Two B767 first officers describe the events surrounding their captain's decision to refuse an aircra...

Narrative:

APU failed to start three times during boarding. After writing up APU; amts successfully started APU; however APU started abnormally slow. Captain wanted assurance [that] APU would start airborne since APU failed to start three times before and fourth start was abnormally slow. We informed amts prior to fourth start that three starts per hour was a limitation. The amt told the captain emphatically after APU started; 'don't shut it (APU) down.' captain was suspect that APU was defective per amt's remark. Captain was not willing to cross north atlantic without a normal operating APU. APU failed to start again as suspected. APU battery charger was replaced [and again] failed to start. APU battery was then changed; APU failed to start. APU starter was replaced; APU started abnormally slow as before; but would not start on second attempt per captain's request. Captain [was] not willing to take aircraft. A customer service duty manager entered cockpit with captain and I and said (to best of my recollection); 'captain; this is a deferrable item and we have 147 passengers to accommodate; I insist (or strongly encourage) you take this airplane.' the captain was polite; but firm and said; 'no; I cannot fly this airplane in this condition today.' the flight [was] subsequently canceled. Severe turbulence was encountered by a flight an hour before near our route and diverted with passenger injuries. This is pilot pushing and is a safety issue [that] should never occur or be tolerated. The captain/dispatcher is the final authority for the safety of flight; not customer service agents.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two B767 first officers describe the events surrounding their Captain's decision to refuse an aircraft with a defective APU for a North Atlantic crossing.

Narrative: APU failed to start three times during boarding. After writing up APU; AMTs successfully started APU; however APU started abnormally slow. Captain wanted assurance [that] APU would start airborne since APU failed to start three times before and fourth start was abnormally slow. We informed AMTs prior to fourth start that three starts per hour was a limitation. The AMT told the Captain emphatically after APU started; 'Don't shut it (APU) down.' Captain was suspect that APU was defective per AMT's remark. Captain was not willing to cross North Atlantic without a normal operating APU. APU failed to start again as suspected. APU battery charger was replaced [and again] failed to start. APU battery was then changed; APU failed to start. APU starter was replaced; APU started abnormally slow as before; but would not start on second attempt per Captain's request. Captain [was] not willing to take aircraft. A Customer Service Duty Manager entered cockpit with Captain and I and said (to best of my recollection); 'Captain; this is a deferrable item and we have 147 passengers to accommodate; I insist (or strongly encourage) you take this airplane.' The Captain was polite; but firm and said; 'No; I cannot fly this airplane in this condition today.' The flight [was] subsequently canceled. Severe turbulence was encountered by a flight an hour before near our route and diverted with passenger injuries. This is pilot pushing and is a safety issue [that] should never occur or be tolerated. The Captain/Dispatcher is the final authority for the safety of flight; not customer service agents.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	943045
Time
Date	201104
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference	FO
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Parked
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	APU
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35 Flight Crew Total 14000 Flight Crew Type 6000
Person 2
Function	First Officer Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 14000 Flight Crew Type 3000
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Two B767 first officers describe the events surrounding their captain's decision to refuse an aircraft with a defective APU for a north atlantic crossing.