Narrative:

This form is being submitted to draw attention to procedures followed by personnel at a field base of operations (FBO) at a non-towered field after an aircraft crash had occurred which induced confusion and potential safety problems with other aircraft returning to land shortly after the accident took place. The submitter is a career military pilot with previous experience as a squadron safety officer. The primary mishap surrounding this discussion was the fatal crash on takeoff of a homebuilt. Returning to my home field from an afternoon cross country in a grumman aa-5B tiger; I was flying VFR without monitors and had tuned up the unicom frequency for the airport approximately twenty five miles from the field. Shortly after tuning to the unicom frequency a male voice was heard to say that an aircraft was down at the airport and the field was closed. I immediately transmitted over the frequency asking to 'say again' in order to confirm this unusual transmission; but nothing was heard. After two or three additional attempts to clarify the transmission I switched to approach control to ask if they had any information about the airport while still monitoring the unicom frequency on the other radio. Approach had no information and advised me to standby while they tried to call the field; which I did. After a short time approach informed me that they were unable to get an answer at the airport but that they had no indications of a field closure. With no further transmissions regarding a down plane being heard I entered the pattern at the airport at 1;000 ft MSL for the runway (based on winds) but crossed over the runway overhead in order to better observe the airport and entered the downwind leg for a right hand pattern; announcing my intentions to perform a low approach in order to clear the runway before landing. Around this time a cessna began checking in for landing on the unicom frequency. While passing overhead the runway I noticed an aircraft down in a field near a line of trees upwind of the end of the runway and well to the right of the extended runway centerline. Upon completion of the low approach I had noted the downed aircraft; two to three ground vehicles parked on the parallel taxiway nearest to the crash site; and gained of sight of the cessna entering the pattern; but observed no obstructions on the runway or any potential hindrances to performing a safe landing. The cessna had not heard the previous warning on the unicom frequency which I had heard at twenty five miles out; and I informed him of the warning. The cessna de-conflicted in altitude and we discussed via the radio our observations that the field appeared to be clear and that there was nothing to prohibit our landing. By this time I had completed the low approach as well as a second execution of the landing pattern at 1;000 ft MSL pattern altitude (the cessna indicated he was at 1;500 ft) while communicating with the cessna. We had both communicated extensively over the unicom frequency with no transmissions from someone on the ground and I emphasized my intention to full stop on this pass from the crosswind turn position. I ensured to make downwind; base; and final calls and announced the intention to full stop at each transmission in order to prompt someone listening on the ground to counter my intentions. Around this time a third aircraft entered the traffic pattern and announced he would stay at 2;200 ft. While on downwind a fourth aircraft (another tiger) called over unicom that he was on the final portion of the ILS approach to the runway (opposite direction to the VFR traffic). I continued through a right hand VFR landing pattern to the runway and only as I was on short final over the runway threshold did a voice; apparently from the ground station; come up and tell us that the runway was closed and that we should all divert. Although I am now positive I could have performed a normal landing; I executed wave-off procedures and; along with the other aircraft in the airport pattern; began sequencing ourselves for diverting to another airport which is nine miles northwest. All aircraft diverted without incident. After returning to the airport by car; due to security measures we walked through the FBO building; which has a ground radio station to monitor the unicom frequency. (The FBO uses the ground station to communicate with its rental aircraft and will often provide helpful feedback to aircraft in the pattern; when able. My experience has been that the FBO does not abuse or overuse the frequency in any way.) there were three or four persons assembled at the help window for the FBO discussing the event; and they indicated that the field was now open; again. I opened a discussion with them to give feedback that leaving the ground radio on the unicom frequency unattended after the crash could have potentially compounded the problems with multiple aircraft entering the landing pattern within the approximately 15-20 minutes after the incident. Their response was to be defensive (understandably) and to explain the abandoning of the radio being due to everyone rushing out of the building to attempt to provide aide to the crash victims. I advised them that a high priority in a situation like that is to ensure someone stays with the radio precisely to be able to communicate with other aircraft unaware of the incident that are attempting to return to the airport. With my background in naval aviation; and previous experience as a squadron safety officer; it was foreign to me that there were apparently not any established procedures in place for airport personnel; particularly the FBO employees who monitored the ground radio; in the event of a mishap such as this. In conversation I have used the analogy that in learning first aide procedures one of the most important points is for the responder to stay with the victim and assign others to perform tasks such as getting additional help and calling 911. Just as leaving the victim in a first aide situation will often make the problem worse; leaving the radio unattended; particularly after just a single transmission to indicate a problem and then not responding to an immediate query for clarification; could have compounded this emergency with the three or four other aircraft entering the landing pattern within fifteen minutes. In this particular case the runway was clear and unobstructed with emergency and other responding ground vehicles only interfering with part of the taxiway; but had the runway actually been obstructed it would have been of profound importance for someone to man that ground radio in order to help ensure the safety of emergency responders and returning aircraft. In this case all parties involved took the safe option and did not land at the airport; but we discussed the legal ramifications of actually landing in this scenario. Upon consulting a legal assistance line; the answer given is that only the airfield owner or manager can close the airfield and a NOTAM must be issued. It seems obvious to me that the FBO personnel made a poor choice in abandoning the radio ground station with only one (to my knowledge) unusual transmission which initially caused more confusion and was unable to be clarified; although the one transmission was better than none. This also left no one present to answer a phone call from approach to clarify the situation (assuming; of course; the number approach called was at the FBO). My recommendation is that improved training for the individuals who were at this FBO could have resulted in one of them remaining at the radio to provide information to other aircraft and kept someone at a central location with excellent communication capability and this topic and scenario could be an excellent discussion point for future safety seminars and other forums. I don't believe it is reasonable to require FBO employees to be trained in extensive emergency response procedures as a condition of their employment; but I do believe there may be merit in requiring emergency response checklists to be present that all employees know where to find. These can be actual checklists; posters; or placards; but I believe based on my own experience that even personnel who are very panicked would react much more consistently and effectively when a checklist is available for them to follow in an emergency situation. Of course; if there is only one or two people present it may be more beneficial to assist survivors of the initial incident; and the checklist should provide guidance as to what conditions would be best served by responding to the site or when the best thing to do is to ensure someone stays right where they are.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An AA-5 pilot returning to a non-towered airport near which an accident had just occurred took exception to the failure of the FBO to ensure staffing of the Unicom.

Narrative: This form is being submitted to draw attention to procedures followed by personnel at a Field Base of Operations (FBO) at a non-towered field after an aircraft crash had occurred which induced confusion and potential safety problems with other aircraft returning to land shortly after the accident took place. The submitter is a career military pilot with previous experience as a squadron safety officer. The primary mishap surrounding this discussion was the fatal crash on takeoff of a homebuilt. Returning to my home field from an afternoon cross country in a Grumman AA-5B Tiger; I was flying VFR without monitors and had tuned up the UNICOM frequency for the airport approximately twenty five miles from the field. Shortly after tuning to the UNICOM frequency a male voice was heard to say that an aircraft was down at the airport and the field was closed. I immediately transmitted over the frequency asking to 'say again' in order to confirm this unusual transmission; but nothing was heard. After two or three additional attempts to clarify the transmission I switched to Approach Control to ask if they had any information about the airport while still monitoring the UNICOM frequency on the other radio. Approach had no information and advised me to standby while they tried to call the field; which I did. After a short time Approach informed me that they were unable to get an answer at the airport but that they had no indications of a field closure. With no further transmissions regarding a down plane being heard I entered the pattern at the airport at 1;000 FT MSL for the runway (based on winds) but crossed over the runway overhead in order to better observe the airport and entered the downwind leg for a right hand pattern; announcing my intentions to perform a low approach in order to clear the runway before landing. Around this time a Cessna began checking in for landing on the UNICOM frequency. While passing overhead the runway I noticed an aircraft down in a field near a line of trees upwind of the end of the runway and well to the right of the extended runway centerline. Upon completion of the low approach I had noted the downed aircraft; two to three ground vehicles parked on the parallel taxiway nearest to the crash site; and gained of sight of the Cessna entering the pattern; but observed no obstructions on the runway or any potential hindrances to performing a safe landing. The Cessna had not heard the previous warning on the UNICOM frequency which I had heard at twenty five miles out; and I informed him of the warning. The Cessna de-conflicted in altitude and we discussed via the radio our observations that the field appeared to be clear and that there was nothing to prohibit our landing. By this time I had completed the low approach as well as a second execution of the landing pattern at 1;000 FT MSL pattern altitude (the Cessna indicated he was at 1;500 FT) while communicating with the Cessna. We had both communicated extensively over the UNICOM frequency with no transmissions from someone on the ground and I emphasized my intention to full stop on this pass from the crosswind turn position. I ensured to make downwind; base; and final calls and announced the intention to full stop at each transmission in order to prompt someone listening on the ground to counter my intentions. Around this time a third aircraft entered the traffic pattern and announced he would stay at 2;200 FT. While on downwind a fourth aircraft (another Tiger) called over UNICOM that he was on the final portion of the ILS approach to the runway (opposite direction to the VFR traffic). I continued through a right hand VFR landing pattern to the runway and only as I was on short final over the runway threshold did a voice; apparently from the Ground Station; come up and tell us that the runway was closed and that we should all divert. Although I am now positive I could have performed a normal landing; I executed wave-off procedures and; along with the other aircraft in the airport pattern; began sequencing ourselves for diverting to another airport which is nine miles northwest. All aircraft diverted without incident. After returning to the airport by car; due to security measures we walked through the FBO building; which has a ground radio station to monitor the UNICOM frequency. (The FBO uses the ground station to communicate with its rental aircraft and will often provide helpful feedback to aircraft in the pattern; when able. My experience has been that the FBO does not abuse or overuse the frequency in any way.) There were three or four persons assembled at the help window for the FBO discussing the event; and they indicated that the field was now open; again. I opened a discussion with them to give feedback that leaving the ground radio on the UNICOM frequency unattended after the crash could have potentially compounded the problems with multiple aircraft entering the landing pattern within the approximately 15-20 minutes after the incident. Their response was to be defensive (understandably) and to explain the abandoning of the radio being due to everyone rushing out of the building to attempt to provide aide to the crash victims. I advised them that a high priority in a situation like that is to ensure someone stays with the radio precisely to be able to communicate with other aircraft unaware of the incident that are attempting to return to the airport. With my background in naval aviation; and previous experience as a squadron safety officer; it was foreign to me that there were apparently not any established procedures in place for airport personnel; particularly the FBO employees who monitored the ground radio; in the event of a mishap such as this. In conversation I have used the analogy that in learning First Aide procedures one of the most important points is for the responder to stay with the victim and assign others to perform tasks such as getting additional help and calling 911. Just as leaving the victim in a First Aide situation will often make the problem worse; leaving the radio unattended; particularly after just a single transmission to indicate a problem and then not responding to an immediate query for clarification; could have compounded this emergency with the three or four other aircraft entering the landing pattern within fifteen minutes. In this particular case the runway was clear and unobstructed with emergency and other responding ground vehicles only interfering with part of the taxiway; but had the runway actually been obstructed it would have been of profound importance for someone to man that ground radio in order to help ensure the safety of emergency responders and returning aircraft. In this case all parties involved took the safe option and did not land at the airport; but we discussed the legal ramifications of actually landing in this scenario. Upon consulting a legal assistance line; the answer given is that only the airfield owner or manager can close the airfield and a NOTAM must be issued. It seems obvious to me that the FBO personnel made a poor choice in abandoning the radio ground station with only one (to my knowledge) unusual transmission which initially caused more confusion and was unable to be clarified; although the one transmission was better than none. This also left no one present to answer a phone call from Approach to clarify the situation (assuming; of course; the number Approach called was at the FBO). My recommendation is that improved training for the individuals who were at this FBO could have resulted in one of them remaining at the radio to provide information to other aircraft and kept someone at a central location with excellent communication capability and this topic and scenario could be an excellent discussion point for future safety seminars and other forums. I don't believe it is reasonable to require FBO employees to be trained in extensive emergency response procedures as a condition of their employment; but I do believe there may be merit in requiring emergency response checklists to be present that all employees know where to find. These can be actual checklists; posters; or placards; but I believe based on my own experience that even personnel who are very panicked would react much more consistently and effectively when a checklist is available for them to follow in an emergency situation. Of course; if there is only one or two people present it may be more beneficial to assist survivors of the initial incident; and the checklist should provide guidance as to what conditions would be best served by responding to the site or when the best thing to do is to ensure someone stays right where they are.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.