Narrative:

During a normal takeoff; when gear was selected up; a system hydraulic quantity and pressure went to zero. The right main landing gear down and locked light extinguished momentarily and then came back on; along with the landing gear unlocked light. The nose and left landing gear down and locked lights never extinguished. We elected to put the gear handle back to the down position. After climbing to our initially cleared altitude of 4;000 ft MSL; checking in with ATC; and turning to the south/southeast; we informed them that we had lost all of our main system hydraulic fluid. We began running the checklists for loss of a hydraulic system fluid. During the running of the checklist by the non-flying pilot in the right seat; we determined that a control transfer was required in order to locate the hydr B/ptu cont circuit breaker. During this time; there were also numerous calls from ATC regarding the choice of divert fields available; which delayed our locating the circuit breaker long enough that a hydraulic O'temp B cas message came up. In hind sight; this should have been expected; but this message; along with a slight odor in the cockpit from the leaking fluid; became a deciding factor in declaring an emergency and making the decision to head for the AFB about 35 miles to the southeast. At that time; we had not reached the part of the checklist where we calculated our landing distance. We knew we would need a longer runway and nothing that we saw around us; nor anything that ATC offered was over 7;000 ft; and prior to running the checklist and calculating the landing distance; that sounded like a good minimum number. At that time; we also sent a very short message to the company that read something like; 'a hyd fluid loss.' as we were completing the checklist; we were in the area of the AFB and had descended to 3;000 ft and joined a right downwind. At this point; the cockpit flight phone rang. Initially I ignored it in order to complete the checklist; but then; just to silence the loud ringing; I answered the phone to hear the on duty assistant chief pilot calling. After informing him of our situation and that we were in the pattern; I hung up so that we could complete the precautionary landing. We brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway and were subsequently towed clear. As far as lessons learned; there were several factors that are related to distractions and task management that should be brought up. First; I could have done a better job of dividing up the duties regarding ATC communications and setting up the FMS. Second; it was my decision that there was not enough time to call the assistant chief pilot. I certainly did not need to receive a phone call from the assistant chief pilot as we were arriving at our divert field and completing the final steps of our checklist. The cessna QRH; unlike some of the other aircraft I've flown; does not provide any information to help locate the critical circuit breakers in a procedure. This would have had a significant effect on time management/task management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE750 Captain experienced a hydraulic failure just after lift off preventing gear retraction. The HYD B/PTU CONT circuit breaker is not pulled per the QRH in a timely manor due to difficulty locating; resulting in a HYD B overheat. The decision was made to divert to a nearby AFB for its long runway.

Narrative: During a normal takeoff; when gear was selected up; A system hydraulic quantity and pressure went to zero. The right main landing gear down and locked light extinguished momentarily and then came back on; along with the landing gear unlocked light. The nose and left landing gear down and locked lights never extinguished. We elected to put the gear handle back to the down position. After climbing to our initially cleared altitude of 4;000 FT MSL; checking in with ATC; and turning to the south/southeast; we informed them that we had lost all of our main system hydraulic fluid. We began running the checklists for loss of A Hydraulic System fluid. During the running of the checklist by the non-flying pilot in the right seat; we determined that a control transfer was required in order to locate the HYDR B/PTU CONT circuit breaker. During this time; there were also numerous calls from ATC regarding the choice of divert fields available; which delayed our locating the circuit breaker long enough that a HYD O'TEMP B CAS message came up. In hind sight; this should have been expected; but this message; along with a slight odor in the cockpit from the leaking fluid; became a deciding factor in declaring an emergency and making the decision to head for the AFB about 35 miles to the southeast. At that time; we had not reached the part of the checklist where we calculated our landing distance. We knew we would need a longer runway and nothing that we saw around us; nor anything that ATC offered was over 7;000 FT; and prior to running the checklist and calculating the landing distance; that sounded like a good minimum number. At that time; we also sent a very short message to the company that read something like; 'A Hyd fluid loss.' As we were completing the checklist; we were in the area of the AFB and had descended to 3;000 FT and joined a right downwind. At this point; the cockpit flight phone rang. Initially I ignored it in order to complete the checklist; but then; just to silence the loud ringing; I answered the phone to hear the on duty Assistant Chief Pilot calling. After informing him of our situation and that we were in the pattern; I hung up so that we could complete the precautionary landing. We brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway and were subsequently towed clear. As far as lessons learned; there were several factors that are related to distractions and task management that should be brought up. First; I could have done a better job of dividing up the duties regarding ATC communications and setting up the FMS. Second; it was my decision that there was not enough time to call the Assistant Chief Pilot. I certainly did not need to receive a phone call from the Assistant Chief Pilot as we were arriving at our divert field and completing the final steps of our checklist. The Cessna QRH; unlike some of the other aircraft I've flown; does not provide any information to help locate the critical circuit breakers in a procedure. This would have had a significant effect on time management/task management.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.