Narrative:

On the flight deck at the gate captain; first officer; relief pilot present. I received the ATIS and communicated to the crew out loud 'runway xxl in use.' I did not say 'that is the shorter runway.' my concern was big; heavy airplane using the shorter of the two runways. Off the gate and after engine start I reviewed the weight and balance and communicated out loud to the crew 'APU bleed on; toga takeoff.' I did not say 'we are using every single foot of this runway for takeoff.' my concern was big; heavy airplane using the shorter runway and to be legal we need every pound of thrust from the engines because it is a toga takeoff and we are using the APU to power pressurization and air conditioning so that we have more engine thrust. No response from the crew. No concern expressed by the crew. We are number 3 for takeoff. Just at that moment the tower announces the wind as 250/11. I communicate to the crew 'wind is 250/11; I do not think we are legal for this runway' I clearly and with clarity voiced a safety concern to the crew. No response from the relief pilot and the captain blew me off. The captain expressed no concern. The captain had no interest in spending any time investigating how a 10 to 11 KT tailwind affected the takeoff. The captain said; 'let's just go'. My guts were telling me we were not legal for this takeoff. I was completely handcuffed by a non responsive crew and a captain that was oblivious to the performance problem; a captain that ignored basic CRM procedures; a captain that ignored the 'capturing of errors model.' in cruise I discussed with the relief pilot the takeoff. We reviewed the weight and balance form and the tps and concluded that we were illegal for the takeoff. The weight and balance was predicated on no tailwind and it was an 'improved performance to' the tps showed that no tailwind is allowed for a takeoff on 09L using an 'improved performance to' the data was later given to the captain. A captain that is unconcerned with safety. A captain that is unconcerned with CRM. A relief pilot that is not engaged as a crew member during a critical phase of flight. A first officer that did not stop the flight until the problem was solved to the satisfaction of the entire crew. Load control sent a weight and balance that did not accurately reflect the actual wind condition. ATC did not turn the airport around when the wind favored the west runways. Dispatch for not making the captain aware of the critical runway condition during the phone briefing.[we need] further training for the captain in areas of weight and balance; tps; CRM; safety; trapping errors; further training for the relief pilot in crew member duties; weight and balance; tps; CRM; safety; further training for the first officer regarding CRM; further training for load control regarding meteorology and how that affects safety; and further training for dispatch regarding the interface between ATC and meteorology and how that affects safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A330 First Officer describes a maximum performance takeoff and his inability to convince the other crew members that they are not legal for takeoff due to excessive tailwind.

Narrative: On the flight deck at the gate Captain; First Officer; Relief Pilot present. I received the ATIS and communicated to the crew out loud 'Runway XXL in use.' I DID NOT SAY 'that is the shorter runway.' My concern was big; heavy airplane using the shorter of the two runways. Off the gate and after engine start I reviewed the weight and balance and communicated out loud to the crew 'APU BLEED ON; TOGA takeoff.' I DID NOT SAY 'We are using every single foot of this runway for takeoff.' My concern was big; heavy airplane using the shorter runway and to be legal we need every LB of thrust from the engines because it is a TOGA takeoff and we are using the APU to power pressurization and air conditioning so that we have more engine thrust. No response from the crew. No concern expressed by the crew. We are number 3 for takeoff. Just at that moment the Tower announces the wind as 250/11. I communicate to the crew 'wind is 250/11; I DO NOT THINK WE ARE LEGAL FOR THIS runway' I clearly and with clarity voiced a safety concern to the crew. No response from the Relief Pilot and the Captain blew me off. The Captain expressed no concern. The Captain had no interest in spending any time investigating how a 10 to 11 KT tailwind affected the takeoff. The Captain said; 'Let's just go'. My guts were telling me we were not legal for this takeoff. I was completely handcuffed by a non responsive crew and a Captain that was oblivious to the performance problem; a Captain that ignored basic CRM procedures; a Captain that ignored the 'capturing of errors model.' In cruise I discussed with the Relief Pilot the takeoff. We reviewed the weight and balance form and the TPS and concluded that we were illegal for the takeoff. The weight and balance was predicated on NO tailwind and it was an 'IMPROVED PERFORMANCE TO' The TPS showed that NO tailwind is allowed for a takeoff on 09L using an 'IMPROVED PERFORMANCE TO' The data was later given to the Captain. A Captain that is unconcerned with safety. A Captain that is unconcerned with CRM. A Relief Pilot that is not engaged as a crew member during a critical phase of flight. A First Officer that did not stop the flight until the problem was solved to the satisfaction of the entire crew. Load Control sent a weight and balance that did not accurately reflect the actual wind condition. ATC did not turn the airport around when the wind favored the west runways. Dispatch for not making the Captain aware of the critical runway condition during the phone briefing.[We need] further training for the Captain in areas of weight and balance; TPS; CRM; Safety; Trapping errors; further training for the Relief Pilot in crew member duties; weight and balance; TPS; CRM; Safety; further training for the First Officer regarding CRM; further training for load control regarding meteorology and how that affects safety; and further training for Dispatch regarding the interface between ATC and meteorology and how that affects safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.