Narrative:

On arrival into mlb; we were given vectors to set us up for the visual approach. Approximately 15 miles northwest of the field and level at 3;000 ft; we noticed converging traffic on the TCAS display. We began visually looking for the traffic. Within a few moments; we had a visual on the traffic. On the TCAS display; he indicated at our altitude and approximately 1 mile and closing. At this time; ATC seemed somewhat saturated and had not issued an instruction...also; we received a TCAS alert. As the traffic approached; it appeared slightly above our altitude (maybe 50 or 100 ft). Waiting for an instruction; I disengaged the autopilot and realizing we were not going to receive an instruction and that the aircraft was quickly converging [on] our course I decided to take evasive action. However; as I was about to enter a right descending turn; ATC gave the instruction 'turn left heading; change of plans; turn right heading (I do not recall heading assignment) and descend to 2;000 ft' (although this is not meant to be a direct quote; it is a close approximation of the instructions). The instruction seemed odd as the traffic was coming from our left; but I banked left for a split second and then quickly banked right. Also; I had already begun a pitch down for a descent as the aircraft was above us. So; at the point that I was about 30 to 40 degree bank and approximately 6 to 8 degrees nose down; roughly 2;900 ft and descending; the TCAS gave us an RA to climb. At this time; the aircraft was in sight above us (appeared to be a cessna) and compliance with the RA was not practical as it would have climbed us into the aircraft. We continued our descent and leveled at 2;000 ft; keeping the aircraft in sight throughout the entire maneuver; until we were clear of the conflict. I am unsure exactly how close we came; but he was almost directly above us and he appeared to be maybe just inside 200 ft vertical separation. It was too close for sure. Then; shortly after; we were cleared to turn left to enter the left downwind for 27L and were cleared the visual approach 27L. On downwind; we noticed another aircraft on the TCAS display on the upwind turning crosswind. We were level at 1;600 ft (approximately 1;500 AGL). We heard tower give the traffic our position as we were visually looking for him. He called us in sight and was ordered to maintain visual separation. He acknowledged. Shortly after; we got him in sight; and again; he appeared to be converging and climbing. He appeared to be a light piston twin aircraft and my assumption was that he would level at 1;000 AGL pattern altitude. Closely monitoring the aircraft and TCAS; it became apparent he was not going to level at 1;000 AGL. Again; we got an alert; quickly followed by a TCAS RA to climb. We complied with the RA and climbed up to approximately 2;000 ft; leveled and then once clear; descended back down to complete the visual approach and landed on 27L. Once at the gate; we contacted both the dispatcher and the chief pilot and followed the instructions provided in the fom for a TCAS RA event. The events described above occurred in a saturated airspace with a saturated controller(s). Although the outline of the first TCAS event is detailed it creates the illusion that there was ample time to react; which is not the case. The decision to turn and descend on my part occurred almost simultaneously with the ATC instructions. Although I had made the decision to turn right and was about to initiate the turn; the ATC initial instruction to make a left turn caused a slight hesitation on my part; followed by a very quick correction to turn right. Because we were in a steep banking descent and had the traffic in sight; it was not practical or safe to comply with the TCAS RA. As stated above; the TCAS display showed the aircraft at our altitude; but he was actually slightly above; so the decision was made to descend prior to the TCAS giving the RA. As for the RA in the pattern; this would have been avoided if the light twin had both followed the instruction of the tower to 'maintained visual separation' and also; if he would have leveled off at a 1;000 ft pattern altitude. Although we received an RA on this event; I would note that it was not as 'close' as the first event as the aircraft passed slightly behind and below us. The error I feel that I made here was allowing the situation to get that close. Looking back; I would have turned and descended a bit sooner (on the first event) to avoid allowing the situation to get as close as it did. The slight hesitation of following ATC instruction instead of carrying out my original decision made the incident closer than it would have been otherwise. Again; I cannot stress how quickly this transpired. There was only a split second to react in both incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain experienced two airborne conflicts on approach to MLB; commenting the Controller seemed 'saturated'.

Narrative: On arrival into MLB; we were given vectors to set us up for the visual approach. Approximately 15 miles northwest of the field and level at 3;000 FT; we noticed converging traffic on the TCAS display. We began visually looking for the traffic. Within a few moments; we had a visual on the traffic. On the TCAS display; he indicated at our altitude and approximately 1 mile and closing. At this time; ATC seemed somewhat saturated and had not issued an instruction...also; we received a TCAS alert. As the traffic approached; it appeared slightly above our altitude (maybe 50 or 100 FT). Waiting for an instruction; I disengaged the autopilot and realizing we were not going to receive an instruction and that the aircraft was quickly converging [on] our course I decided to take evasive action. However; as I was about to enter a right descending turn; ATC gave the instruction 'turn left heading; change of plans; turn right heading (I do not recall heading assignment) and descend to 2;000 FT' (although this is not meant to be a direct quote; it is a close approximation of the instructions). The instruction seemed odd as the traffic was coming from our left; but I banked left for a split second and then quickly banked right. Also; I had already begun a pitch down for a descent as the aircraft was above us. So; at the point that I was about 30 to 40 degree bank and approximately 6 to 8 degrees nose down; roughly 2;900 FT and descending; the TCAS gave us an RA to CLIMB. At this time; the aircraft was in sight above us (appeared to be a Cessna) and compliance with the RA was not practical as it would have climbed us into the aircraft. We continued our descent and leveled at 2;000 FT; keeping the aircraft in sight throughout the entire maneuver; until we were clear of the conflict. I am unsure exactly how close we came; but he was almost directly above us and he appeared to be maybe just inside 200 FT vertical separation. It was too close for sure. Then; shortly after; we were cleared to turn left to enter the left downwind for 27L and were cleared the visual approach 27L. On downwind; we noticed another aircraft on the TCAS display on the upwind turning crosswind. We were level at 1;600 FT (approximately 1;500 AGL). We heard Tower give the traffic our position as we were visually looking for him. He called us in sight and was ordered to maintain visual separation. He acknowledged. Shortly after; we got him in sight; and again; he appeared to be converging and climbing. He appeared to be a light piston twin aircraft and my assumption was that he would level at 1;000 AGL pattern altitude. Closely monitoring the aircraft and TCAS; it became apparent he was not going to level at 1;000 AGL. Again; we got an alert; quickly followed by a TCAS RA to climb. We complied with the RA and climbed up to approximately 2;000 FT; leveled and then once clear; descended back down to complete the visual approach and landed on 27L. Once at the gate; we contacted both the Dispatcher and the Chief Pilot and followed the instructions provided in the FOM for a TCAS RA event. The events described above occurred in a saturated airspace with a saturated Controller(s). Although the outline of the first TCAS event is detailed it creates the illusion that there was ample time to react; which is not the case. The decision to turn and descend on my part occurred almost simultaneously with the ATC instructions. Although I had made the decision to turn right and was about to initiate the turn; the ATC initial instruction to make a left turn caused a slight hesitation on my part; followed by a very quick correction to turn right. Because we were in a steep banking descent and had the traffic in sight; it was not practical or safe to comply with the TCAS RA. As stated above; the TCAS display showed the aircraft at our altitude; but he was actually slightly above; so the decision was made to descend prior to the TCAS giving the RA. As for the RA in the pattern; this would have been avoided if the light twin had both followed the instruction of the Tower to 'maintained visual separation' and also; if he would have leveled off at a 1;000 FT pattern altitude. Although we received an RA on this event; I would note that it was not as 'close' as the first event as the aircraft passed slightly behind and below us. The error I feel that I made here was allowing the situation to get that close. Looking back; I would have turned and descended a bit sooner (on the first event) to avoid allowing the situation to get as close as it did. The slight hesitation of following ATC instruction instead of carrying out my original decision made the incident closer than it would have been otherwise. Again; I cannot stress how quickly this transpired. There was only a split second to react in both incidents.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.