Narrative:

I was tasked to re-assemble some wire bundles and disconnects that had been disconnected to facilitate other maintenance on an A300 aircraft. I re-secured four wire bundles into their respective sponge clamps and re-connected four disconnected plugs onto their respective receptacles. At the time I reconnected the plugs; the jump seat area was still disassembled; the jump seats were still removed; and most of the upper deck area above the structural repair was still disassembled. The aircraft was parked in the run-up area with no power available and in no condition for power; so systems operational checks could not be made.I updated the aircraft logbook to reflect reconnection of the four plugs. It was later cleared by another supporting shop and a required inspection item (rii) performed without mention or documentation of systems operational checks. This was discovered three days later and the aircraft was [grounded] for systems operational checks. I believe that the original item to remove the four plugs to facilitate the structural repair should not have been made within the discrepancy of the structural repair; but as a separate item in the logbook. Entering the action to include other maintenance within the structural repair discrepancy caused a communications gap between multiple specialty shops; thus the assumption that operational checks were accomplished. Separating the action for [the electrical connectors] would have kept the action within the same supporting shop; keeping a constant flow of communication; preventing confusion as to which operational checks have been accomplished.I recommend a separate logbook entry for each item not specific to the intended repair. Also; the airbus swpm is not clear about required operational checks for general installation of circular connectors. It is; however; clear in the electrical inspection section. This may have caused the lack of communication/documentation that checks were required. I recommend that the airbus swpm be amended to specifically note the requirement of operational checks in both locations of chapter 20-44-10 and 20-52-10.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Mechanic and Inspector report about their involvement with the reconnection and inspection of cannon plugs under the floorboard of a jump seat at cabin door 1-right on an A300 aircraft. An FAA Inspector noted the lack of any reference to an operational check having been accomplished for the electrical systems affected.

Narrative: I was tasked to re-assemble some wire bundles and disconnects that had been disconnected to facilitate other maintenance on an A300 aircraft. I re-secured four wire bundles into their respective sponge clamps and re-connected four disconnected plugs onto their respective receptacles. At the time I reconnected the plugs; the jump seat area was still disassembled; the jump seats were still removed; and most of the upper deck area above the structural repair was still disassembled. The aircraft was parked in the run-up area with no power available and in no condition for power; so systems operational checks could not be made.I updated the aircraft logbook to reflect reconnection of the four plugs. It was later cleared by another supporting shop and a required inspection item (RII) performed without mention or documentation of systems operational checks. This was discovered three days later and the aircraft was [grounded] for systems operational checks. I believe that the original item to remove the four plugs to facilitate the structural repair should not have been made within the discrepancy of the structural repair; but as a separate item in the logbook. Entering the action to include other maintenance within the structural repair discrepancy caused a communications gap between multiple specialty shops; thus the assumption that operational checks were accomplished. Separating the action for [the electrical connectors] would have kept the action within the same supporting shop; keeping a constant flow of communication; preventing confusion as to which operational checks have been accomplished.I recommend a separate logbook entry for each item not specific to the intended repair. Also; the Airbus SWPM is not clear about required operational checks for general installation of circular connectors. It is; however; clear in the electrical inspection section. This may have caused the lack of communication/documentation that checks were required. I recommend that the Airbus SWPM be amended to specifically note the requirement of operational checks in both locations of chapter 20-44-10 and 20-52-10.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.