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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 942148 |
Time | |
Date | 201104 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | King Air C90 E90 |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge) |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Engineer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132 Flight Crew Total 19000 Flight Crew Type 132 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Conflict Airborne Conflict |
Narrative:
I was captain on a passenger flight. The first officer was the pilot flying. On short final to runway xx at flaps 20 the first officer called for the final flap setting of xx. We received a trailing edge flap disagree EICAS message and discreet light. We informed tower of our flap problem; and went around to run the QRH procedure. I informed the passengers we had to go around due to a light in the cockpit; and we expected to resolve the issue and would be landing shortly. I also briefed the a flight attendant that we had a flap problem that I; at the time thought we could clear and we'd be coming back around for a normal landing. I elected to keep the first officer flying the aircraft initially and ran the QRH procedure trailing edge flap disagree. During the procedure; when directed to move the le and te flap selector switches to alternate the te light went out; but the le light and EICAS message illuminated. I continued the procedure to the deferred items; decent and approach check portion. I now took control of the aircraft to have the first officer go back through the procedure and make sure that I had done everything correctly; and to confirm it didn't say anywhere to not run the le flap procedure. The first officer went through the te procedure again; and agreed that we should run the le QRH procedure; which he did. Based on the indications we received during this procedure it directed us to the slat asymmetry checklist which he also ran. By this time we were on downwind at 5;000 ft slightly past abeam the field when approach control called out a king air 500 ft below us; which we saw; but that traffic caused a resolution advisory which I complied with by hand flying the RA; climbing to approximately 5;400 ft before TCAS issued the clear of conflict. The first officer informed approach control we were complying with and RA due to that traffic and would be descending back to 5;000 shortly. After the RA approach descended us to 2;500 at which time I re-selected the xx ILS as the first officer was finishing the le flap asymmetry QRH and we set our bug speeds per that procedure to an approach speed of vref 30 + 30 (157 KTS) and ran the deferred items; descent and approach checks. I decided to fly the approach and landing. The first officer consulted the abnormal configuration; actual landing distances tables on the odm; per the QRH and came up with less than 3;800 ft for our configuration. Runway xx being 11;000 ft long. Approach was normal but touchdown was a little firm as I did not want the aircraft to float with the approach speed and configuration. We cleared the runway at taxiway november and crossed xx at papa; leaving the flaps down during taxi in. What I would do different. Declare an emergency. I initially thought we would be able to resolve the flap issue and be able to make a normal landing. By the time I realized that we would not resolve the issue; the multiple checklists and TCAS RA had distracted me from ensuring an emergency was declared. In closing I would like to say my first officer did a fantastic job; his outstanding knowledge of the QRH and operations manual allowed us to complete a myriad of tasks in a short period without feeling rushed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757 had TE Flap Asymmetry on final and the crew went around to complete the QRH. The TE Asymmetry indication became a LE Flap Asymmetry after the LE and TE flap selectors switches were moved to alternate. An emergency was not declared but a normal landing followed with speed additives.
Narrative: I was Captain on a passenger flight. The First Officer was the pilot flying. On short final to Runway XX at flaps 20 the First Officer called for the final flap setting of XX. We received a trailing edge flap disagree EICAS message and discreet light. We informed Tower of our flap problem; and went around to run the QRH procedure. I informed the passengers we had to go around due to a light in the cockpit; and we expected to resolve the issue and would be landing shortly. I also briefed the A Flight Attendant that we had a flap problem that I; at the time thought we could clear and we'd be coming back around for a normal landing. I elected to keep the First Officer flying the aircraft initially and ran the QRH procedure Trailing Edge Flap Disagree. During the procedure; when directed to move the LE and TE flap selector switches to Alternate the TE light went out; but the LE light and EICAS message illuminated. I continued the procedure to the deferred items; decent and approach check portion. I now took control of the aircraft to have the First Officer go back through the procedure and make sure that I had done everything correctly; and to confirm it didn't say anywhere to not run the LE flap procedure. The First Officer went through the TE procedure again; and agreed that we should run the LE QRH procedure; which he did. Based on the indications we received during this procedure it directed us to the Slat Asymmetry checklist which he also ran. By this time we were on downwind at 5;000 FT slightly past abeam the field when Approach Control called out a King Air 500 FT below us; which we saw; but that traffic caused a resolution advisory which I complied with by hand flying the RA; climbing to approximately 5;400 FT before TCAS issued the clear of conflict. The First Officer informed Approach Control we were complying with and RA due to that traffic and would be descending back to 5;000 shortly. After the RA approach descended us to 2;500 at which time I re-selected the XX ILS as the First Officer was finishing the LE flap asymmetry QRH and we set our bug speeds per that procedure to an approach speed of VREF 30 + 30 (157 KTS) and ran the deferred items; descent and approach checks. I decided to fly the approach and landing. The First Officer consulted the Abnormal configuration; actual landing distances tables on the ODM; per the QRH and came up with less than 3;800 FT for our configuration. Runway XX being 11;000 FT long. Approach was normal but touchdown was a little firm as I did not want the aircraft to float with the approach speed and configuration. We cleared the runway at Taxiway November and crossed XX at Papa; leaving the flaps down during taxi in. What I would do different. Declare an Emergency. I initially thought we would be able to resolve the flap issue and be able to make a normal landing. By the time I realized that we would not resolve the issue; the multiple checklists and TCAS RA had distracted me from ensuring an emergency was declared. In closing I would like to say my First Officer did a fantastic job; his outstanding knowledge of the QRH and operations manual allowed us to complete a myriad of tasks in a short period without feeling rushed.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.