Narrative:

While obtaining the IFR clearance for our flight we were assigned the la guardia two departure procedure; maspeth climb off runway 13; which requires an ATC climb of 900 ft per NM (14.8% climb gradient) to 1;500 ft MSL. I read back the clearance; and then I informed the lga clearance controller that we could fly the maspeth climb ground-track; but I couldn't guarantee compliance with the vertical profile (14.8% climb gradient). He mumbled something to the effect of; 'thanks for the information;' and that was the end of it; or so I thought. However; on taxi out (while holding short of runway 4/22); the ground controller instructed us to contact clearance delivery on another radio. When I called clearance (different clearance controller) we were given a completely new route; along with a new lga 2 departure procedure climb; the whitestone climb. We both heard; 'whitestone climb' I read back the clearance; with the lga 2 departure procedure; whitestone climb; and then I reprogrammed the FMS with the new route. Subsequently; we both reviewed the route; I briefed it and we departed runway 13. Both the maspeth and whitestone climbs have an initial right turn to a heading of 180 at 400 ft MSL. The maspeth climb has another right turn to a heading of 340 at the lga VOR 4.1 DME. The whitestone climb however; has a left turn to 040 at the lga VOR 2.5 DME; with a speed restriction of 210 KIAS until established on the 040 heading. I started my left turn at the 2.5 DME point; and hadn't gone very far when the departure controller asked us the dreaded; what are you doing? The captain was retracting the flaps (crj-900 flaps 20 take-off) and responded that we were on the whitestone climb. The controller asked if we were assigned the maspeth climb; and the captain responded that yes; initially we had been; but then later we were given a full route clearance with the whitestone climb just prior to departure. The controller continued to ask questions about the clearance while the captain was performing pilot not flying duties; and I was instructed by the controller to keep the turn tight; which I did. We were then given a new heading towards our revised route's initial fix. There was no mention to us of any loss of separation with traffic arriving jfk; however; the reaction of the departure controller indicated that something adverse was occurring.initially the captain and I believed that the whitestone climb was issued to us because I had told the original clearance controller that I couldn't guarantee compliance with the vertical profile (14.8% climb gradient). However; after the grilling we received from the new york TRACON controller; in retrospect; I believe that the second clearance controller may have either issued us the whitestone climb by mistake; or neglected to coordinate our revised clearance with the new york TRACON. If we were issued the whitestone climb as a result of not being able to guarantee compliance with the vertical profile required in the maspeth climb; then there is a serious breakdown in pilot and controller comprehension of the magnitude of the climb gradient required. I have never heard anybody else mention this issue on the lga clearance frequency; and based on the controllers' response to me; apparently they haven't either. As mentioned in a prior safety report on this subject; we have our engine-inoperative take-off paths (lateral and vertical profiles) which we fly in the event of an engine failure; but no data for all-engine climb requirements; as specified in the lga two departure procedure. This is an extremely untenable position in which pilots are placed. I am fairly certain that I can comply with the vast majority of these all-engine climb requirements; but I cannot state with certainty that I can comply with all of them; and believe that we need to be provided this data. The very next day; a similar situation occurred. I was the flying pilot; and once again we were assigned the lga 2 departure procedure with the maspeth climb off runway 13. I again advised the clearance controller that we were unable to guarantee compliance with the vertical profile; due to not having the associated climb data. Again; the controller was clearly surprised; and issued a couple of other clearances while he coordinated our response. The clearance controller told us to expect a different climb at departure time (same situation as the prior day). This time however; we were ready for it. Once again; just prior to crossing runway 4/22 we were given a revised climb clearance. We were told by the ground controller to fly the maspeth climb; but we would be exempted from the vertical profile requirement. Since were in a crj-700 versus a -900 (the day prior); we were departing runway 13 with flaps 8; not 20. Although we were exempted from the vertical profile; I decided to adjust the take-off profile to see if the aircraft could comply with the required climb gradient. The crj-700 aircraft weighed approximately 72;568 pounds at brake release; and the OAT was reported as 18C. Prior to departure; upon being re-assigned the maspeth climb; I briefed the following take-off profile. Due to the remnants of earlier storms; we performed a normal thrust take-off; and since the maspeth climb requires its climb gradient up to 1;500 ft; I briefed a delayed flap retraction until 1;500 ft MSL (versus the standard flap retraction; and acceleration height of 1;000 ft AGL). The captain timed the climb from main gear lift-off until the aircraft reached 1;500 ft; and it was approximately 45 seconds; which equates to a 2;000 ft/min average rate of climb. This is less than the 2;400 to 2;500 ft/min average rate of climb required to comply with the initial maspeth climb gradient of 900 ft per NM. Since the airplane's performance capability was insufficient to comply with the initial climb gradient; the take-off weight would have to be reduced to ensure compliance; or continued relief from the vertical profile will have to be obtained. The rest of the maspeth climb's vertical profile requires crossing the lga VOR R-220 at; and maintain; 5;000 ft. By accelerating to just 200 KIAS (slightly faster than vfs); after retracting the flaps; and continuing to climb to 5;000 ft at 200 KIAS; we were able to comply with the lga VOR R-220 crossing restriction.as previously identified; two possible solutions to this issue are (there may be others as well): 1) have each operator be required to develop/obtain all-engine climb performance data to ensure compliance with all-engine operating departure procedure and runway-specific departure climbs; or 2) have each operator be required to obtain a waiver from its local poi enabling continuing operations by stating that the carrier's engine-inoperative departure paths and procedures provide an equivalent level of safety. I don't believe a continuation of the status-quo of just ignoring ATC climb gradients is a viable option; either somebody is going to get hit with an altitude deviation; or traffic separation will be lost and the flight crew will get dinged; or worse; a potential collision hazard exists. In either case; something needs to be done to address this; as far 91.3(a) may state that the PIC is 'directly responsible for; and is the final authority as to; the operation of that aircraft;' but we all know that if the operator does not supply the PIC (and sic) with the data to comply with the safe operation of the aircraft; and ATC instructions; it's not the operator who takes the hit; it's the flight crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 First Officer believes that his aircraft cannot comply with the climb requirements of the LGA 2 with Maspeth climb and conveys the information to Clearance Delivery. A Whitestone climb is assigned and flown; but was not what Departure Control was expecting.

Narrative: While obtaining the IFR clearance for our flight we were assigned the La Guardia Two Departure Procedure; Maspeth climb off Runway 13; which requires an ATC climb of 900 FT per NM (14.8% climb gradient) to 1;500 FT MSL. I read back the clearance; and then I informed the LGA Clearance Controller that we could fly the Maspeth climb ground-track; but I couldn't guarantee compliance with the vertical profile (14.8% climb gradient). He mumbled something to the effect of; 'thanks for the information;' and that was the end of it; or so I thought. However; on taxi out (while holding short of Runway 4/22); the Ground Controller instructed us to contact Clearance Delivery on another radio. When I called Clearance (different Clearance Controller) we were given a completely new route; along with a new LGA 2 Departure Procedure climb; the Whitestone climb. We both heard; 'Whitestone climb' I read back the clearance; with the LGA 2 Departure Procedure; Whitestone climb; and then I reprogrammed the FMS with the new route. Subsequently; we both reviewed the route; I briefed it and we departed Runway 13. Both the Maspeth and Whitestone climbs have an initial right turn to a heading of 180 at 400 FT MSL. The Maspeth Climb has another right turn to a heading of 340 at the LGA VOR 4.1 DME. The Whitestone climb however; has a left turn to 040 at the LGA VOR 2.5 DME; with a speed restriction of 210 KIAS until established on the 040 heading. I started my LEFT turn at the 2.5 DME point; and hadn't gone very far when the Departure Controller asked us the dreaded; what are you doing? The Captain was retracting the flaps (CRJ-900 flaps 20 take-off) and responded that we were on the Whitestone climb. The Controller asked if we were assigned the Maspeth climb; and the Captain responded that yes; initially we had been; but then later we were given a full route clearance with the Whitestone climb just prior to departure. The Controller continued to ask questions about the clearance while the Captain was performing pilot not flying duties; and I was instructed by the Controller to keep the turn tight; which I did. We were then given a new heading towards our revised route's initial fix. There was no mention to us of any loss of separation with traffic arriving JFK; however; the reaction of the Departure Controller indicated that something adverse was occurring.Initially the Captain and I believed that the Whitestone climb was issued to us because I had told the original Clearance Controller that I couldn't guarantee compliance with the vertical profile (14.8% climb gradient). However; after the grilling we received from the New York TRACON Controller; in retrospect; I believe that the second Clearance Controller may have either issued us the Whitestone climb by mistake; or neglected to coordinate our revised clearance with the New York TRACON. If we were issued the Whitestone climb as a result of not being able to guarantee compliance with the vertical profile required in the Maspeth climb; then there is a serious breakdown in pilot and controller comprehension of the magnitude of the climb gradient required. I have never heard anybody else mention this issue on the LGA clearance frequency; and based on the Controllers' response to me; apparently they haven't either. As mentioned in a prior safety report on this subject; we have our engine-inoperative take-off paths (lateral and vertical profiles) which we fly in the event of an engine failure; but no data for all-engine climb requirements; as specified in the LGA Two Departure Procedure. This is an extremely untenable position in which pilots are placed. I am fairly certain that I can comply with the vast majority of these all-engine climb requirements; but I cannot state with certainty that I can comply with all of them; and believe that we need to be provided this data. The very next day; a similar situation occurred. I was the flying pilot; and once again we were assigned the LGA 2 Departure Procedure with the Maspeth climb off Runway 13. I again advised the Clearance Controller that we were unable to guarantee compliance with the vertical profile; due to not having the associated climb data. Again; the Controller was clearly surprised; and issued a couple of other clearances while he coordinated our response. The Clearance Controller told us to expect a different climb at departure time (same situation as the prior day). This time however; we were ready for it. Once again; just prior to crossing Runway 4/22 we were given a revised climb clearance. We were told by the Ground Controller to fly the Maspeth climb; but we would be exempted from the vertical profile requirement. Since were in a CRJ-700 versus a -900 (the day prior); we were departing Runway 13 with flaps 8; not 20. Although we were exempted from the vertical profile; I decided to adjust the take-off profile to see if the aircraft could comply with the required climb gradient. The CRJ-700 aircraft weighed approximately 72;568 LBS at brake release; and the OAT was reported as 18C. Prior to departure; upon being re-assigned the Maspeth climb; I briefed the following take-off profile. Due to the remnants of earlier storms; we performed a normal thrust take-off; and since the Maspeth climb requires its climb gradient up to 1;500 FT; I briefed a delayed flap retraction until 1;500 FT MSL (versus the standard flap retraction; and acceleration height of 1;000 FT AGL). The Captain timed the climb from main gear lift-off until the aircraft reached 1;500 FT; and it was approximately 45 seconds; which equates to a 2;000 FT/min average rate of climb. This is less than the 2;400 to 2;500 FT/min average rate of climb required to comply with the initial Maspeth climb gradient of 900 FT per NM. Since the airplane's performance capability was insufficient to comply with the initial climb gradient; the take-off weight would have to be reduced to ensure compliance; or continued relief from the vertical profile will have to be obtained. The rest of the Maspeth climb's vertical profile requires crossing the LGA VOR R-220 at; and maintain; 5;000 FT. By accelerating to just 200 KIAS (slightly faster than VFS); after retracting the flaps; and continuing to climb to 5;000 FT at 200 KIAS; we were able to comply with the LGA VOR R-220 crossing restriction.As previously identified; two possible solutions to this issue are (there may be others as well): 1) Have each operator be required to develop/obtain all-engine climb performance data to ensure compliance with all-engine operating Departure Procedure and runway-specific departure climbs; or 2) Have each operator be required to obtain a waiver from its local POI enabling continuing operations by stating that the carrier's engine-inoperative departure paths and procedures provide an equivalent level of safety. I don't believe a continuation of the status-quo of just ignoring ATC climb gradients is a viable option; either somebody is going to get hit with an altitude deviation; or traffic separation will be lost and the flight crew will get dinged; or worse; a potential collision hazard exists. In either case; something needs to be done to address this; as FAR 91.3(a) may state that the PIC is 'directly responsible for; and is the final authority as to; the operation of that aircraft;' but we all know that if the operator does not supply the PIC (and SIC) with the data to comply with the safe operation of the aircraft; and ATC instructions; it's not the operator who takes the hit; it's the flight crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.