Narrative:

In preparing for this flight we must review approximately 6-8' of computer printout with all the various required data. (This is typical.) on this, in the field report section, a temporary airport analysis for cle (point of landing) was idented. This is down by 'taa 8809 in effect,' buried in text. I missed this bit of data while reviewing the flight papers, as did the captain. This is my only notification that something abnormal exists. I must manually pull this up on the computer in addition to the normal flight papers. Since we missed the note on the field report, we didn't have the temporary airport analysis. We departed ord for cle. When the flight engineer copied the cle ATIS, he failed to note that the first 1800' of runway 05R was closed. (This 1800' closure is the reason for the temporary airport analysts.) we landed on runway 05R not knowing the first 1800' were closed. The actual point of T/D was approximately the 1800' point. As we landed we noticed displaced threshold. The marking was not as I'm used to seeing for a displaced threshold. There were no markings on the closed portion, except the normal marking of an open full length ILS runway. I didn't think any more of the runway marking till I pulled up the paperwork for our departure approximately 1 hour later. Upon pulling up the paperwork for our departure from cle I first noticed this temporary airport analysis (it appears in a very different way on the paperwork for departure in the takeoff data that you can't miss it). At this point I retraced our arrival to cle with respect to this temporary airport analysis in 20/20 hindsight. The temporary airport analysis for runway 05R at cle specifies that for landing consult the airport analysis for cle. (The first officer carries this as his flight equipment.) this data makes no provision for landing on runway 05R with the first 1800' closed. Thus we landed on a runway which we had no landing data. A number of errors were made here. Several things could have helped avoid this event, such as better paperwork format, more vigilant reading, better listening or more paint on the runway. What is most important is that this event displays how easily a comedy of errors can occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAILED TO NOTE FIRST 1800' RWY 5R CLOSED. LANDED AT THE 1800' POINT.

Narrative: IN PREPARING FOR THIS FLT WE MUST REVIEW APPROX 6-8' OF COMPUTER PRINTOUT WITH ALL THE VARIOUS REQUIRED DATA. (THIS IS TYPICAL.) ON THIS, IN THE FIELD RPT SECTION, A TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSIS FOR CLE (POINT OF LNDG) WAS IDENTED. THIS IS DOWN BY 'TAA 8809 IN EFFECT,' BURIED IN TEXT. I MISSED THIS BIT OF DATA WHILE REVIEWING THE FLT PAPERS, AS DID THE CAPT. THIS IS MY ONLY NOTIFICATION THAT SOMETHING ABNORMAL EXISTS. I MUST MANUALLY PULL THIS UP ON THE COMPUTER IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL FLT PAPERS. SINCE WE MISSED THE NOTE ON THE FIELD RPT, WE DIDN'T HAVE THE TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSIS. WE DEPARTED ORD FOR CLE. WHEN THE FE COPIED THE CLE ATIS, HE FAILED TO NOTE THAT THE FIRST 1800' OF RWY 05R WAS CLOSED. (THIS 1800' CLOSURE IS THE REASON FOR THE TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSTS.) WE LANDED ON RWY 05R NOT KNOWING THE FIRST 1800' WERE CLOSED. THE ACTUAL POINT OF T/D WAS APPROX THE 1800' POINT. AS WE LANDED WE NOTICED DISPLACED THRESHOLD. THE MARKING WAS NOT AS I'M USED TO SEEING FOR A DISPLACED THRESHOLD. THERE WERE NO MARKINGS ON THE CLOSED PORTION, EXCEPT THE NORMAL MARKING OF AN OPEN FULL LENGTH ILS RWY. I DIDN'T THINK ANY MORE OF THE RWY MARKING TILL I PULLED UP THE PAPERWORK FOR OUR DEP APPROX 1 HR LATER. UPON PULLING UP THE PAPERWORK FOR OUR DEP FROM CLE I FIRST NOTICED THIS TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSIS (IT APPEARS IN A VERY DIFFERENT WAY ON THE PAPERWORK FOR DEP IN THE TKOF DATA THAT YOU CAN'T MISS IT). AT THIS POINT I RETRACED OUR ARR TO CLE WITH RESPECT TO THIS TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSIS IN 20/20 HINDSIGHT. THE TEMPORARY ARPT ANALYSIS FOR RWY 05R AT CLE SPECIFIES THAT FOR LNDG CONSULT THE ARPT ANALYSIS FOR CLE. (THE F/O CARRIES THIS AS HIS FLT EQUIP.) THIS DATA MAKES NO PROVISION FOR LNDG ON RWY 05R WITH THE FIRST 1800' CLOSED. THUS WE LANDED ON A RWY WHICH WE HAD NO LNDG DATA. A NUMBER OF ERRORS WERE MADE HERE. SEVERAL THINGS COULD HAVE HELPED AVOID THIS EVENT, SUCH AS BETTER PAPERWORK FORMAT, MORE VIGILANT READING, BETTER LISTENING OR MORE PAINT ON THE RWY. WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THIS EVENT DISPLAYS HOW EASILY A COMEDY OF ERRORS CAN OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.