Narrative:

I was working an adjacent sector; cpc working the east position with satellite and sawgy sectors combined. Combination of satellite airport operations increased complexity (nip on a west operation; crg ILS arrivals). Airspace design in the area is lacking and could be made better to help alleviate some complexity in my opinion. Work groups have met in the past to discuss this but the air traffic management has labeled the situation an 'efficiency' issue; not a safety issue. In this situation a light GA aircraft [aircraft X] was being vectored to the ILS final at crg. Moderate to heavy traffic in the area caused the cpc to miss a nearby primary target. The target turned out to be a P3 operating VFR. While receiving vectors; the GA aircraft had to perform evasive action to avoid a collision with the P3. Estimated distance by the pilot was less than 300 ft horizontally. Near midair collision report filed with the facility. There are a large number of factors contributing to this scenario. Blame was placed mainly on the cpc for failing to issue a traffic alert since that is a 'first priority duty.' the actual contributing factors include; but are not limited to: 1) dense traffic in the area between crg; nip; nrb and jax. Commonly referred to as the 'wild west;' 'indian country' and the 'triangle of death'; the area contains at least seven final approach courses; two military facilities with operating radar approach controls (heavy gca traffic in the area all on unique frequencies); a downtown area with frequent tfr's involving sporting events; a major VFR airport; an international airport; a VOR (crg) that serves as a primary navigational fix for much of florida's east coast traffic; and finally; a large mix of traffic. It is common to have a blimp holding in the area; B737 traffic landing jax; P3 traffic in a gca pattern at nip; helicopter traffic making approaches to nrb; tactical aircraft transiting the river at low altitude/high speed and large amounts of transient aircraft flying along the beach. 2) airspace design. To run this airspace 'by the book' would require nearly shutting down all arrivals and departures until you've sterilized the surrounding airspace. We often have satellite airports providing visual separation between departures and aircraft under control of adjacent facilities (crg departure vs. Nrb gca traffic); with that departure then entering the airspace of two separate controllers (crg departures are launched into east or satellite airspace; but often enter arrival airspace during climb-out.) this makes for a massive amount of coordination and distraction on land lines; not to mention increases the chances of miscommunication between facilities. 3) aircraft type. P3's often have transponders that are intermittent; inoperative or impossible to detect due to direction of flight and position relative to our radar site. In this case there was no secondary radar with the P3 involved; making traffic calls difficult; especially without ca processing on a primary target. 4) display of primary targets. Any flight physiology class will cover how the eye sees color. Human factors have determined that certain colors appear more obvious to us than others. Yet stars displays a primary target; the center point of our separation standards; as a blue dash on a black background. This is idiocy; as if the idea is to have the target blend in rather than be seen. Stars is certainly capable of displaying more than three colors; yet we continue to use those three colors over and over. I should have the ability to turn a target red; yellow; white or green and should be able to see important targets clearly; not be forced to develop a fine scanning technique to find them. TCAS was invented because VFR flight is dangerous and see-and-avoid doesn't always work; yet stars forces me to hunt for traffic in much the same way. 5) clutter. The jax radar site often displays false primary targets within about a ten-mile ring of jax; right in the middle of the aforementioned triangle of death. This increases the likelihood of a controller potentially ignoring or overlooking a primary target; classifying it instead as a false return. This has caused nmacs in the past. These and other issues compound; there will be a mid-air collision in the area if this airspace is not thought out better. We make it work and we move a lot of traffic through it; but it is a matter of time before it all goes down. It probably will not be our fault; but we will be blamed. The FAA continues to be a reactive agency rather than a proactive one; and it will cost lives if it does not address our issues in this area. Better staffing; stars changes; better airspace/procedures that simplify the working of aircraft would all be beneficial. Formation of a TRSA or the creation of class B airspace; though not appealing to pilots; will probably save lives. It would have prevented this near midair collision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A JAX Controller described a NMAC event listing in detail numerous factors that contributed to the event that included equipment; airspace and procedural shortfalls that need attention.

Narrative: I was working an adjacent sector; CPC working the east position with Satellite and Sawgy Sectors combined. Combination of satellite airport operations increased complexity (NIP on a west operation; CRG ILS arrivals). Airspace design in the area is lacking and could be made better to help alleviate some complexity in my opinion. Work groups have met in the past to discuss this but the Air Traffic Management has labeled the situation an 'efficiency' issue; not a safety issue. In this situation a light GA aircraft [Aircraft X] was being vectored to the ILS final at CRG. Moderate to heavy traffic in the area caused the CPC to miss a nearby primary target. The target turned out to be a P3 operating VFR. While receiving vectors; the GA aircraft had to perform evasive action to avoid a collision with the P3. Estimated distance by the pilot was less than 300 FT horizontally. NMAC report filed with the facility. There are a large number of factors contributing to this scenario. Blame was placed mainly on the CPC for failing to issue a traffic alert since that is a 'first priority duty.' The actual contributing factors include; but are not limited to: 1) Dense traffic in the area between CRG; NIP; NRB and JAX. Commonly referred to as the 'wild West;' 'Indian country' and the 'triangle of death'; the area contains at least seven final approach courses; two military facilities with operating RADAR Approach Controls (heavy GCA traffic in the area all on unique frequencies); a downtown area with frequent TFR's involving sporting events; a major VFR airport; an international airport; a VOR (CRG) that serves as a primary navigational fix for much of Florida's East coast traffic; and finally; a large mix of traffic. It is common to have a blimp holding in the area; B737 traffic landing JAX; P3 traffic in a GCA pattern at NIP; helicopter traffic making approaches to NRB; tactical aircraft transiting the river at low altitude/high speed and large amounts of transient aircraft flying along the beach. 2) Airspace design. To run this airspace 'by the book' would require nearly shutting down all arrivals and departures until you've sterilized the surrounding airspace. We often have satellite airports providing visual separation between departures and aircraft under control of adjacent facilities (CRG departure vs. NRB GCA traffic); with that departure then entering the airspace of two separate controllers (CRG departures are launched into East or Satellite airspace; but often enter Arrival airspace during climb-out.) This makes for a massive amount of coordination and distraction on land lines; not to mention increases the chances of miscommunication between facilities. 3) Aircraft type. P3's often have transponders that are intermittent; inoperative or impossible to detect due to direction of flight and position relative to our RADAR site. In this case there was no secondary RADAR with the P3 involved; making traffic calls difficult; especially without CA processing on a primary target. 4) Display of primary targets. Any flight physiology class will cover how the eye sees color. Human factors have determined that certain colors appear more obvious to us than others. Yet STARS displays a primary target; the center point of our separation standards; as a blue dash on a black background. This is idiocy; as if the idea is to have the target blend in rather than be seen. STARS is certainly capable of displaying more than three colors; yet we continue to use those three colors over and over. I should have the ability to turn a target red; yellow; white or green and should be able to see important targets clearly; not be forced to develop a fine scanning technique to find them. TCAS was invented because VFR flight is dangerous and see-and-avoid doesn't always work; yet STARS forces me to hunt for traffic in much the same way. 5) Clutter. The JAX RADAR site often displays false primary targets within about a ten-mile ring of JAX; right in the middle of the aforementioned Triangle of Death. This increases the likelihood of a controller potentially ignoring or overlooking a primary target; classifying it instead as a false return. This has caused NMACs in the past. These and other issues compound; there WILL BE a mid-air collision in the area if this airspace is not thought out better. We make it work and we move a lot of traffic through it; but it is a matter of time before it all goes down. It probably will not be our fault; but we will be blamed. The FAA continues to be a reactive agency rather than a proactive one; and it will cost lives if it does not address our issues in this area. Better staffing; STARS changes; better airspace/procedures that simplify the working of aircraft would all be beneficial. Formation of a TRSA or the creation of Class B airspace; though not appealing to pilots; will probably save lives. It would have prevented this NMAC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.