Narrative:

The evening flight to dtw began and remained uneventful until when we were approximately 1-2 miles outside tigrz intersection at 6;000 ft already established on the localizer for 21L at dtw. The clearance from approach control several miles back was 'cleared for the ILS 21L maintain 6;000 ft till tigrz'. Afcs was fully coupled with the 'approach' mode armed; everything normal until the captain's glide slope came alive prior to mine. I was not as alarmed as the captain was with the 'maintain 6;000 ft till tigrz' clearance since the afcs would capture my glide slope signal on first officer side allowing in my opinion 'adequate' crossing margins at 6;000 ft over tigrz. However; I was prepared to take action as flying pilot had the crossing altitude been compromised in any way. Suddenly the captain elected to reach up and select 'navigation' mode to prevent 'glide slope' capture and also pressed 'altitude' mode. Surprised by his action I now 'believed' that there was something more going on than I was aware of or missing. Having looked up to see what he had done I allowed myself to become distracted (first mistake on 'my' part). I wanted to confirm what modes he had selected and why specifically 'altitude' since my glide slope was still nearly 1 dot from capturing. By this time we realized the aircraft was turning right and was already to the right of course. The captain said 'disengage' the autopilot which I did; turned back on course; and got reestablished on the localizer using 'navigation' mode with 'flight director'. Inside tigrz I now began to descend to recapture the glide slope from above which I did manually with raw data. At this point I called for 'approach' mode. I'm not 100% certain after the fact whether or not the request for 'autopilot' was made but did not verify it using the 'FMA' (second mistake on 'my' part). Hands on the controls still; I continued flying the aircraft to the flight director believing the 'approach' mode was armed. It was not. Turns out 'vs' mode was armed adequately to track the glide slope. However 'heading' mode was armed with the heading bug set to the right of course. Following incorrect lateral commands manually this time the aircraft was off course to the right at an altitude of approximately 5;500 ft while on the glide slope. The captain said 'disengage the auto pilot turn back on course.' attempts were made to do exactly that from both sides with no cavalry sound indicating it's disengaging. Now feeling heavy resistance on the control wheel thinking the autopilot actually had control and would not disengage I looked over and saw the captain's left hand firmly on the control wheel leading me to believe that was the reason for the heavy resistance feeling controls and confirming 'auto pilot' not engaged on the 'pfd'. As I was returning back on course now for the second time during this approach the final controller was trying to reach us and asked us if we had a problem. The captain replied 'we were fighting with the autopilot.' ATC asked if we had the airport in sight; the captain answered yes; ATC then cleared us for the visual approach to 21L switch to tower now with no mention of any traffic conflict. I continued visually and upon receiving landing clearance from the tower landed the aircraft without further incident. Knowing the captain for some time now and having worked with him on several occasions I have the utmost respect for his professionalism and standardization and work very well with him and this event does not change those thoughts. I also know my own abilities; experience and am very standard when performing my duties. I am gratefully the outcome was how it turned out without conflict. This was a perfect example of how things can go when both crew members lose standardization; when tired or overloaded with radio calls or becoming fixated on one thing only. I believe had no changes been made to the flight control panel initially by the captain all would have turned out fine. However that isnot the case. In dealing with the events which followed that decision had we both communicated more clearly than we did and been more standard in our actions or inactions clearly referring to flight mode selection on the flight control panel while hand flying. The captain should have been controlling the flight modes more accurately to my requests and I should have been verifying that they actually were activated and taken more decisive action sooner. Had those items been handled better this all could have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier First Officer; as pilot flying; described a conflict while on a DTW Runway 21L ILS after the fatigued crew CRM failed and the Captain as non flying pilot failed to follow the flying pilot's automation requests.

Narrative: The evening flight to DTW began and remained uneventful until when we were approximately 1-2 miles outside TIGRZ Intersection at 6;000 FT already established on the Localizer for 21L at DTW. The clearance from Approach Control several miles back was 'cleared for the ILS 21L maintain 6;000 FT till TIGRZ'. AFCS was fully coupled with the 'APPROACH' mode armed; everything normal until the Captain's glide slope came alive prior to mine. I was not as alarmed as the Captain was with the 'maintain 6;000 FT till TIGRZ' clearance since the AFCS would capture my glide slope signal on First Officer side allowing in my opinion 'adequate' crossing margins at 6;000 FT over TIGRZ. However; I was prepared to take action as flying pilot had the crossing altitude been compromised in any way. Suddenly the Captain elected to reach up and select 'NAV' mode to prevent 'glide slope' capture and also pressed 'ALT' mode. Surprised by his action I now 'believed' that there was something more going on than I was aware of or missing. Having looked up to see what he had done I allowed myself to become distracted (first mistake on 'my' part). I wanted to confirm what modes he had selected and why specifically 'ALT' since my glide slope was still nearly 1 dot from capturing. By this time we realized the aircraft was turning right and was already to the right of course. The Captain said 'disengage' the autopilot which I did; turned back on course; and got reestablished on the localizer using 'NAV' mode with 'FLIGHT DIRECTOR'. Inside TIGRZ I now began to descend to recapture the glide slope from above which I did manually with raw data. At this point I called for 'APPROACH' mode. I'm not 100% certain after the fact whether or not the request for 'AUTOPILOT' was made but did not verify it using the 'FMA' (second mistake on 'my' part). Hands on the controls still; I continued flying the aircraft to the flight director believing the 'APPROACH' mode was armed. IT WAS NOT. Turns out 'VS' mode was armed adequately to track the glide slope. However 'HDG' mode was armed with the heading bug set to the right of course. Following incorrect lateral commands manually this time the aircraft was off course to the right at an altitude of approximately 5;500 FT while on the glide slope. The Captain said 'Disengage the auto pilot turn back on course.' Attempts were made to do exactly that from both sides with no cavalry sound indicating it's disengaging. Now feeling heavy resistance on the control wheel thinking the autopilot actually had control and would not disengage I looked over and saw the Captain's left hand FIRMLY on the control wheel leading me to believe that was the reason for the HEAVY RESISTANCE feeling controls and confirming 'auto pilot' not engaged on the 'PFD'. As I was returning back on course now for the second time during this approach the Final Controller was trying to reach us and asked us if we had a problem. The Captain replied 'we were fighting with the autopilot.' ATC asked if we had the airport in sight; the Captain answered yes; ATC then cleared us for the visual approach to 21L switch to Tower now with no mention of any traffic conflict. I continued visually and upon receiving landing clearance from the Tower landed the aircraft without further incident. Knowing the Captain for some time now and having worked with him on several occasions I have the utmost respect for his professionalism and standardization and work very well with him and this event does not change those thoughts. I also know my own abilities; experience and am very standard when performing my duties. I am gratefully the outcome was how it turned out without conflict. This was a perfect example of how things can go when BOTH crew members lose standardization; when TIRED or overloaded with radio calls or becoming fixated on one thing only. I believe had no changes been made to the flight control panel initially by the Captain all would have turned out fine. However that isnot the case. In dealing with the events which followed that decision had we BOTH communicated more clearly than we did and been more standard in our actions or inactions clearly referring to flight mode selection on the flight control panel while hand flying. The Captain should have been controlling the flight modes more accurately to my requests and I should have been verifying that they actually were activated and taken more decisive action sooner. Had those items been handled better this all could have been avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.