she was very frustrated but I feel he/she should have directed his frustration at the Controller who set up this situation. Suggestions; Approach Controllers should not vector aircraft together expecting them to see each other and separate themselves. Until visual contact is made; there should be a plan to keep them separate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.