Narrative:

After being cleared for a visual approach and then cleared to land tower. Advised another aircraft to taxi into position and hold. On approximately a 2 mi final tower advised us to expect a possible go around. We therefore maintained altitude and course and over the threshold of runway 1 we were told 'go around, enter left downwind runway 28, cleared to land.' on approximately a 2 mi final for runway 28, I observed an light transport on short final for runway 1. I asked my first officer to verify we were cleared to land. Tower confirmed we were cleared and then asked if we could hold short of runway 1. After advising tower it would be close, we were instructed to begin an immediate go around. We entered left downwind for runway 1 and landed normally. On the first go around tower was in error, by trying to hurry another departure. On the second go around tower made a terrible and possibly fatal error in allowing 2 aircraft to land on intersecting runways. No warning was given to either aircraft and a conflict was avoided by pilot awareness only! Once an aircraft has been cleared to land, that runway is his alone and he should be given priority. In this case, that rule was broken twice. In my opinion, tower controllers need to be constantly aware of aircraft flow and give priority to landing aircraft. This case could have been a very disastrous controller error. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter and first officer went immediately to director of operations who was on field at time of incident. Director called tower supervisor who said they would review tapes and let the crew know what happened. Supervisor said sounds like we need some training. They have not heard from him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWO GO AROUNDS, TWR PLANNING.

Narrative: AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND THEN CLRED TO LAND TWR. ADVISED ANOTHER ACFT TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. ON APPROX A 2 MI FINAL TWR ADVISED US TO EXPECT A POSSIBLE GO AROUND. WE THEREFORE MAINTAINED ALT AND COURSE AND OVER THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 1 WE WERE TOLD 'GO AROUND, ENTER LEFT DOWNWIND RWY 28, CLRED TO LAND.' ON APPROX A 2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 28, I OBSERVED AN LTT ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 1. I ASKED MY F/O TO VERIFY WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. TWR CONFIRMED WE WERE CLRED AND THEN ASKED IF WE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1. AFTER ADVISING TWR IT WOULD BE CLOSE, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN AN IMMEDIATE GO AROUND. WE ENTERED LEFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 1 AND LANDED NORMALLY. ON THE FIRST GO AROUND TWR WAS IN ERROR, BY TRYING TO HURRY ANOTHER DEP. ON THE SECOND GO AROUND TWR MADE A TERRIBLE AND POSSIBLY FATAL ERROR IN ALLOWING 2 ACFT TO LAND ON INTERSECTING RWYS. NO WARNING WAS GIVEN TO EITHER ACFT AND A CONFLICT WAS AVOIDED BY PLT AWARENESS ONLY! ONCE AN ACFT HAS BEEN CLRED TO LAND, THAT RWY IS HIS ALONE AND HE SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY. IN THIS CASE, THAT RULE WAS BROKEN TWICE. IN MY OPINION, TWR CTLRS NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY AWARE OF ACFT FLOW AND GIVE PRIORITY TO LNDG ACFT. THIS CASE COULD HAVE BEEN A VERY DISASTROUS CTLR ERROR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REPORTER AND F/O WENT IMMEDIATELY TO DIRECTOR OF OPS WHO WAS ON FIELD AT TIME OF INCIDENT. DIRECTOR CALLED TWR SUPVR WHO SAID THEY WOULD REVIEW TAPES AND LET THE CREW KNOW WHAT HAPPENED. SUPVR SAID SOUNDS LIKE WE NEED SOME TRNING. THEY HAVE NOT HEARD FROM HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.