B737 flight crew reports planning a flaps 5 deaprture from sna and inadvertently setting flaps 1. Th...

Attributes
ACN	952628
Time
Date	201106
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	SNA.Airport
State Reference	CA
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Flying
Person 2
Function	Pilot Not Flying Captain
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Weight And Balance

Narrative:

I was pilot flying. We talked at length about load; thrust rating; flap setting at the gate. We pushed and were at the hold point with brakes set. Captain called for flaps and I inadvertently set to 1 instead of 5. Five was in FMS and on the plan. I briefed the plan to captain; but since it was pulled from ACARS; missed the flaps verification I usually do. When running the mechanical checklist; apparently flipped the flaps switch at the same time as takeoff data and bugs because neither the captain nor I remember responding to it (after the event). We were not rushed at all; but it was my first time into sna. On climbout; I called for flaps 1 and we both realized that we had taken off with flaps 1 27K instead of flaps 5. We didn't notice an unusually long takeoff roll. An unrelated event after the fact was there was a soaring bird over the runway about 100 ft that we had to shallow the climb to avoid hitting.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reports planning a flaps 5 deaprture from SNA and inadvertently setting flaps 1. This is not discovered until the First Officer calls for flaps 1 after takeoff and found to be already there.

Narrative: I was pilot flying. We talked at length about load; thrust rating; flap setting at the gate. We pushed and were at the hold point with brakes set. Captain called for flaps and I inadvertently set to 1 instead of 5. Five was in FMS and on the plan. I briefed the plan to Captain; but since it was pulled from ACARS; missed the flaps verification I usually do. When running the mechanical checklist; apparently flipped the flaps switch at the same time as takeoff data and bugs because neither the Captain nor I remember responding to it (after the event). We were not rushed at all; but it was my first time into SNA. On climbout; I called for flaps 1 and we both realized that we had taken off with flaps 1 27K instead of flaps 5. We didn't notice an unusually long takeoff roll. An unrelated event after the fact was there was a soaring bird over the runway about 100 FT that we had to shallow the climb to avoid hitting.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

B737 flight crew reports planning a flaps 5 deaprture from sna and inadvertently setting flaps 1. This is not discovered until the first officer calls for flaps 1 after takeoff and found to be already there.