Narrative:

I was in my C140 performing takeoff and landing practice in the pattern for runway 15 at my home airport. A citabria with an instructor and student were also in the runway 15 pattern performing training. We had both made a couple of takeoffs and landings and were halfway apart from each other in the pattern. A high wing single engine cessna was practicing an ILS instrument approach to runway 33 out on the procedure turn seven miles out. It was a VFR day with good visibility. It was a great day for flying. All three of us were making normal position reports on the radio. I was on left base for runway 15 and after my 'left base 15' radio call I heard the practice instrument traffic report that they were inbound of the final approach fix for a practice ILS approach. I keyed the mic and asked; 'how will this approach terminate?' they came back saying that they were planning to execute a low approach and then asked if I thought there would be a conflict between our two aircraft; mine on left base for 15 and theirs inbound of the FAF on the ILS. I am an instrument rated pilot and familiar with the ILS 33 approach. It was good visibility and the ILS traffic had their landing light on making them quite visible. Typically when there is other traffic in the pattern for 15 the practice instrument traffic on 33 will break off the approach at the 500 ft circle to land minimums and then execute either the missed approach procedure; climb and then turn right back to the holding fix; or will enter the pattern for a circle to land. This is what I expected them to do based upon the call of 'low approach'. This was an incorrect assumption on my part! By my estimate of our positions I would be on the runway on the roll of my touch-and-go while they would be over the numbers 33; which is more than a mile away; and executing a climbing right turn back to the holding fix. That seemed a safe separation. We were talking and coordinating actions. I responded that if they were doing a low approach then I didn't think there would be a problem of conflict between us. And with that we both continued doing what we were doing. My touch-and-go landing was uneventful and I stayed on the roll on my main wheels. I kept the opposite direction ILS traffic in sight at all times. I saw the other aircraft proceeded lower and continue the approach lower than I expected. For several seconds I was in denial; surely they weren't going to actually land opposite direction. We had been talking and they had reported that they were performing a low approach. I expected they would be no lower than the circle to land minimums and would turn right for the missed approach. But it looked to me like they were now continuing on for a landing. At this point I was about five feet off the runway. Many possible scenarios flashed through my head. I might have chopped the power and landed to a full stop but if they continued and landed in front of me then that would put us together in the middle of the runway and me without a lot of options. I decided I should continue flying so that I could maneuver away but stay as low as possible expecting them to eventually climb and turn right. I started a sidestep to the right and then I became concerned that they might break off with a non-standard left turn since sometimes practice runway 33 instrument traffic will do that to avoid the left hand pattern traffic of runway 15. If they did that then that would put us into a serious conflict situation. Some more seconds passed and I had sidestepped off the right side of the runway and climbed to about twenty feet to ensure that I would clear the windsock but I was determined to stay as low as possible in order to give altitude separation between us when they eventually climbed away as I was sure they would do. But they were now well below 100 feet AGL and were potentially landing on the runway. Eventually I saw them suddenly bank hard right and start climbing. By that sharp action I would guess that is when they saw me. We passed each other in opposite directions off of our left sides with me at 25 ft AGL and the other aircraft about 25 ft above my altitude and 150 ft away with each of us on opposite sites of the 100 ft wide runway. I continued to keep sight of them since now we would both be making climbing turns toward each other and could be another potential conflict later. Upon making my 'left crosswind 15' radio call I told the practice instrument traffic that I had expected them to do something different than they had done and that had undoubtedly contributed to our close pass. I received two mic clicks in response and nothing more from them. I made a normal pattern and landing and put the airplane into the hanger. Even though we were on the radio and talking it didn't mean that we were communicating. And I imagine that inside the cockpit of the other aircraft the same situation applied between the pilot training and the safety pilot. I expected them to do something other than what they were doing. In later reflection upon the call 'low approach' I realize that it is a very non-specific call and could mean any of a number of things and not necessarily what I thought it would be at the time. Upon reflection I now realize that they had probably always intended to shoot the approach to minimums but were only intending not to actually touch down. If I had realized this I would have made different decisions. This misunderstanding on my part led me to accept the situation and allowed us to come to close proximity even though we were both talking and saying what we thought was appropriate and in visual contact. I then was in denial about the situation for several seconds. I imagine they thought I was either doing something different from what I was doing or that I was in a different location in the pattern. They may have confused my aircraft on the base leg with the citabria in the pattern on the crosswind leg and thought that they had the runway clear for them. I did keep them in sight at all times and was determined to avoid them but in retrospect I imagine they did not have my airplane in sight until the last moment. When I started to see the situation develop I should have keyed the mic immediately and coordinated with them again to ensure that we each knew what the other was doing. I should have turned on my landing light to increase my visibility. I should be more vigilant when sharing airport operations with several different aircraft. I had become complacent with 'the way things normally work' here and then didn't react quickly enough when things became abnormal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C140 pilot reported a NMAC with an practice instrument approach aircraft whose pilot was talking on CTAF with two other pilots and did a low approach on the opposite direction runway as one of two pattern aircraft was taking off.

Narrative: I was in my C140 performing takeoff and landing practice in the pattern for Runway 15 at my home airport. A Citabria with an instructor and student were also in the Runway 15 pattern performing training. We had both made a couple of takeoffs and landings and were halfway apart from each other in the pattern. A high wing single engine Cessna was practicing an ILS instrument approach to Runway 33 out on the procedure turn seven miles out. It was a VFR day with good visibility. It was a great day for flying. All three of us were making normal position reports on the radio. I was on left base for Runway 15 and after my 'left base 15' radio call I heard the practice instrument traffic report that they were inbound of the final approach fix for a practice ILS approach. I keyed the mic and asked; 'How will this approach terminate?' They came back saying that they were planning to execute a low approach and then asked if I thought there would be a conflict between our two aircraft; mine on left base for 15 and theirs inbound of the FAF on the ILS. I am an instrument rated pilot and familiar with the ILS 33 approach. It was good visibility and the ILS traffic had their landing light on making them quite visible. Typically when there is other traffic in the pattern for 15 the practice instrument traffic on 33 will break off the approach at the 500 FT circle to land minimums and then execute either the missed approach procedure; climb and then turn right back to the holding fix; or will enter the pattern for a circle to land. This is what I expected them to do based upon the call of 'low approach'. This was an incorrect assumption on my part! By my estimate of our positions I would be on the runway on the roll of my touch-and-go while they would be over the numbers 33; which is more than a mile away; and executing a climbing right turn back to the holding fix. That seemed a safe separation. We were talking and coordinating actions. I responded that if they were doing a low approach then I didn't think there would be a problem of conflict between us. And with that we both continued doing what we were doing. My touch-and-go landing was uneventful and I stayed on the roll on my main wheels. I kept the opposite direction ILS traffic in sight at all times. I saw the other aircraft proceeded lower and continue the approach lower than I expected. For several seconds I was in denial; surely they weren't going to actually land opposite direction. We had been talking and they had reported that they were performing a low approach. I expected they would be no lower than the circle to land minimums and would turn right for the missed approach. But it looked to me like they were now continuing on for a landing. At this point I was about five feet off the runway. Many possible scenarios flashed through my head. I might have chopped the power and landed to a full stop but if they continued and landed in front of me then that would put us together in the middle of the runway and me without a lot of options. I decided I should continue flying so that I could maneuver away but stay as low as possible expecting them to eventually climb and turn right. I started a sidestep to the right and then I became concerned that they might break off with a non-standard left turn since sometimes practice Runway 33 instrument traffic will do that to avoid the left hand pattern traffic of Runway 15. If they did that then that would put us into a serious conflict situation. Some more seconds passed and I had sidestepped off the right side of the runway and climbed to about twenty feet to ensure that I would clear the windsock but I was determined to stay as low as possible in order to give altitude separation between us when they eventually climbed away as I was sure they would do. But they were now well below 100 feet AGL and were potentially landing on the runway. Eventually I saw them suddenly bank hard right and start climbing. By that sharp action I would guess that is when they saw me. We passed each other in opposite directions off of our left sides with me at 25 FT AGL and the other aircraft about 25 FT above my altitude and 150 FT away with each of us on opposite sites of the 100 FT wide runway. I continued to keep sight of them since now we would both be making climbing turns toward each other and could be another potential conflict later. Upon making my 'left crosswind 15' radio call I told the practice instrument traffic that I had expected them to do something different than they had done and that had undoubtedly contributed to our close pass. I received two mic clicks in response and nothing more from them. I made a normal pattern and landing and put the airplane into the hanger. Even though we were on the radio and talking it didn't mean that we were communicating. And I imagine that inside the cockpit of the other aircraft the same situation applied between the pilot training and the safety pilot. I expected them to do something other than what they were doing. In later reflection upon the call 'low approach' I realize that it is a very non-specific call and could mean any of a number of things and not necessarily what I thought it would be at the time. Upon reflection I now realize that they had probably always intended to shoot the approach to minimums but were only intending not to actually touch down. If I had realized this I would have made different decisions. This misunderstanding on my part led me to accept the situation and allowed us to come to close proximity even though we were both talking and saying what we thought was appropriate and in visual contact. I then was in denial about the situation for several seconds. I imagine they thought I was either doing something different from what I was doing or that I was in a different location in the pattern. They may have confused my aircraft on the base leg with the Citabria in the pattern on the crosswind leg and thought that they had the runway clear for them. I did keep them in sight at all times and was determined to avoid them but in retrospect I imagine they did not have my airplane in sight until the last moment. When I started to see the situation develop I should have keyed the mic immediately and coordinated with them again to ensure that we each knew what the other was doing. I should have turned on my landing light to increase my visibility. I should be more vigilant when sharing airport operations with several different aircraft. I had become complacent with 'the way things normally work' here and then didn't react quickly enough when things became abnormal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.